Section VII
History (Political, Social, and Economic)

32

TRADE LINKS IN THE EASTERN HINDU KUSH: THE CHITRAL ROUTE

*Hermann Kreutzmann**

Introduction

Approaching Chitral, the present-day visitor is confronted with the cul-de-sac situation of one of the largest districts of Pakistan. Chitral's communication and traffic links are virtually reduced to only one major road connecting Chitral with Peshawar. This circumstance is especially felt during the cold season from October to May when the Loari Top (3118 m) is practically impassable. A number of enterprises have been envisaged to link Chitral and its dispersed villages with modern traffic infrastructure. The Kunar Valley Road could be an alternative all-year-long approach from the south, but it crosses through Afghan territory. Presently this road is not safe for all kinds of traffic. Plans for a tunnel underneath the Loari Top are regularly discussed; drilling started in the 1970s but came to a sudden halt shortly afterwards and was never commenced since. The strategic importance of the Lutkoh valley for the supplies of Afghan *mujahiddeen* (holy warriors) has improved the traffic infrastructure towards the Dora Pass. The Shandur Pass Road is presently upgraded and different contractors—national and international—are involved in sections of this corridor, which eventually could provide Chitral with a truckable connection leading to the Karakoram Highway (KKH). Nevertheless, the present situation seems to be a reflex on Chitral's strategic position within international boundaries contiguous to neighbours of different political alliances. In this study, it is attempted to draw attention to a certain historical period prior to the closure of international boundaries and the introduction of motorized traffic when Chitral commanded a trade corridor for commerce with Central Asia.

Central Asian Trade Competition and Routes of Exchange in the Nineteenth Century

During the 'great game' played between Russian and British diplomats, special attention was directed towards regions outside their direct sphere of control such as the urban oases of Kashgaria, where a strong competition for market domination arose. Access to these Chinese-dominated cities and turntables of Central Asian trade was easier from the Russian railhead at Andijan than from British India. The mountain barrier of the Hindu Kush, Karakoram, and the Himalayas posed a major obstacle to modern traffic, that is, railways, in the second half of the nineteenth century. From the end of those lines caravan trade based on mules, horses, camels, and human porterage was the only feasible option. The distance between Andijan and Kashgar could be covered in twelve marches by crossing only the Terek Dawan (3870 m).

* Institute of Geography, University of Bonn, Germany.

Trade caravans from British India were channelled through three routes. All of them were much longer and involved the hardship of crossing major mountain passes. The longest but most important route was the Leh corridor, involving fifty marches between Srinagar and Yarkand by covering a total distance of 1706 kilometres from the railhead in Rawalpindi to Kashgar. Five passes above 5000 metres had to be crossed in addition to numerous river fordings. The caravans needed to carry fodder and supplies for fourteen consecutive marches. Reaching for the same destination, the route via Gilgit was much shorter. The 1335 kilometre -long sector afforded only twenty-nine marches between Gilgit and Kashgar and the passage of two passes of minor difficulty. Problems abounded in the Hunza valley, where frequent fording of rivers and difficult passages along the notorious hanging paths restricted the volume of trade. This route regularly imposed heavy losses on the traders. Meagre resources on route resulted in shortages in fodder supply, but one of the biggest problems was the extraordinarily high demand in toll taxes and grazing fees by the rulers of Hunza and Nager. Their cupidity affected the reputation of this trade corridor as well. The Chitral route remained the shortest thoroughfare of all by covering a distance of 1169 kilometes between Peshawar and Kashgar. Here the major uncertainty was the dependence on good relations with Afghanistan as the territory of the neighbouring country had to be crossed on the route to and from Central Asia (cf. Harris 1971). This feature proved to be a shortcoming and created many reservations by traders and administrators.

Assets and Constraints of the Chitral Route

On the route via Chitral the railhead at Dargai was the starting point for British Indian goods on their journey towards Kashgar. It took forty marches for mule and/or horse caravans to cover the distance. From Chitral Bazaar, the valley was followed north and in Mastuj the route turned up the Yarkhun River (cf. Younghusband 1894, 1895). Crossing the Boroghil Pass (3807 m) on the border with Afghanistan the caravans proceeded to Sarhad-e-Wakhan. Here, the Wakhan and Chitral routes united. In the direction of Kashgar, the traders proceeded through the Pamir-e-Khurd (Little Pamir) and crossed Kirghiz grazing grounds towards the Wakhjir Pass (4923 m) where they left the Afghan-controlled Wakhan Corridor. Entering the Taghdumbash Pamir and Chinese territory, the Chitral route linked up with the one from Gilgit. From Mintaka Aghzi in the Kara Chukur valley both continued via Tashkurgan to Kashgar and Yarkand respectively. The Chitral route proved to be faster than the Gilgit and Leh routes by a span of two days to nearly three weeks.

Depending on favourable political relations with Afghanistan, the narrow transit sector posed a vulnerable trading corridor. Between 1897 and 1904 the Afghan government attempted to deviate the Chitral trade to another sector. After Amir Abdur Rahman Khan's conquest of Kafiristan (nowadays Nuristan), he attempted to display territorial control by leading a trade route from Faizabad to Parun, Asmar, and Bajour which involved twenty-nine stages without major obstacles (Holzwarth 1990: 199). In the aftermath, Anglo-Afghan relations deteriorated again with a culmination in the 1919 war. This struggle terminated British domination and finally led to Afghan sovereignty. Although Chitral militia supported British forces during this war, the Afghan government kept an interest in continuing trade via Badakhshan and officially acknowledged the Chitral route in 1920. On this route varying custom duties were levied on different commodities: export of pistachio nuts (50 %), cumin (40 %), sheep and opium (30 %), woollen fabrics, and animal skins and hides (10–20 %). The import duties of consumer goods ranged between 100 per cent for luxury items, 40 per cent for tea, and 15–22 per cent for cotton

and sugar (Ghani 1921: 250–61 quoted in Holzwarth 1990: 202). The political developments, additional custom duties, and the insecurity of trade—as much in the so-called tribal areas of Dir and Bajour as across the boundaries—counterbalanced the timesaving aspect on this route, which was only seasonally open in the summers. Even the lower unit cost, that is, the fact that the average transport fees for standardized pieces of commerce were lower than those on any other route, could not make up for this and draw substantial quantities of trade volume.

All the same, the trade via Chitral fluctuated during this period in a manner that Chitral held a share of 34.6 per cent in 1932 of the total Central Asian trade volume which was reduced to only 0.2 per cent four years later (Figs. 32.1 and 32.2). Looking at different trade items, we see a regional peculiarity emerge which is connected with the commodities exchanged. While in the overall Central Asian trade the import of Xinjiang *charas* (hashish, *Cannabis indica*) ranged around a fifth of the total, the *charas* trade via Chitral accounted for more than three quarters in the 1920s (Table 32.1). Besides officially accepted drug trade by licensed dealers, a certain share was smuggled in order to avoid the payment of taxes and custom duties to Chinese, Afghan, and British authorities. For this specific purpose, the Chitral route had an additional advantage compared to other thoroughfares. The overall volume might have been much higher taking into account the observation by Skrine (1925: 234) in the 1920s about '...Chitrali and Badakhshi traders who smuggle Yarkand *charas* (hemp drug) into India and Afghanistan through Chitral, and Afghan opium into Kashgaria on their return journey.' Comparing the commercial costs for 1931 reveals that the *charas* import to British India via Chitral was about 19 per cent cheaper than via Leh. This calculation includes all transport charges, taxes, and customs duties. The difference was significant for *charas*, felts, and animal skins while the import of silk was cheaper via Leh.[1]

Table 32.1 Trade via Chitral (1920–26)

	1920–21	1921–22	1922–23	1923–24	1924–25	1925–26	1920–26
IMPORT FROM XINJIANG TO BRITISH-INDIA (IN RS)							
charas (hashish)[a]	13,400	27,000	-	33,000	168,600	42,000	284,000
woolen and cotton fabrics	-	7112	2960	3264	2956	8122	24, 414
dried fruit	2100	-	260	-	-	-	2360
goats		53	361	543	-	335	1192
other items	1840	1112	20,924	4916	24,248	1900	54,940
total import	17,340	35,224	24,144	41,180	195,804	52,022	365,714
percentage *charas* of total	77.2 %	76.7 %	0 %	80.1 %	86.1 %	80.7 %	77.6 %
EXPORT FROM BRITISH INDIA TO XINJIANG (IN RS)							
opium[b]	24,000	17,920	1600	-	-	9360	52, 880
woollen and cotton fabrics	11,899	9050	9880	14,453	4070	29,416	78,768
other items[c]	2948	7217	5215	7510	15,035	7450	45,375
total export	38,847	34,187	16,692	21,963	19,105	46,226	177,020
percentage opium of total	61.7 %	52.4 %	9.6 %	0 %	0 %	20.2 %	29.9 %

a. The value of one *maund* (37.32 kg) of *charas* amounted to Rs 200.
b. The value of one *ser* (0.933 kg) opium was given as Rs 80.
c. Other items include commodities such as tea, sugar, salt, and dried fruit.
Source: Calculations on the basis of data from IOR/2/1076/232: 23.

The persons whom Skrine identified as traders and smugglers from Chitral and Badakhshan covered only one part of the business. Licensed drug dealers involved in this profitable

enterprise originated mainly from Hoshiarpur (Punjab) and Shikarpur (Sindh). Expanding their business, these Hindu traders were also engaged in money-lending. Along all trade routes they controlled a transborder network of financial institutions. When a new bazaar was built in Chitral in 1904, the British political agent

> ...advised the *Mehtar* to set aside a certain number of shops for Hindus. There is at present only one shop owned by a Hindu in Chitral, and the introduction of some competition of this sort would tend to break the ring of Bajauri *Parachas* [small merchants] who at present have matters too much their own way.[2]

Like other enterprises, this trade was interrupted due to the disturbances in Xinjiang in the 1930s as well. While some of the established downcountry traders continued for a while with colonial support, Chitral was already out of licensed *charas* trade as the transit corridor through Afghanistan was no longer feasible. All Xinjiang *charas* entered British India via Leh, the little that was left before the closure of the borders and the expulsion of traders.

Fig. 32.1 Chitral-Yarkand Trade via Boroghil Pass



Source: IOR/2/1076/232

Design: H. Kreutzmann

Fig. 32.2 Caravan Trade via Boroghil and Dora Passes



Source: IOL/P&S/12/1753

Design: H. Kreutzmann

In the other direction (south-north) about 30 per cent of all export via Chitral (Tab. 32.1) was commanded by opium (*teryok*, *Papaver somniferum*). This cash crop gained in importance as an export commodity of Badakhshan in the beginning of the twentieth century. Holzwarth (1990: 206–14) attributes this development to two factors: first, in 1907, Anglo-Sino negotiations about opium trade had led to an agreement about the gradual reduction of exports to China; second, Xinjiang gained more detachment from core politics after the Chinese Revolution of 1911. Thus, a power and economic vacuum furnished favourable conditions for making opium sales by satisfying the continuing demand of Chinese users. As this trade was mainly dominated by Badakhshanis and Pathans from Bajour and the Malakand Agency, the Chitral route played an important role. The British consul-general stated the developments:

> The Sinkiang authorities have been making strenuous efforts during the past few years to eradicate the opium traffic and heavy penalties are imposed on Chinese subjects found to be in possession of opium. In the past, the opium traffic in South Sinkiang has been chiefly in the hands of Afghans and Pathans of Indian territory (especially of Bajaur and the states of the Malakand Agency) and the activities of these Pathans have to some extent been partly responsible for the anti British attitude of the Sinkiang authorities. These men have been making use of their status as 'British protected persons' to escape the consequences of being discovered in illegal activities but they have persistently ignored orders and warnings issued from this Consulate-General forbidding British subjects to have any dealings in opium.[3]

The fact that Pathan and Badakhshani traders operating on the Chitral route were mainly involved is somehow surprising as the production zone of *charas* was far away from Chitral in the Yarkand and Khotan districts, and to a limited degree in Russian/Soviet Turkestan. Other routes would have been closer, but the advantage was the lower burden from taxation and customs, thus increasing the trade profits. While in tsarist Middle Asia the export of *charas* was prohibited since the beginning of the twentieth century, Xinjiang experienced a similar declaration in 1909 in connection with the opium legislation of the central government in Beijing.[4]

Besides these lightweight and valuable drugs, items such as woollen and cotton fabrics, dried fruit, and livestock products constituted some of the commodities exchanged via Chitral Bazaar. Here, traders from Afghanistan and Central Asia met with those of the south. The Norwegian linguist Georg Morgenstierne observed in 1929:

> From beyond the Hindu Kush passes a constant stream of traders comes down to Chitral. The two most important passes are the Dorah in the north-western, and the Baroghil in the north-eastern corner of Chitral. But communication with the north is by no means restricted to these comparatively easy passes, and in spite of snow-blindness and dangers many lightly equipped travellers use the higher and much more difficult passes to the north of the Dorah in order to save a day or two. But these passes have scarcely ever been used by invaders.
>
> Across the Baroghil came Wakhis, but chiefly traders bring blocks of reddish rock-salt and lapis lazuli [lazurite] from the mines belonging to the Afghan government, but exploited by the local population during the rebellion in 1929. Chitral is a local emporium of some importance in these regions. [p. 31: There is no bazaar in Chitral above the capital]. While several caravans from Badakhshan carrying rugs, Russian china etc. passed through Chitral on their way to Peshawar, the local traders from Munjan and neighbouring valleys rarely go further than Chitral, but dispose of their goods there.[5]

The importance of this trade can be estimated by comparing the state income derived from this sector with other sources and by looking at the groups participating in it. The only central place for these enterprises was located in Chitral proper. Consequently, it is not a surprising fact that the state authorities played an important role in it.

The *Mehtar* of Chitral's Revenue and Income from Trade

The Lockhart and Woodthorpe mission visited Chitral in 1885 and estimated the sources of state revenue. According to their observation the ruling families played a significant role in the transborder trade and had managed to monopolize certain activities:

> The *Mehtar* of Chitrál derives his income from the following sources:-
>
> 1. The sale of timber and orpiment [auripigment, As_2S_3] to foreign traders.
> 2. The sale of lead to Bájaorí traders, and of lead and gold-dust in the country.
> 3. Slave-trade.
> 4. Toll on horses and all pack animals passing through from Badakhshán to Dír, Bájaor, and Pesháwar, and *vice versâ*.
> 5. A fixed contribution of sheep, goats and grain, rugs, *choghas* and *tsadars* from each province [regional sub-unit of Chitral].
> 6. Tribute from Káfiristán, and fines imposed on the subject Kalásh Káfirs, &c.
> 7. The Kashmir subsidy.

He also barters English piece-goods and other merchandise from Péshawar, such as tea in Badakhshán for *Yambús*, or Yárkand ingots of silver. He further takes his pick of the horses brought from the north for the southern markets. The traders consequently have taken to hogging the manes of their best ponies, which disfigures them in Chitrál, but does not interfere with their sale in Pesháwar.'

Tolls—These are numerous and vexatious to the traders passing through the Mehtar's territory. He himself takes the proceeds of a few stations, but his sons and favoured officials are allowed to take toll at many others.

The rates fixed at Chitrál for horses, &c., laden or unladen, passing through from foreign countries and returning, are as follows:-

Per 1 horse—2 Kábal rupees. Per 1 mule—1 Kábal rupee. Per 3 asses—1 Kábal rupee. (Lockhart & Woodthorpe 1889: 266–67)

What were the major sources of income? Basically there were two important ones according to their list: exchange relations with non-local traders, and taxes levied in Chitral. This dual structure of state revenue underpinned the significance of external relations and commercial endeavours. As the hereditary ruler of Chitral had to satisfy the demands and needs of a growing number of relatives in different parts of his state these sources became the more important. At that time, the *mehtar* of Chitral received an annual subsidy from Kashmir to the value of Rs 3600 on top of his income from these sources (Lockhart & Woodthorpe 1889: 268). His allowance was raised later on and in 1889

...the Mehtar of Chitral was granted a subsidy of Rs 6,000 per annum and a large consignment of rifles. In 1891 the Government of India, with the intention of strengthening the position of the Mehtar, decided to double this subsidy on the condition that he accepted the advice of the British Agent in all matters relating to foreign policy and the defence of the frontier. (Malleson 1907: 43).

In comparison with the British-Indian support, the *mehtar* of Chitral managed to derive a similar revenue from tolls on trade which accounted for Rs 33,397 averaging Rs 6679.40 per annum between 1896 and 1901.[6] The sources of income developed and continued to move upward in a similar manner, and in 1906, '...*Mehtar* Shuja-ul-Mulk receives a subsidy of Rs. 1,000 *per mensem* and an annual allowance of Rs 8,000 as compensation for the loss of the Mastuj and Laspur districts' (Malleson 1907: 79). From 1927 to 1936 the *mehtar* of Chitral accrued Rs 136,413 in import and export taxes from traders in Chitral. Those were the 'good' years when the contribution from trade dues amounted to Rs 18,338 per annum on average (Table 32.2). Although data is scanty and needs to be supplemented with explicit lists of internal sources of state income, it can be concluded that a substantial contribution to Chitral's state revenue was derived from exchange relations with entrepreneurs. This factor is often neglected when the political structure of Chitral is explained only on the basis of internal and land-related social hierarchies.[7] The centre of power based its overall control of the state on its wealth extracted from the rural areas as much as from pecuniary resources supplied by traders. The predominantly non-local businessmen used Chitral as an important entrepot. For them, Chitral Bazaar was a central place for the exploitation of trade niches. Chitral held a favourable locational position in relation to consumer places and resource areas such as Badakhshan, Xinjiang, and the NWFP.

Table 32.2: Chitral State Revenue from Import and Export Taxes: Badakhshan and Chinese Turkestan (1927–36)

Year	*Chitral-Badakhshan (Dora and Boroghil)*		*Chitral-Chinese Turkestan (Boroghil)*		*Trade Revenue*
	Import	**Export**	**Import**	**Export**	**Total (In Rs)**
1927	13,269	6240	1435	4525	25,469
1928	8868	5620	982	5985	21,455
1929	7736	5985	1167	2970	17,858
1930	no data	no data	no data	no data	no data
1931	6703	5865	5437	3840	21,845
1932	3418	4100	3885	3595	14,998
1933	4193	5297	985	1602	12,077
1934	6656	4977	732	2302	14,667
1935	96	87	625	2552	3360
1936	335	290	32	5	662
1927–34	50,843	38,084	14, 623	24,819	128,369
annual	7263	5441	2089	3545	18,338

Source: Calculations on the base of data from IOL/P&S/12/1753: 40–41

The share of the local people in any surplus from trade and subsidies indicates that little trickled down. Their exchange with traders was basically restricted to the supply of porterage. In addition, some barter trade in fodder and food for consumer goods occurred. As part of their obligations local farmers had to be available as load-carriers (coolies) for the porterage of state goods. The residents functioned as labourers for the maintenance of tracks and bridges under the ubiquitous scheme of forced labour (*kar-i-begār, rajaaki*) for the ruling class, a constellation which could be observed in neighbouring mountain societies as well. Thus, a relationship developed in which the external resources such as subsidies, octroi, and customs duties helped to stabilize the centre of power. From the colonial perspective indirect rule in the form of installing and supporting a *mehtar* or *mir* had led to the direct transfer of state subsidies to loyal chiefs. The right and procedures of internal distribution and allocation of funds was reserved under their sole authority. In a similar manner revenue from trade was mainly accumulated at the seat of power. From the perspective of the local population forced labour in the form of porterage, provision of supplies, and infrastructure construction and maintenance was taken for granted or without remuneration, thus enhancing the wealth of the local rulers. Consequently, the socio-economic gap between centre and periphery within the mountain societies widened by providing a traffic infrastructure for external or imperial interests and non-local entrepreneurs. The limited spin-off effects of developments such as the provision of roads and bridges for inter-village communication and limited marketing and exchange of locally produced goods should not be omitted.

The End of Chitral's involvement in Central Asian Trade

The sudden interruption of trade made felt the mutual dependence: the purchase of local grain and fodder by itinerant traders had provided a welcome local market for the mountain farmers in need of bartering for salt, tea, and other consumer goods such as kitchenware and cotton cloth. For the well-to-do, luxury items were available in Chitral Bazaar only. Overall trade declined significantly in the mid-1930s after the Afghan government's decision to inflict a

trade embargo on Chitral. The pretext for terminating exchange relations in this trade sector was the alleged illegal import of *charas* into Afghanistan and uncontrolled export of gold and lapis lazuli. Consequently, Chitral's trade corridor with Xinjiang was cut off as well. The *mehtar* of Chitral, Shuja-ul-Mulk, assessed the importance of exchange relations:

> Our flourishing timber trade which was the chief source of income during my father's time has been totally prohibited. The Afghans are... bent upon ruining our trade... have been looking on us as a thorn in their side, and by imposing prohibitive taxes on the Sarhadi Wakhan, they have stopped the trade between this country [Chitral] and Yarkand... This year they have practically closed all the Badakhshan routes to all the import and export trade with Chitral.[8]

The British political agent in Malakand reported to his superiors about the situation in Chitral and emphasized on the fiscal effects and the survival conditions for the local population:

> ...The country [Chitral] is being very hard hit by the restriction on trade over the Dorah and Baroghil Passes imposed by the Afghan Government...practically all trade has ceased between Chitral and Badakhshan and Wakhan. It is a very serious matter for the Chitral State revenues and also for the inhabitants of Northern Chitral the livelihood of many of whose inhabitants depended on this trade. Salt was a most important import from Badakhshan and its stoppage is causing great hardship. The Afghans of the provinces concerned must also be feeling the loss of their trade with Chitral... Afghanistan is trying to bring pressure on Chitral to use the Kunar valley route only with possible development of this route to facilitate traffic.[9]

The following months did not bring any improvements in the bleak situation, and in 1936, trade performance had reached the bottom line. Income from trade contributed to Chitral's state revenue only a meagre 3 per cent of the value which had been generated five years earlier (Table 32.2). The entrepreneurs in Chitral trade filed a petition which was presented through British diplomatic channels: 'The traders of Chitral wish to be allowed to import the following from Badakhshan: Pistachio nuts, caraway, almonds, salt, opium, dried cheese, lapislazuli, carpets, namdahs, cloth (khaddar), cloth (silk), pattis and chogahs, skins and wild animals (stone marten, fox and panther), sulpher, wool, sheep and goats.'[10] All efforts did not significantly improve the situation and failed to restore bilateral exchange relations. On a lower level, some trade continued by smuggling of goods across the border passes; especially by this method substantial quantities of opium reached Chitral annually (Holzwarth 1990: 205–06). Besides the unilateral Afghan termination of trade caravans across the Boroghil and Dora passes, internal developments in Xinjiang attenuated the prospects. Overall, a significant decline of all trade between British India and Central Asia followed.

Response to Trade Decline and Border Closures

The commencement of the Cold War and the subsequent Chinese Revolution resulted in the closure of international boundaries and mountain passes and amplified the decline on all sectors. Central Asian trade via the Chitral route had come to an end already in 1935. This turning point marked the beginning of a domestic response to the loss of goods exchange. Parallel to the trade decline and the growing restrictions of the Xinjiang authorities on the export of *charas*, the cultivation of this valuable cash crop was promoted in Chitral. As a new source of income generation it replaced the revenue loss accrued out of trade decline and served a continuing

demand in British India. After the Chinese borders were sealed in 1950/1951, the superior quality products from Xinjiang ceased to be a competitive commodity on the market. This event further boosted *charas* cultivation in Upper Chitral. Staley (1966: 234) measured the share of revenue accounted for by taxes on *charas* production in the order of one third of the total. The cultivation zones in Chitral range from 1760 meters to 3350 meters in altitude and are located in Lotkuh, Torkhow, Mulikhow, and Yarkhun. Licensed cultivation was permitted in Swat and Chitral while *charas* cultivation was prohibited in the Gilgit Agency. The total export of *charas* from Chitral was estimated at 500 *maunds* (18,516 kg) in 1964. A state sales tax of Rs 5 per pound of *charas* was levied within Chitral while an additional export tax of Rs 11.50 per pound had to be paid when it left the state.[11] Other estimates highlighted its importance in the state's trade balance by attributing 80 per cent of all exports to *charas* in the 1960s.[12] The introduction of this cash crop can be perceived as a direct result of trade decline and response to vanishing economic opportunities.

Potentials and Prospects

The case of Chitral has been presented as an example of the termination of international trade and domestic responses. While its decline coincided with the factual closure of all three South Asian approach routes perpetually, plans have existed to reopen the thoroughfares if political conditions permit. This medium-term perspective gains in importance as political conditions have been affected by recent developments. How has Chitral prepared itself for commercial exchange with independent Central Asian republics? This consideration has to be evaluated on the basis of infrastructure assets and sectors of surplus production.

The infrastructural factor is tied with the closure of the Chitral route. The economic attraction and potential of Chitral itself has not been able to sustain further improvements in order to improve the link to downcountry Pakistan. Prior to partition only the road between Ashret and Chitral Town was widened for motor vehicles. Those had been carried in pieces across the Loari Top and mechanics reassembled them at the location. The Loari Pass remained a serious obstacle until 1947, when the first jeep managed to cross. From then onwards a regular service between Dir and Chitral came into being but was restricted to the summer months.[13] The road from Chitral via Mastuj to Sor Laspur was improved in a manner that motorcycles could ply between Chitral and the foot of the Shandur Pass (Power 1948: 70). A shuttle service was introduced between Drosh and Chitral where approximately forty vehicles were in use to link the two central places. Dichter (1967: 47) mentions that this service included the connection of Chitral with the only airport (in Balach since 1951; Ghufran 1962: 268) at Drosh serviced twice a week. In 1962, Chitral Airport was inaugurated with daily flights, weather conditions permitting. Considerable extensions of jeep tracks were commissioned after partition when Chitral State acceded to Pakistan. By the mid-1960s the road network within the cul-de-sac of Chitral had increased five times.[14]

All these developments do not disguise the fact that the loss of Chitral's function as a highland entrepot for cross-boundary and transmontane trade affected the traffic situation detrimentally and was connected with a slow growth of infrastructure. The previously central position of Chitral Bazaar had been converted into a cul-de-sac position at the end of an exchange corridor. Henceforth, Chitral's economic relations were totally directed southwards, a change which found its political expression by terminating the area's special constitutional status and in the abolishment of the state in 1969. The short-lived advantage of being a

commercial turntable in the Hindu Kush has never come back to Chitral since. This has had an effect on the district's economy.

For comparative purposes, it might be suitable to state that the availability and sale of consumer goods in Gilgit District is much higher than in Chitral District. The total value and per capita supply of consumer goods from downcountry Pakistan is only less than a quarter in Chitral (Kreutzmann 1995: 220). All the same, the demand for the import of rice, wheat flour, and grain is quite substantial in Chitral, an area where agriculture overshadows all other economic activities. The import of these basic foodstuffs across the Loari Pass covers about three-quarters of the value of all goods purchased. The still growing dependence of Chitral on external supplies involves high costs for carriage as the Loari Pass remains a major physical obstacle and the Kunar Valley Road insecure.

While in the beginning of this century different modes of transport were applied for sustaining international trade, the present technology of motor vehicles leaves little scope for alternative routes as the cost of road construction in mountain areas exceeds the allocation in public budgets by far. This fact is symbolized in the Loari tunnel project, which was planned for two decades and commenced in the 1970s but stopped soon after.

NOTES

1. The Afghan authorities levied a transit tax of Rs 21 per pony-load of silk at the customs checkpost at Sarhad-e-Wakhan while the same quantity of *charas* passed through for Rs 4.50 (IOL/P&S/12/3246: India Office Library & Records: Departmental Papers: Political & Secret Internal Files & Collections 1931–1947: Chinese Turkestan: Trade: Development of Trade between India and Chinese Turkestan. Letter of Consul-General Kashgar 11.7.1931).
2. IOL/P&S/7/165/1054: India Office Library & Records: files Relating to Indian States Extracted from the Political and secret letters from India 1881–1911: Chitral Diary 30.4.1904.
3. IOL/P&S/12/2358: India Office Library & Records: Departmental Papers: Political & Secret Internal Files & Collections 1931–1947: Letter from H.H. Johnson, Consul-General Kashgar to Government of India, Simla, dated Kashgar 15.8.1940.
4. IOL/P&S/7/240/923: India Office Library & Records: Files Relating to Indian States Extracted from the Political and Secret Letters from India 1881–1911: Memorandum of Information... May 1910. The date given was 21.11.1909 for implementing this legislation. In the following year it was reported that this prohibition act had not immediately affected opium and *charas* cultivation at all (IOL/P&S/7/242/1367: India Office Library & Records: Files relating to Indian states extracted from the Political and Secret Letters from India 1881–1911: Memorandum of Information August 1910).
5. Morgenstierne 1932: 31–2. Faizi (1991: 188) mentions the establishment of a bonded warehouse in Boroghil (Yarkhun) in 1926 in order '...to check the illegal import of charas.'
6. IOL/P&S/7/136/982: India Office Library & Records: Files Relating to Indian States Extracted from the Political and Secret Letters from India for 1908, Vol. 8.
7. Cf. in this context the descriptions of Chitral's social structure and taxation system by Barth (1956: 80–83); Beg (1990: 7); Eggert (1990); Lorimer (1980: 224–29). Biddulph (1880: 66) already mentions the importance of trade for the state revenue of Chitral.
8. IOL/P&S/12/1753: India Office Library & Records: Departmental Papers: Political & Secret Internal Files & Collections 1931-1947: Afghanistan. Trade. Stoppage of Trade between Chitral and Badakhshan: Rough Translation of the Persian Speech delivered by His Highness Sahib of Chitral...in the Durbar held in Chitral on 6th of Oct., 1935: pp. 94–96.
9. IOL/P&S/12/1753: India Office Library & Records: Departmental Papers: Political & Secret Internal Files & Collections 1931–1947: Afghanistan. Trade. Stoppage of Trade between Chitral and Badakhshan: Memorandum on 'Chitral Trade', P. A. Dir, Swat and Chitral, Malakand 15.10.1935: pp. 90–91.
10. IOL/P&S/12/1753: India Office Library & Records: Departmental Papers: Political & Secret Internal Files & Collections 1931–1947: Afghanistan. Trade. Stoppage of Trade between Chitral and Badakhshan: Memorandum from the Political Agent Dir, Swat and Chitral, Malakand 26.3.1936: p. 64.

11. Data provided by the Chitral state revenue authorities, quoted from Staley 1966: 234.
12. Dichter 1967: 45. A significant share left the state as contraband; legal export was restricted to the so-called 'tribal areas' alone.
13. Proudlock 1947: 193–94. Cf. for the development of traffic conditions prior to partition Schomberg 1938: 24, 29; Power 1948; Staley 1966: 202.
14. Israr-ud-Din 1967: 47. For recent extensions of the road network and the planned tunnel project underneath the Loari Pass, cf. Israr-ud-Din 1967: 47–48; Amir Mohammed 1981: 10–15; Haserodt 1989: 141–46.

References

Manuscript and Primary Printed Sources

Ghufran, Mirza Mohammad. 1962. *A New History of Chitral* [Urdu, English translation 1974 in manuscript]. Peshawar.

IOL/P&S/12/3246: India Office Library & Records: Departmental Papers: Political & Secret Internal Files & Collections 1931–1947: Chinese Turkestan: Trade: Development of Trade between India and Chinese Turkestan. Letter of P. A. Gilgit 30.4.1928.

IOR/2/1076/232: India Office Records: Development of Trade between India and Chinese Turkestan. File No 22-C of 1938.

Lockhart, W.S.A. & R.G. Woodthorpe. 1889. *The Gilgit Mission 1885-86*. London.

_____, 1894. *Report on the Baroghil-Mastuj-Chitral Route*. Gilgit (Public Record Office/FO 539/67: pp. 28–29).

_____, 1895. *The Northern Frontier of India. Roads and Passes. Measures for Defence of Frontier*. London (IOL/P&S/18/A 95).

Secondary Printed Sources

Amir Mohammed, ed. 1981. Agriculture Experts Committee Report on Chitral. Islamabad.

Barth, Fredrik. 1956. Indus and Swat Kohistan —An Ethnographic Survey. *Studies Honouring the Centennial of Universtetets Etnografiske Museum*, Oslo 1857–1957; Vol. II: pp. 5–98. Oslo.

Beg, R.K. 1990. Revenue System of the Ex-state of Chitral. *Terich Mer* 5: pp. 5–6, 12.

Biddulph, John 1880. *Tribes of the Hindoo Koosh*. Calcutta: Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing. Reprints, edited by K. Gratzl, Graz: Akademische Druck-u. Verlagsanstatlt, 1971; Karachi: Indus Publications, 1977.

Dichter, D. 1967. *The North-West Frontier of West Pakistan. A Study in Regional Geography*. Oxford.

Eggert, P. 1990. *Die frühere Sozialordnung Moolkhos und Turkhos (Chitral)*. (Beiträge zur Südasienforschung 134. Stuttgart.

Faizi, Inayatullah 1991. The Geo-political Significance of the Southern Passes of the Wakhan Corridor. Unpublished dissertation, Peshawar.

Harris, L. 1971. The Frontier Route from Peshawar to Chitral: Political and Strategic Aspects of the 'Forward Policy' 1889–1896. *Contributions to Asian Studies* 1: pp. 81–108.

Haserodt, K. 1989. Chitral (Pakistanischer Hindukusch). Strukturen, Wandel und Probleme eines Lebensraumes im Hochgebirge zwischen Gletschern und Wüste. In *Hochgebirgsräume Nordpakistans im Hindukusch, Karakorum und Westhimalaya*, ed. K. Haserodt, pp. 43–180. Beiträge und materialien zur Regionalen Geographic, 2. Berlin: TU Berlin.

Holzwarth, Wolfgang. 1990. *Vom Fürstentum zur afghanischen Provinz. Badakhshan* 1880–1935. Berlin.

Israr-ud-Din. 1967. Socio-economic Developments in Chitral State. Pakistan Geographical Review 22 (1): pp. 42–51.

Kreutzmann, H. 1995. Globalization, Spatial Integration, and Sustainable Development in Northern Pakistan. *Mountain Research and Development* 15 (3): pp. 213–27.

Lorimer, David Lockhart Robinson. 1980. Personal records from the India Office Library & Records. Edited and published by I. Müller-Stellrecht: *Materialien zur Ethnographie von Dardistan (Pakistan). Aus den nachgelassenen Aufzeichnungen von D.L.R. Lorimer. Teil II–III, Gilgit. Chitral und Yasin*. Bergvölker im Hindukusch und Karakorum 3. Graz: Akademische Druck-u. Verlagsanstatt.

Malleson, W. 1907. *Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India*. Selections from Govt. Records. Vol. 1: Tribes North of the Kabul River. Simla. Reprint, Quetta, 1979.

Morgenstierne, G. 1932. *Report on a Linguistic Mission to North-Western India*. Instituttet for Sammenlignende Kulturforskning, C III–1. Oslo. Reprint, Karachi: Indus Publications, no date.

Power, R.H. 1948. A Subaltern in the Gilgit Agency. *The Royal Egineers Journal* 62 (1): pp. 66–77.

Proudlock, V. 1947. By Jeep to Chitral. *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society* 34 (2): pp. 193–94.

Schomberg, Reginald C.F. 1938. *Kafirs and Glaciers. Travels in Chitral*. London.

Skrine, C.P. 1925. The Roads to Kashgar. *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society* 12: pp. 226–50.

Staley, J. 1966. *Economy and Society in Dardistan: Traditional Systems and the Impact of Change*. Lahore.

33

RELATIONS BETWEEN CHITRAL AND BALTISTAN

*Muhammad Hassan Hasrat**

Chitral has geopolitically been part of little Bolor, whereas Baltistan is identified as greater Bolor by some foreign as well as local researchers. In the ancient Tibetan version, Chitral was called 'Goq Yul' and later on 'Broshal.' Both the territories (Chitral and Baltistan) have remained as separate sovereign states since the prehistoric period and are situated at a distance of at least 400 to 500 kilometres from each other, separated by the Karakoram and Hindu Kush ranges. However, Chitral and Baltistan have similarities in culture and are temperamentally near to each other. Some historical, lingual, ethnic, and cultural relations between the two territories are discussed in this work.

It is quite strange that the writers of the history of Chitral are silent about its relations with Baltistan. However, researchers on the surrounding regions make ample references regarding historical relations between the two areas.

At the beginning of the eighth century the Tibetans extended their boundaries up to Pamir and clashed with Chinese interests. At that time, Chitral came under the influence of the Tibetan Empire, called 'Patola Shahi.' On this occasion, Chitralis and Tibetans found a chance to face each other for the first time.

It is said that when Sangin Ali, the ruler of Chitral, loomed large and attacked Gilgit, Raja Sultan Mirza of Gilgit was defeated and fled to Skardu for asylum and to seek help. So, Ali Sher Khan Anchan, the great ruler of the Maqpon dynasty of Baltistan marched on Gilgit with a huge army worthy of his glorious name. In Gilgit, Sangin Ali was defeated at the hands of Ali Sher Khan Anchan and thus the latter extended his dominion to Chitral.

According to tradition, Ali Sher Anchan, to commemorate his victory, entangled a grind stone in the branches of a plane tree in Chitral near the village of Broshal, which, by some historians, has been claimed to be still present some time ago. In Balti folk songs and stories, Chitral is known as a part of Broshal and this plane tree is referred to as 'Brosho Shingal.' Balti folklore pays tribute to Ali Sher Khan Anchan for his remarkable conquest and the boundary of his kingdom referring to it as '*Leh Purang na Brosho Shingal,*' meaning 'from Purang (Tibet) in the east to Brosho plane tree in the west.' All these achievements of Ali Sher Khan Anchan have been attributed by some researchers to his grandson Ali Shah. A bridge was also built near the Chitral fort and named Cho Bridge, meaning the royal bridge. *The Gazetteer of India* has recorded that this bridge was constructed by Raja Sultan Murad, the grandson of Shah Murad of Skardu. In fact, Chitral had been conquered by the Maqpon rulers of Skardu on three occasions, first, by Ali Sher Khan Anchan (1580 to 1624 AD), and second, by Sher Shah and Ali Shah, the grandsons of Ali Sher Khan Anchan, under the rule of Shah Murad (1650 to 1688 AD). In a stanza of a Shina folk song, the exploits of Sher Shah and Ali Shah in Chitral are extolled in the following words: 'Sher Shah Ali Shah constructed

* Assistant director, Allama Iqbal Open University, regional officer, Skardu.

a wall in Chitral and then dust was raised due to huge number of horses and army in the battle field. Maqpon brothers constructed a wall in Chitral and dust was raised.'

On the third occasion, Raja Sultan Murad (1723 to 1753 AD) marched on Gilgit and then as far as Chitral, forcing the chiefs to pay allegiance to him. At Chitral, he repaired or reconstructed the Cho Bridge.

After a long silence between Chitral and Baltistan, communication between them resumed once again when the people of Gilgit and Baltistan revolted against the Dogra rulers during 1947–48. A number of armed militia forces and the State Bodyguard of Chitral came to the help of the freedom fighters on their request and rendered admirable services in Skardu under the guardianship of the *mehtar* of Chitral. The old people of Baltistan still remember and praise the valuable services of Colonel Mutaul Mulk and his soldiers who helped in relieving Skardu Fort from the Kashmiri contingent.

History is a witness to the fact that the prisoners brought by the Maqpon rulers from Chitral during the sixteenth century were settled in different parts of Baltistan. Moreover, groups of Chitrali adventurers have also migrated to Baltistan from time to time. Though these Chitralis are totally amalgamated in Balti culture and have no separate identity today, some of these tribes living in Tolti, Khaplu, and Siksa of Baltistan do continue to recognize themselves as 'Goq-Pa' connecting with 'Goq Yul' that is, Chitral. It is also said that the village Ghandus of Kharmong, Baltistan, was settled by ancestors of the Oma-chikpa family who came from Chitral in the prehistoric period. Arandu village of Shigar, and Shingus and Tiriko villages of Rundu valleys are referred to as Chitrali settlements also.

A Balti folk song 'Broshal-pa,' also describes a story in which a man named Muhammad belonging to Broshal (Chitral) married a lady named Sikim in Baltistan. After some time, when Muhammad wanted to return to his native land, his Balti wife narrated her sentiments through some verses and Muhammad replied. This song, which is sung as a duet, oresebts a giid exanke if kive between the couple (i.e., Chitral and Baltistan).

It is narrated that Ali Sher Khan Anchan introduced the game of polo in Gilgit and Chitral during his military campaign in the sixteenth century. Polo is a word of Balti origin meaning ball which has been adopted by others. According to folk tales, it is suggested that the polo game was well-developed and in vogue in Baltistan thousands of years earlier during the Kesar era (Kesar was the hero of a famous Tibetan epic). Moreover, it is claimed, most of the terminology of polo is of Balti-Tibetan origin. The present styles of polo in Chitral and Baltistan have many similarities between them. The credit for a polo ground at the Shandur Top, among some others, is also given to Ali Sher Khan Anchan. It is said that its correct pronunciation is 'Shamdun' instead of 'Shandur', which is actually a Balti word for a wild flower reportedly grown on the said plateau. A Balti folk song named 'Abda Khan' also enlightens us on the polo match played by Ali Sher Khan Anchan on the Shamdun ground. In this song, Ali Sher Khan says that he does not enjoy playing polo on the Shamdun ground due to the absence of his son Abda Khan. In another version of this song, he talks about holding his court of public gathering in Chitral, complaining about the absence of his son, Abda Khan. Besides polo, sports such as hunting of wild animals, tug-of-war, wrestling, archery, stone throwing, and hide-and-seek are played in both Chitral and Baltistan.

It has been observed that certain fundamental social characteristics are common to both Baltistan and Chitral. There are great similarities in different mythologies and legends between the two areas. Some proverbs, riddles, and many other folk tales both in Balti and Khowar languages are of a common nature. For example, the imaginary offering of a fort to the winner of riddles is a common tradition even today in Baltistan and Chitral.

It has been noted that some Balti and Khowar folk songs are exactly the same ideologically. For instance, 'Masharif Bashaono' in Khowar and 'Ango Dalmo Suk' in Balti are both a dialogue between a doe and her deer. It is interesting that the central idea and even some sentences of this folk song are the same in both the Balti and Khowar languages. It is a good example of the mental harmony between the people of Chitral and Baltistan centuries earlier. Today also the Balti and Chitralis are, psychologically and mentally, harmonious and peaceful, harmless and noble souls. Their folk imaginings are also in harmony with each other. For instance, *Mayon* the weaver bird, is considered the ideal bird of the poets in both the regions (its name is also pronounced the same way in both Chitral and Baltistan). It is also a common practice for mothers in Baltistan and Chitral to silence their weeping babies by terrifying them by saying that a cat will come to bite off their ears.

It is also common among the people of Baltistan and Chitral to bathe in the hot water sulphur springs in case of skin diseases; pull horn pipes on the back of the patient and open a vein with a I lancet to draw spoiled blood; tighten a broken bone with the help of two planks; and wear an amulet as a charm against the evils of most diseases. It has been known that a prominent folk dance, called *Ragi Kar* in Balti and *Khongora Phonik* in Khowar, in which the dancers wave their swords in the air, is found in both Chitral and Baltistan.

The Kalash women wear a sort of long gown-type shirt, named *Sangach*, made of woollen cloth. Their caps are decorated with corals and shells called *Ko-Phas* and have a long tail which hangs up to their waists. Balti women had the same clothes three to four decades earlier.

An illumination festival, Chaomos, is celebrated in Chitral by the Kalash on or after 21st December every year. Its background is annexed with the traditional solar circulation according to the Kalasha mythology. The same festival is celebrated in Baltistan during the same season. Some kinds of traditional food in Chitral and Baltistan are of a common nature:

Balti	***Khowar***	***Description***
Zan	*Hool*	The flour is cooked in water and eaten with melted butter or soup.
Hitzab Balay	*SoSp KaLi*	It is cooked in either water or edible oil/fats and prepared in liquid form mixing a sweet flour in it. Some diseases were cured in the past by using this kind of food.
Kro Balay	*Lažek*	The grains of wheat are ground in a mortar and cooked with meat or heads and feet of animals. Spices are used in it. It is like the Chinese chicken corn soup or *halim* cooked in the subcontinent.

Finally, we can definitely say that Baltistan and Chitral have enjoyed close cultural, lingual, racial, and historical relations since ancient times and offer an important venue to our researchers to probe further to enhance understanding of the people of these regions. Such studies will also help to bring the two peoples closer to each other once again.

References

Abidi, Mohammad Yousaf Hussain 1983. *Baltistan per ek Nazar*.

Afridi, Banat Gul. 1988. *Baltistan in History*.

Akhtar Ali Siksa; Ghulam Hassan Lobsang Tolti; Ghulam Hussain Sundus. Interviews with Muhammad Hassan Hasrat.

Ali, Manzoom. 1985. *Karakoram Hindu Kush*. In Urdu. Gilgit.

Faizi, Inayatullah. *Chitral*. In Urdu. Islamabad: Lok Virsa.

Hashmatullah Khan, Al-haj Maulvi. 1996. *Tarikh-e-Jammu.*
Israr-ud-Din, Wazir Ali Shah, & Inayatullah Faizi,1986. *Chitral Ek Taaruf.* Chitral.
Kazmi, Syed Mohammad Abbas. 1985. *Bali Lok Geet.*
Shah Rais Khan. 1987. *Tarikh-e-Gilgit.* Edited by Ahmad Hasan Dani-Islamabad: Quaid-i-Zaam University.
Sikandar, Kacho Sikandar Khan. 1985. *Qadeem Ladakh.*

34

THE TURBULENT PERIODS—AN ACCOUNT OF MASS MOVEMENTS IN CHITRAL (1917–53)

*Inayatullah Faizi**

'Chitralis are a people tenaciously attached to old observance and custom, including fidelity to the ruling house as such, though not necessarily to its individual members, but look with a suspicious horror not upon crime, but upon innovation.'[1]

These remarks were passed by Lord Curzon in 1894, and he was right in his assessment of what he saw during a visit to Chitral almost a century ago. But things change and twenty years later the Chitralis turned against the system evolved and supported by their forbear. The year of the Bolshevik revolution in neighbouring Russia marked the opening of a new chapter in the history of Chitral, where people took to the streets against the sitting ruler of the princely state, Shuja-ul-Mulk, who was then backed by British India's power. This uprising was followed by another attempt to dethrone him in 1926. The violent tide rose against the state rulers once again in 1946 and 1949 and continued even after the merger of the state with the NWFP in July 1969.

Among the princely states of the Hindu Kush region, Chitral has the distinction of having the oldest political setup and the most efficient public administration system, evolved and successfully run for more than thirteen centuries by rulers from Bahman-e-Kohistani (670 AD) to the last Katore prince (1969). During the long span of history, Chitral paid tribute to different neighbouring powers at different periods but internally it remained independent. The state rulers and their subjects had a mutual understanding and both were of the view that each party was indispensable for the other. Though the rulers were despotic, the subjects were faithful and peaceful.

The beginning of the twentieth century was the era of reawakening for the people of Chitral. The ruler had consolidated his power with the help of British India. It was thought that he would continue to enjoy public support like his predecessors. He levied certain new taxes on his subjects, for example, *ushur* that is, payment of one-tenth of the land farm produce—a religious obligation upon Muslims which they pay to the deserving people at their own discretion. In 1915, the ruler ordered that all *ushur* of Mastuj be collected for the state through the state administration. After the *ushur's* partial consumption by the ruler's large family and state officials, it was to be distributed among the public. The first popular uprising against the ruler began from Mastuj and it was a public reaction to this order.

The Uprising of 1917

The Mastuj area to the west of Shandur in the Hindu Raj Range was previously included in the Khushwaqt territory administered by the rulers of Yasin from the east of the range. In

* Lecturer in Urdu literature, Govt College, Bumi (Chitral).

1895, Mastuj came under the direct control of British India. After his formal coronation on 2 September 1895, Shuja-ul-Mulk began to think over plans to annex Mastuj to his dominion. During his visit to India in 1899 he took up his plea with the viceroy and persisted in his demand until the government handed over the Khushwaqt territory to him under an agreement on 13 May 1914.[2] After assumption of the charge of Mastuj the *mehtar* ordered the realization of *ushur* from the people of Mastuj. The public did not respond positively and a revolt was stirred up in May 1917 in which a spiritual leader of the Ismaili community from Chuinj and a lady activist from Buni played key roles.

Syed Shah Nawaz alias Bulbul Shah was a religious leader of the Ismaili community. He was a landlord and a prominent figure in the area. Owing to his friendship and intimate relations with the Khushwaqt ruler of Yasin, he was unhappy with the annexation of his area to Katore territory. There were even theories about possible intrigues by Shah Abdur Rehman Khan, the then *mehtar* of Yasin. The Zondre tribe of the area had fostered the ruler of Yasin. It was also active in the agitation, and a lady from the Zondre clan of Buni also launched a similar campaign against the Katore *mehtar*. Her name was Zhoor Nama and she was an aged woman. Her father, Lasht Duroyu, hailed from a respectable family and her cousin Ali Noor Khan held an important post in the local administration. She pretended to die, and came out of the grave after some time to give the impression that she had been given new life to fight against the Katore *mehtar*. She claimed that she was given the task of cleansing society of his misdeeds. For this purpose, she chose the 'whisk' as her symbol. Her movement became popular and it gave indirect support to the mass movement led by Bulbul Shah. People of Yarkhun, Mastuj, and Laspur had joined hands with Bulbul Shah while the public of lower Mastuj Sonoghor, Awi, and Buni joined Zhoor Nama. She called herself Faqir that is, Beggar, but people gave her the title of Buzurg (Saint). Both the movements had one goal, that is, replacing the Katore *mehtar*, Shuja-ul-Mulk. The leaders had mass support but mobilization of street power was yet to start. The assistant political agent, N.E. Reilly, suggested that the *mehtar* deal with the agitation on his own. The *mehtar* sent two contingents of a 1000 men under Atalique Bahadur and 3000 under Atalique Sarfaraz Shah to Mastuj. Bulbul Shah was exiled to Badakhshan and Zhoor Nama was punished severely. After some time she was handed over to her cousins who killed her by drowning her in the river. Thus, the uprising against the *mehtar* came to a tragic end. The situation was brought under control within a period of two months. In July 1917, Shuja-ul-Mulk visited Mastuj and the people expressed their allegiance and full support his rule.[3]

The Revolt of 1926

Though Shuja-ul-Mulk succeeded in quelling the first uprising against his authority, there were people in Chitral who were opposed to his rule and wanted to dethrone him. The 1926 revolt was such an attempt by his opponents. Some notables from the royal family and some elites of the ruling class were unhappy over the influence of some other people on the *mehtar*. They wanted to make their own way into the corridors of power by creating posts of ministers and a prime minister. Mir Haider Ali Khan of Kesu, Mir Ali Khan of Damik, Sufi Sikandar Khan of Patti, Hakim Munsif Khan of Drosh, Azizullah Khan Lal, Broze, and Mohammed Saeed Khan of Mastuj were leaders of this revolt. They consulted like-minded people and made a group of twenty-two persons, all important figures belonging to the ruling class. The group tried to attract mass support by chanting popular slogans against the *mehtar*. Waiving of some unpopular taxes and forced labour were the main demands. The group was about to

make an attempt on the life of the *mehtar* for paving the way to a ruler of their own choice. The *mehtar's* eldest son, Nasir-ul-Mulk, was a potential substitute because he had intimate relations with the group leaders and was not liked by his father.

On the night of 22 March 1926, the group held its meeting in secrecy and under strict security in a house in Shiaqo-tek, Chitral. They decided to go ahead with the plan immediately and get rid of the *mehtar*. The proceedings of the meeting were leaked out to the *mehtar*, however, the next morning by one of the conspirators, whose house had served as its venue. The *mehtar* ordered an inquiry into the alleged conspiracy and sought the help of the government. Consequently, on 22 March four persons, Sufi Sikandar Khan, Haji Amir Ali Khan, Mehtarjao Mir Haider Ali Khan, and Hakim Munsif Khan, were arrested. Others managed to escape by pleasing the *mehtar* and assuring him of their confidence and loyalty in future. On 26 May 1926, the detained leaders were sent to a prison in Abbottabad, Hazara, where they remained behind bars for four years. Sufi Sikandar Khan of Patti breathed his last after twenty-six days of illness in prison. The rest were released in June 1930. The prisoners were given B-class facilities in prison and their expenses were born by the treasury of the *mehtar* of Chitral. It was a revolt in name only. No mass movement took place. Neither the leaders nor their well-wishers could raise street power against the prevailing system.

Popular Uprising of 1946

Though the first two revolts could not yield positive results, these attempts were indicators of public reaction against the sitting ruler. Eventually, twenty years after the second revolt a popular uprising took place against the *mehtar* in 1946. It may be pertinent to note that the first movement was initiated in Mastuj on the eastern borderland of Upper Chitral and the second one was planned and perceived by the people of Drosh on the southern borderland of Lower Chitral. This third revolt was also backed by the masses belonging to Drosh, the brain behind it being Shahzada Mohammad Hussam-ul-Mulk, a prominent figure from the ruling family and younger brother of the sitting *mehtar*, His Highness Mohammad Muzaffar-ul-Mulk, and governor of the Drosh area. The cause of this revolt was the decision of the *mehtar*, on 23 May 1946, to appoint his son, Saif-ur-Rahman, as heir apparent due to his own critical health condition. The decision was challenged by Hussam-ul-Mulk, who on some occasion had been verbally assured by the *mehtar* that his son, Samsam-u-Mulk, who was also son-in-law of the latter, was going to be appointed as heir apparent.[4] To hinder the action of the *mehtar*, Hussam-ul-Mulk, in a short time, was able to raise the people of Drosh against the sitting ruler. This uprising, known as daSmán duhu, made plans to undertake a long march to Chitral Town. On 25 May information reaching Chitral gave the impression that the governor of Drosh was going to attack Chitral to seize the throne. Though later Hussam-ul-Mulk tried his best to clarify that he had no ill intentions against the throne and only wanted to meet the *mehtar* to remove his misgivings, it was too late. Consequently, a 3000-strong contingent of bodyguards from Lotkuh was mobilized under the command of Atalique Sarfaraz Shah, the iron man who had crushed the Mastuj uprising in 1917. The commandant of the Chitral Scouts in Drosh was ordered to arrest Hussam-ul-Mulk while Shahzada Shahabuddin was sent to Drosh to replace him as governor. Orders were carried out accordingly and on 27 May 1946, Hussam-ul-Mulk was sent to Loralai prison in Balochistan, where he remained a prisoner until his release on 19 September 1949. The bodyguard force raided Drosh and returned after a week of plundering and looting. The unfortunate event was a result of intrigue in the court of the ailing *mehtar*. It, however, proved to be a milestone in the history of Chitral in the

sense that it paved the way to popular uprisings and mass agitations against the *mehtar* during the period 1946 to 1949 and onwards. In prison, Hussam-ul-Mulk devoted himself to socio-political planning. He masterminded a pamphlet, *Mazalim-e-Chitral* (*Oppressions in Chitral*), against the *mehtar*, which was published in Delhi by Chitrali students led by Maulana Amir Ali of Tirich, and widely distributed among the people of Chitral living downcountry from Peshawar to Lahore, Delhi, and Bombay. Some copies of the booklet even reached different corners of Chitral despite strict vigilance on the part of the *mehtar*.[5]

The Loralai prison gave Chitral an intellectual prince in the person of Hussam-ul-Mulk, who later wrote extensively on the culture of Chitral and created socio-political awareness among the masses in the area. He also organized a group of political activists to distribute handbills, posters, and other propaganda material against the government. His encouragement went a long way in promoting political activities in Chitral through an influential and vocal group of theologians.[6]

The Upheaval of 1949

Despite all odds, His Highness Muzaffar-ul-Mulk has to his credit the singular honour of bringing about Chitral's accession to Pakistan in November 1947.[7] On 14 August, he had donated Rs 40,000 in cash for the rehabilitation of refugees and sent a high-level delegation to meet Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the governor general of Pakistan, in Karachi. The *mehtar* had a meeting with the Quaid-i-Azam in Peshawar in April 1948. The former also sent his bodyguard contingents to war on the Kashmir front, and under the command of Colonel Mutaul Mulk, Skardu was liberated from the occupation of Dogra forces in August 1948.[8]

Despite all these victories, the *mehtar* could not quell the political movements. After the detention of Hussam-ul-Mulk, Drosh had become the centre of political activities. Social workers, religious leaders, and activists had organized themselves against the *mehtar*. Maulana Noor Shahidin, Maulana Qalandar Khan, Maulana Mohammad Aqil, Maulana Noorul Ain, Qadir Nawaz Khan, Maulana Abdul Karim, Zafar Ahmed, Saifullah Jan Lal, Mir Hussamuddin, and their comrades opposed the *mehtar* and his administration. After the emergence of Pakistan, political authorities guided and encouraged the anti-state forces. At the same time, an internal conflict was going on between the *mehtar* and his brothers on different issues. Mutaul Mulk, Khoshwaqtul Mulk, and Khosh Ahmadul Mulk had also developed differences with the *mehtar*, and had their own political views and designs. On 6 January 1949, His Highness Muzaffar-ul-Mulk died and the next day Crown Prince Saif-ur-Rahman was crowned as the new *mehtar*.[9] He was hardly 26 and dependent on his advisers and courtiers like his father in the last days of his life. Soon after his coronation, the young *mehtar* announced several concessions for his subjects and waived many taxes but the political activists wanted more concessions. The Drosh-based leaders demanded a share in power and shifted their headquarters to Chitral. At the same time, the people of Mastuj, led by Mohammad Saeed Khan, Sahib Nagin, Shah Syed, and others, created another front for the fulfilment of their demands and started to pass on wire messages to the authorities of the central government, to intervene in the affairs of Chitral and give the people their fundamental rights.

The mass agitation in Mastuj began in March 1949 and it spread from Yarkhun and Laspur down to Reshun. Shahzada Burhanuddin, commander-in-chief of the State Bodyguard, mobilized his troops towards Mastuj and arrested 400 persons including Sahib Nagin, Mohammad Saeed Khan, Shah Syed, Shokor Rafi, and other leaders. He also arrested Atalique Sarfaraz Shah of Chitral, the man who had earlier crushed the uprisings in Mastuj in 1917 and

Drosh in 1946, on the charges of indulging in intrigues against the *mehtar*. The drastic measures taken by the commander-in-chief of the State Bodyguard worsened the situation. Torture cells, physical punishment, and insulting treatments in public brought a very bad reputation to the administration. Leaders of public opinion launched a movement to demand the establishment of the a responsible Islamic government with immediate effect. They also came in contact with Manzar Alam and Chaudry Khaliquz Zaman of the Pakistan Muslim League, showing their intent to join the political mainstream in the country. The state administration took a serious view of the situation, and ordered a baton charge of nine leaders, including Salar Rahmatud Din and Haji Ghazi Khan, on 26 May. The detainees were put in torture cells. In his popular song, Sahib Nagin of Mastuj blames pro-Congress elements for these atrocities. The mobs grew larger day, by day and the Chitral State Muslim League was formed on 20 June 1949.[10] This first political party was supported by influential people among the ruling elite. Consequently, an inquiry was ordered into the affairs of the state to give relief to the public. In May 1949, Mohammad Sharif Khan, political agent, Malakand, finalized his inquiry report. As a result of his findings, all the prisoners were unconditionally released. Shahzada Burhanuddin and Dilaram Khan were detained and sent to Peshawar for mishandling the matter.

The Muslim League held a big rally on 17 September 1949, Chitral Polo Ground. It was the first show of street power against the *mehtar*.[11] After this rally, the government decided to introduce a new setup instead of the traditional one. On 16 October, His Highness Saif-ur-Rahman was sent to the Pakistan Administrative Academy, Lahore, for training.[12] An administrative board was constituted. Sarfaraz Shah, Shahabuddin, and Syed Nadir Shah were its members. In 1950, the pro-*mehtar* forces organized themselves under the banner of the Ittehadi League, headed by Agha Saadi Khan Chughtai. On 14 August 1950, both the rival political parties took out processions to show their strength. This game of numbers was won by the Muslim League, whose leader, Maulana Noor Shahiddin, managed to show a much larger gathering.[13]

The mass movement and upheaval of 1949 continued until April 1953, when the governor of the NWFP introduced the interim act of administrative reforms for Chitral. Under this act, the age-old state administrative machinery was abolished. Local governors were replaced by *tehsildars* (revenue officers), the State Bodyguard was substituted by the state police and an advisory council of elected representatives of the public was provided for.[14] Though, under an agreement, the Chitral State Muslim League was given a share in power, the mass movements went on until the merger of the state in 1969.[15]

The study of this period of the history of Chitral in the twentieth century reveals that the Katore princedom of Chitral resembled the last decades of the Khawarizm Shahi dynasty of Turkestan. To quote V.V. Barthold, 'they were superior to their rivals in consistency and political skill and they gradually rose to a paramount position in the eastern part of the Muslim World. By his misrule Khawarizm Shah Mohammad aroused the hostility of the military class and the clergy, as well as of the popular masses.'[16] As far as the character of the people is concerned it is still the same as what lord Curzon noted in 1894: loyal and submissive to the leader who has their interests at heart.

Acknowledgements

The paper is mostly based on the author's interviews with eyewitnesses of the events, such as Shahzada Hussam-ul-Mulk, Sahib Nagin, Saifullah Jan, Qadir Nawaz Khan, Mir Hussamuddin, Maulana Abdul Karim, Maulana Mohammad Aqil, Qazi Sahib Nizam, Agha Saadi Khan Chughtai, Wazir Ali Shah, and many other important figures of the period under discussion.

NOTES

1. Marquess Lord Curzon, *Leaves from a Viceroy's Notebook* (London: Macmillan, 1926), p. 131.
2. Mirza Mohammad Ghufran, *Tarikh-e-Chitral* (Peshawar, 1962), pp. 186–87.
3. Israr-ud-Din, Wazir Ali Shah, and Inayatullah Faizi *Chitral Ek Taaruf* (Chitral: Anjuman-e-Taraqqi Khowar, 1985), p. 65/ File No. Ch-304 Agitation in Chitral (Peshawar: Tribal Research Cell, 1927).
4. Tarikh, Ghufran, p. 244 and File No Ch-27, Detention of Hussam-ul-Mulk, (Peshawar: Tribal Research Cell).
5. Anonymous, *Mazalim-e-Chitral* (Katra Nai Delhi: Jamat Talaba Chitral, 1946).
6. File No Ch-27.
7. Ghufran, *Tarikh*, p. 242.
8. Manzoom, Ali, *Karakoram Hindu Kush*, Gilgit, (1985), pp. 392–94
9. Ghufran, *Tarikh*, p. 246.
10. Ibid., pp. 244–46.
11. Ibid., pp. 244–46.
12. File Chitral Muslim League Press Reports *The Daily Tarjuman-e-Afghan Peshawar/Ghufran*, *Tarikh*, p. 249.
13. Israr-ud-Din, Wazir Ali Shah, and Faizi, *Chitral*, p. 74.
14. Ibid., p. 74.
15. Israr-ud-Din, Wazir Ali Shah, and Faizi, *Chitral*, p. 74.
16. V.V. Barthold, *Turkistan Down to the Mongol Invasion* (Karachi: Indus Publishers, 1981), p. XXVI.

35

PRINCE SHER AFZAL KHAN—THE ILL-FATED ADVENTURER OF CHITRAL

*Rahmat Karim Baig**

Prince Sher Afzal Khan, popularly known as the Gerzinda remained a controversial figure in the state politics of Chitral both during his life-long struggle for *mehtarship* and after his death as a prisoner of war. His rule inside and outside the state has both fascinated and disgusted sections of the state subjects in his own time and after his arrest. He left his devotees perplexed at a crossroad in history when his claim to the *mehtarship* of the principality of Chitral was completely genuine.

The younger son of mehtar Shah Afzal the Second, Sher Afzal was fostered by the Baikay clan of Torkhow, where he achieved a substantial following. Additionally, his cordial behaviour with various sections of society, with a view to cementing his relations for a possible scramble for the *Mehtarship*, helped him in winning widespread support. Secret motives cannot be ruled out as his later activities confirmed but for the time being he behaved like a gentleman, enjoying the liberties and privileges allowed to him from the revenue of the area. His ambitious heart was shocked by Prince Nizam-ul-Mulk's arrival at Shagram for fostership—a place which was very vital for Sher Afzal's future course of action. Within a couple of years, after secret deliberations with his close associates he decided to leave for Badakhshan owing to the activities of the disinformation cell which was working to drive a wedge between Sher Afzal and his royal brother. His motives, however, became known to the *mehtar* before his escape from the state and he was summoned to the capital. Sher Afzal was generously allowed to have whatever he wished but it was hard to win him over. After a short time, he left the state with his family for the tribal areas of Kohistan from where he headed to Kabul. He was not a rebel; he never raised a standard of revolt against the authority of the ruling prince; rather, he was a dissident. His fiery nature could not pull on with the repressive measures and mounting expansionist designs of his brother, who had undoubtedly grown stronger and whom he could not openly oppose at that juncture of history. He, therefore, considered it advisable to leave the state and discreetly chose to attend the court of the *amir* of Kabul. He knew that the *amir*, especially the general feeling in Kabul, had never been friendly towards Chitral. Though there was no open hostility between the two states, the Kabul court had often been a refuge for fugitive Chitrali princes and the miasma created by them usually attracted the malcontents of the state of Chitral. Although the Kabul court had never launched a large-scale offensive against Chitral to fight for the cause of any of the fugitives, it did provide them moral support, opportunities to raise an army of volunteers or mercenaries, and dependable intelligence lines to monitor developments in Chitral. After a few years Mehtar Pehlewan of the Khushwaqte stock also reached the Kabul court after being divested of his territories by Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk. His and Sher Afzal's presence in the Kabul court was by no means a good omen for the astute Aman-ul-Mulk. Fears about the

* Lecturer in English, Govt Degree College, Chitral.

Amir's designs against Chitral instigated by the two fugitives compelled Aman-ul-Mulk to befriend the *maharaja* of Kashmir to counteract the imbalance. Because no Chitrali prince ever went to the Kashmir *darbar* seeking asylum, the *maharaja* held no bellicose designs against the mountainous state of Chitral and its ruler at that stage of history. So, Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk's leaning towards Kashmir was a natural outcome of events. It was also easier for him to approach the Government of India through the *maharaja*. All these were practical considerations, purely political motives, unconnected with religion, which he by passed at that moment.

During his twenty years' stay at the Kabul court, Gerzinda (Sher Afzal) had opportunities to take part in some campaigns under the *amir*. He fought bravely and received the *amir's* kind attention, accruing him liberal allowances to live in the northern regions of the country as an agent of the Kabul court, most probably with a view to enable him to remain in contact with his agents working in Chitral secretly, who regularly conveyed to him reports of the latest developments in the state. A local report says that two of his most active informants used to cross a certain pass in summer. During their first trip they were surrounded by villagers and held captive in a hamlet in the Wakhan valley. A few days later, a Chitrali woman was called to talk to the prisoners in Khowar. As a result, the purpose of their journey became known and they were allowed to go to Sher Afzal. But the Gerzinda never attempted to re-enter the state; neither did he give up his designs, nor did he try his luck by an appeal to the sword as long as Aman-ul-Mulk was alive. He watched the chain of events patiently, waiting for an opportune hour.

His patience finally presented him with a chance when his powerful brother disappeared from the political scene of Chitral in August 1892, and a scramble for the *mehtarship* began in earnest between the princes. In November 1892, the Gerzinda moved cautiously from Badakhshan via the Dora Pass into Lotkuh valley with a small contingent of not more than 200 men. It was a most carefully planned advance carried out expeditiously. He stormed the prince governor at Droshp, Lotkuh, in the darkness of the night, decapitating him mercilessly. In order to impress the people of the valley he resorted to military tactics, declaring that a large army was following him from Badakhshan and any kind of resistance by the local people would lead to devastation of the valley. The threat worked effectively and mob propaganda magnified it further. The second effective measure by Sher Afzal to make the bid a success was to cut off the communication lines so that no report of his sudden arrival should reach the capital. Thus, travellers going up the valley were allowed access but those travelling down were refused entry. This manoeuvre had the desired result. Prince Afzal-ul-Mulk, who usurped the capital after his father's death, was quite unaware of the storm moving down the Lotkuh valley. At Shoghor, the Gerzinda overwhelmed Prince Amir-ul-Mulk but he was not put to the sword; if he had been killed, like Murid-Dastigir at Droshp, the course of events would have been entirely different, but Amir-ul-Mulk was spared for unknown reasons. The third potent factor fully utilized by the Gerzinda was his offer to the people of Lotkuh valley to join him and share the booty of battle. This was a tempting bait to increase his native support. Mehtar Afzal-ul-Mulk's disregard for any possible invasion by his uncle was based on the *amir* of Kabul's treaty with British India, which was presumed to be sufficient cause for the *amir* not to allow the Gerzinda to invade Chitral.

Prince Sher Afzal's capture of Chitral Fort was carried out rather expeditiously. The *mehtar* and some of his adherents were killed whilst the rest of the men were overpowered by the invaders. The Gerzinda ascended the throne on 8 November 1892 at dawn and kept his word, allowing his supporters from the Lotkuh valley to loot and plunder as much as they could. In order to strengthen his hold over the supporters of Afzal-ul-Mulk and Prince Nizam-ul-Mulk, the Gerzinda resorted to brutality, killing many notables. A few managed to

escape to join Prince Nizam-ul-Mulk in Ghizer and bring him into the arena against the Gerzinda. The unexpected seizure of the principality of Chitral by the Gerzinda, and some features of his policy, estranged a section of the principal tribes, pushing them towards Nizam-ul-Mulk, who was slowly gaining support in the Ghizer valley. Muhammad Isa—a foster brother of the Gerzinda and a champion of his cause, tried to check Nizam's advance through the Ghizer valley but was forced to retreat to Drasun Fort by Nizam himself.

At Drasun, Sher Afzal's son with a good number of headmen held the fort, where Muhammad Isa and Danial Baig—two of the most gallant warriors of the time—hoped to beat back Nizam. In the Mastuj valley, the Gerzinda did not find dependable support or he would not have left Mastuj Fort to face Nizam. In order to avoid bloodshed and find time to entrench himself more firmly, Sher Afzal sent envoys to his nephew to reach a negotiated settlement of the issue by dividing the state into two halves, to which Prince Nizam-ul-Mulk agreed, providing that the Mulikhow and Torkhow valleys were given to him. However, he continued to exert pressure on Drasun Fort. Talks for peaceful settlement were in progress while Sher Afzal himself was in Chitral waiting for the results. Suddenly, however, a rash of Afghan soldiers belonging to Sher Afzal fired their guns recklessly. This firing sparked a battle amid the confusion. Nizam's men besieged the Drasun Fort for two days, but on the third night Sher Afzal's son made a blunder by deciding to escape. He and his followers fought their way out of the fort at midnight and fled via the Owir-Ozhor-Arkari route to Badakhshan without sending any message of their decision to Sher Afzal in Chitral. It was a very short-sighted, inadvisable, and rather ignominious escape. Their blunder led to speculations in the pro–Sher Afzal circles to which the war propaganda cell of Prince Nizam added rumours that Sher Afzal's son had been killed at the fort and his generals had fled the state unable to show their faces. The Gerzinda, having failed to ascertain the veracity behind the rumours decided to vacate the throne as he was disheartened at the so-called death of his beloved son and had been abandoned by his generals. He, therefore, decided to vacate Chitral Fort but it was a precipitous decision and shows the flaws in his war strategy. Sher Afzal's *mehtarship* over Chitral lasted for only 25 days. He left for Kabul once again on 2 December 1892, desolate and frustrated, while his son and generals had already reached Badakhshan. Soon after his return to Kabul, Chitral Fort was occupied by Nizam-ul-Mulk.

The Gerzinda returned to Kabul in utter disarray but disclosure of the real position further aggravated his fiery passions. Prince Amir-ul-Mulk had also left Chitral with the Gerzinda but he went over to Umara Khan of Jandool. After his reunion with his son and the generals, Sher Afzal sent Danial Baig to Jandool to recruit Amir-ul-Mulk against Nizam, who was then ruling the territories left by his father. A conspiracy was hatched against Nizam-ul-Mulk by the Gerzinda, Amir-ul-Mulk and Umara Khan of Jandool. Each of the three expected to outwit each other but Amir-ul-Mulk, was too young and inexperienced to compete with either of the other two. The young prince was tutored to start playing his role soon after his return to Chitral. The part played by him after his arrival in Chitral was a prologue to the bloody play of the subsequent years. The two principal characters remained calm behind the curtains but were prepared to jump into the arena as soon as their stool pigeon accomplished his part in the play. This part was to assassinate the ruling prince, an event which occurred on 1 January 1895. Umara Khan and Sher Afzal's entry into Chitral soon after the tragic event was entirely according to a pre-planned scheme, but the developments did not move to a climax as smoothly as envisaged by them. Umara Khan coveted some parts of the lower Chitral valley and had once besieged the Narisat Fort, where he had compelled the Chitrali contingent to surrender to him a notable of the Bashgal valley, whom he had carried away as prisoner while killing another at Arandu. This interference had exasperated Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk but the

British authorities had asked the *mehtar* not to take any action against Umara Khan, fearing border complications which they wanted to avoid.

Umara Khan had his own grievances against the British, as he had earlier been indulaged by them and then dropped. His claim over Asmar was rejected by the Boundary Commission, which was cause enough for him to take part in a tug-of-war to avenge the wrong he felt had been committed against him. In order to create border complication, he found elements like Sher Afzal and Prince Amir-ul-Mulk but declared a holy war against the pagans of Bashgal. It was an effective slogan to arouse the religious passions of his fellow tribesmen as his secret motive was still unknown to them. Robertson's report on the politics of the borderlands, long before Umara Khan's march to Chitral, stressed that Umara Khan and Sher Afzal should never be allowed to meet each other; otherwise, it was felt, trouble would be sure to follow. However, the contents of his report were not acted upon by the authorities concerned. Secret correspondence and exchange of messengers kept the two in close contact resulting in a conspiracy that drove Chitral to chaos. For Sher Afzal it was another chance to fulfil his long overdue plan.

The Gerzinda's reappearance on the political scene during such a serious juncture of political instability was reassuring for the portion of the Chitral elite who had in the meanwhile failed to extend all-out support to the incumbent *mehtar*, Amir-ul-Mulk. In the eyes of a major bulk of the public, the Gerzinda was the rightful candidate and had all the essential characteristics to resolve the crisis. However, the British agent stubbornly opposed the idea because he thought it against British honour to have any dealing with Sher Afzal. It was quite fair for the Gerzinda to fish in troubled waters, according to the traditions of his family. Indeed, he was playing a game not unknown in the history of the state, but Robertson's tinkering with the crisis added fuel to his fury. Sher Afzal had the right to make his bid but the British agent was acting on the basis of personal likes and dislikes. He was deadly against Sher Afzal's supremacy in the region as he was prejudiced against the man who enjoyed the support of the majority of the state subjects. Robertson had many options for a peaceful settlement of the issue but he chose the one which was more risky and uncalled for. Yapp, in his introduction to *Chitral: Story of a Minor Siege* writes, 'Robertson admits that Sher Afzal was the popular choice as *Mehtar* and it is by no means clear that the breakdown of the negotiations was the fault of Sher Afzal although Robertson endeavors to cast the blame on him.' According to Robertson, Nizam's death went unwept as some acts of cruelty perpetrated by him were detested by his subjects; and their resultant leaning towards Sher Afzal was a great change in local politics with Prince Amir-ul-Mulk acting as place-warmer for Sher Afzal. Umara Khan had obviously come to support those who favoured him and hoped to receive a part of the state for his sacrifices, which then would have placed him in a better position to reoccupy Narisat and some other parts of the valley.

Robertson has left no stone unturned to prove the so-called villainy and treachery in the character of the natives who had gallantly challenged his interference in a tug-of-war between the princes of the ruling family. Sher Afzal's claim to the *mehtarship* was valid and, for the most part, he relied on a negotiated settlement, abstaining from bloodshed as long as he could tolerate Robertson's delaying tactics.

Sher Afzal fought for his cause and the British contingent for British policy. A delegation of Chitrali notables met the Gerzinda soon after his arrival in Drosh to discuss the crisis and resolve the issue of succession. However, Robertson was infuriated to hear of such a move. Robertson's tactic of prolonging negotiations with Sher Afzal was designed to keep him in suspense until the arrival of reinforcements from Gilgit.

By installing a teenage 'puppet' on the *mehtar's* throne, the British attempted to become masters over the sensitive border state of Chitral. The alternative was to have a popular, powerful, independent, experienced, anti-British, Kabul-aligned Sher Afzal over whom they could not expect to exert their hold effectively. Such a ruler would have proved unruly, and not the tool which the British wanted for Chitral.

Sher Afzal's march into Chitral after Umara Khan and the *amir's* silence over his return to Chitral indicated that he had been allowed to try his luck with the secret consent of the Afghan ruler. At the same time, his march into Chitral was not opposed by any section of the Chitralis. Even those who were supporting Amir-ul-Mulk at that moment did not oppose or object to his entry into the most sensitive and vital sector of defence. This is sufficient proof of his popularity among the masses. The Gerzinda did not make the entry stealthily and Prince Amir-ul-Mulk's supporters knew about all of his movements. However, he did not have to face any kind of resistance by them in Lower Chitral, which was then seething with chaos. Additionally, the Gerzinda's generals received equal acclamation in the valleys of Upper Chitral, where Amir-ul-Mulk seems to have had no supporters at all. The mass support for the Gerzinda against British intervention was enough to prove his valid claim to the throne. All the strategic points from Chitral to Mastuj were occupied by followers of Sher Afzal under the popular command of Muhammad Isa. The defeat suffered by the British on 3 March at the hands of the Gerzinda's men should have opened the British agent's eyes to the fact that he enjoyed the popular support of the natives.

The Gerzinda fought not only for his cause but also for an independent state. He was opposed to the presence of British troops in Chitral whereas Aman-ul-Mulk and his successors had welcomed the British into Chitral and even relied on them. Sher Afzal's point of view, on the other hand, was clear from the very beginning. His uncompromising nature was an obstacle in his path for easy access to the throne. The Gerzinda's role and character in this very turbulent period of the history of Chitral has not received the degree of appreciation that it deserves. He was overwhelmingly supported as a leader and a model of native resistance but books of history have not done him justice. Robertson's mistrust of him was based on the fear that he was a nominee of the *amir* of Kabul and Sher Afzal's *mehtarship* meant to him an expansion of the kingdom of Kabul in the high Hindu Kush region and a setback for British designs. The British commander was determined to keep Chitral at all costs, mostly by his own initiatives, as there were no clear directives coming in. It was Robertson who was trying to change, unwittingly, an age-long tradition of succession* to uphold a frontier policy, deposing and installing young princes to block Sher Afzal's path. Umara Khan's advance to Drosh had made things more complicated for Chitralis as they did not know about his real intentions: whether he came to support Amir-ul-Mulk or the Gerzinda. This divided their loyalty, though Sher Afzal had a major portion of it while Amir-ul-Mulk had a negligible one as his dethronement never became a matter of resentment among the people, nor did Shuja-ul-Mulk's installation bring about any noticeable change in the support enjoyed by the ambitious Gerzinda. It is also noteworthy that Sher Afzal made a tangible mistake by not availing of his superior position gained on 3 March over the British troops but it does not compromise his right to the *Mehtarship*. Whatever was the cause of his failure, the general consensus over his legitimate right to the *Mehtarship* with popular backing and an eye for an independent position for Chitral can hardly be challenged. His failure was a tragedy for Chitral as it ended the independent position the state had enjoyed for hundreds of years.

---

* Robertson's move was exactly according to the age-old tradition of succession prevalent in the region (ed)

References

Ghulam Murtaza, Mirza. 1963. *Nai Tarikh-e-Chitral*, pp. 127, 139, 156–58, 164–75, and 268. Peshawar.

George Scott. Robertson. 1989. *Chitral*: *Story of a Minor Siege*, pp. 17, 32, 48, 58, 73, 83, 90–91, and 102 etc. London: Oxford University Press.

Acknowledgements

Certain information was also obtained through interviews from different informants who had firsthand knowledge of the events.

36

ONE HUNDRED YEARS AFTER THE SIEGE OF CHITRAL: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CAMPAIGN

*Muhammad Nawaz Khan**

General

After the annexation of the Punjab on 29 March 1849, the British inherited the restless tribal area of the frontier from the Sikhs. The British ruled up to 14 August 1947, but had to fight constantly against the fierce and independence-loving Pathans of the frontier. They had to send many expeditions against the Pathan tribes, who never accepted the British rulers, in accordance with their historical traditions. The Ambeyla Campaign of 1863, the Siege of Chitral and the Battle of Malakand of 1895, and the Pathan revolt of 1897 are some of the famous events of the military history of the frontier. April 1995 marked the one hundred year anniversary of the Siege of Chitral. The British have left and the state of Chitral is now a district of Pakistan, but people still read about the gallant actions of the tribal *ghazis* (infidel-slayers) and the British soldiers who fought against each other. This article is presented in celebration of the centenary of the Siege of Chitral and the Battle of Malakand, which shook the British government.

The Scramble for the *Mehtarship*

Relations between the state of Chitral and the British Government of India were first established in 1877. The aim was to check the advances of the Russians into the area. The then *mehtar* of Chitral, Aman-ul-Mulk, was a strong ruler but when he died in August 1892, a fight for the *mehtarship* started. Besides other kinsmen, Aman-ul-Mulk had left seventeen sons who could claim the *mehtarship*. One of his sons, Afzal-ul-Mulk, seized the treasury and arms and the people recognized him as the *mehtar*. The Government of India also recognized him while the lawful heir and elder son, Nizam-ul-Mulk, fled to Gilgit. One of the earliest claimants to the *mehtarship*, Sher Afzal, who was in Afghanistan, however, appeared on the scene and reached Chitral by force. Afzal-ul-Mulk was killed at Chitral Fort and Sher Afzal seized it along with the treasury and arms. Nizam-ul-Mulk, who was in Gilgit, now became active and advanced on Chitral in force. Sher Afzal could not stop his advance and again fled to Afghanistan in the first week of December 1892. The British sent a mission to Chitral to greet the new *mehtar*, Nizam-ul-Mulk. The new ruler settled down and ruled for about two years (1893–95) but was shot dead on 1 January 1895, on the instigation of his half-brother Amir-ul-Mulk, who then seized the throne to become *mehtar*.

* A retired major of the Pakistan Army.

Umara Khan Invades Chitral

The British had, in those days, become deeply involved in the power game of Chitral State. The claim of Amir-ul-Mulk was supported by Umara Khan, the chief of Jandool State, which bordered Chitral and Afghanistan. Umara Khan marched into Chitral with 3000 men, crossing over the 10,000 feet high Loari Pass, under heavy snow. The Chitralis, taken by surprise, could not withstand his attack and lost Drosh Fort. In the meantime, Sher Afzal also came and joined forces with Umara Khan against the British. The British in the interval deposed Amir-ul-Mulk, took him into custody, and formally recognized Shuja-ul-Mulk, who was about 10 years old, as the *mehtar*.

The Siege of Chitral Fort

The combined forces of Sher Afzal and Umara Khan attacked Chitral on 3 March 1895, causing the British forces to also suffer heavy casualties. Chitral Fort had six British officers and 400 men inside, apart from eleven followers, twenty-seven servants, some clerks, messengers, and fifty-two Chitralis. The total strength, therefore, came to 543. The British Government of India started immediate preparations to relieve Chitral. Mobilization of the 1st Division of the Field Army, under Major General Sir Robert Low, was, therefore, ordered. While the preparations were underway, affairs at Chitral worsened and lieutenants Fowler and Edwards were seized by Sher Afzal and sent to Umara Khan, who shifted them to Munda in Jandool.

The Battle of Malakand

The force under Major General Low advanced on 3 April 1895 towards the Malakand Pass, where a fierce battle was fought on the same day. The pass and the shouldering heights were held by about 12,000 tribesmen. These defending Pathan '*ghazis*' fought gallantly, but were overwhelmed by the British forces. According to British sources, about 500 Pathans were martyred, about 1000 wounded, and about 10,000 dispersed. The British losses were seventy killed and wounded.

The Relief of Chitral

After taking Malakand, the British took Chakdara and advanced into Dir valley. While this force had started for Malakand earlier, Colonel Kelly started with his force from Gilgit for Chitral, which was 220 miles away, via the 12,250 feet high Shandur pass, on 23 March 1895. The force crossed the pass, which was covered with heavy snow, on 30 April 1895 with determination and courage. After various combats against Chitrali *mujahideen*, the force finally reached Chitral on 20 April 1895. The siege had been lifted a day earlier. The men of Kelly's force joined hands with their comrades, who had been besieged for 47 days at Chitral Fort. The famous march was highly appreciated by Her Majesty Queen Victoria and her other military commanders. By the end of April 1895, General Low's force also arrived in Chitral via the Loari Pass. With this successful expedition, the new *mehtar*, Shuja-ul-Mulk, was installed. Many military awards were given for gallantry during the siege and relief of Chitral, including the Victoria cross to Surgeon-Captain Whitchurch.

Analysis of the Campaign

It is said that a people can only live in the present if they learn from the past. It is, therefore, necessary to go into the causes of a conflict and its consequences. The Chitral campaign offers a classic example in this regard.

Causes

1. The British had come to stay and, in order to consolidate their position, they showed a keen interest in the affairs of Chitral, Gilgit, Hunza, Swat, Dir, and Malakand. They did not lose any opportunity to take advantage of internal disturbances in the small states. They were ruthless in this regard. The instructions of one commander, Skobeleff, to his officers were:
   'Do not forget that in Asia he is the master who seizes the people pitilessly by the throat and imposes upon their imagination.'
2. The Russians had made political incursions into Hunza. They had taken over neighbouring areas in Turkestan and knew of the importance of Chitral. Their interest prompted the British to move into Chitral as quickly as possible and start actively interfering in the affairs of Kashmir, Gilgit, and Hunza.
3. Internal quarrels for the *mehtarship* of Chitral among the successors of Aman-ul-Mulk weakened the state and created an opportunity for British and Afghan intrigues.
4. Umara Khan, after consolidation of his power in Jandool and other areas, naturally looked towards Chitral. The support of the Afghans and internal conflicts within Chitral's ruling class gave him an opportunity to use force against the state.
5. Last but not the least was the interference of the *maharaja* of Kashmir, who did not want a prosperous and strong Chitral as his neighbour, (specially) ruling Ghizer, Yasin and Ishkoman. This brought him closer to the British and he put his forces under the British command for subjugating the Chitralis.

The Consequences

1. The British were the biggest beneficiaries of the Chitral campaign. They were able to consolidate their control over Chitral and now started to actively interfere in its internal affairs.
2. With the control of the strategically important state of Chitral, the British were able to check the further advance of the Russians. The Pamirs, therefore, became the last areas to come under the Russian Empire.
3. Chitral State was broken. Ishkoman, Yasin, and Ghizer were permanently detached from its rule.
4. The British consolidated their power in Kashmir, Hunza, and Gilgit and the *maharaja* had to suffer losses in this respect. His control and rule in these areas, except Kashmir, became nominal.
5. The Afghans were brought under pressure and their interference in Chitral, Bajour, Dir, and other areas was checked. The Afghans were also not permitted to establish close links with the Russian Empire.

6. The British took full advantage of the campaign and took over the affairs of Dir and Malakand also. With Chitral under their control, their rule was sufficiently strengthened in these areas.

Conclusion

The British did not acquire control over Chitral easily. They fought many battles and suffered a lot at the hands of the Pathans at Malakand and Nawagai. The successes of the Chitralis at Koragh over Captain Ross, at Reshun resulting in the capture of lieutenants Edwards and Fowler, and at Chitral, during British reconnaissance on 3 March 1895, are worth mentioning. The Chitralis fought bravely for their land and independence and scored at many places. After the campaign, a new brand of freedom-loving Chitralis emerged.

Chitral is today more important strategically than before. Its closeness to the new Central Asian states has given the area new dimensions and Chitral cannot be ignored, if links between the Central Asian states, Pakistan, and other countries are to be established. Chitral and its people have always maintained the original characteristics of the culture, language, and customs of their area and will do so for years to come. Their glory shall always remain by the grace of God Almighty. Baba Siyar said:

ma sayūrj dawur diti ma hosto-te goya nogoy
ay ma lot nemi khodai ma niyat mat boya no boy

O-God! Shall my falcon come back to me from the skies and will my wishes be fulfilled.

It shall definitely come, because:

bigzarad az now falak ah-e dile máa khastagán
báaš áagah zálimá az šišt-e tiir andáaz-e ma

O-Tyrant, be afraid of our cries that pierce through nine skies

hergiz siar manáaz bitaɣáat-e khesh
taɣt bikun wa takɣa be litf-e ilah kun

O-Siyar: Do not be proud of your prayers, just go on obeying, and leave the consequences to the mercy of God Almighty

37

MAULANA NOOR SHAHIDIN (1887–1967): HIS POLITICAL ROLE IN THE HISTORY OF CHITRAL

*Amir Khan Mir**

Maulana Noor Shahidin is known in the written annals and folk history of Chitral as a man of great courage. He masterminded and successfully led a mass movement against the prevailing socio-political system in the princely state of Chitral at a time when the state princes had consolidated their power under His Highness Sir Shuja-ul-Mulk with the help of the moral, financial, and military support of the British rulers.

After the demise of Aman-ul-Mulk in 1892, a period of uncertainty, chaos, and political turmoil was ushered into Chitral. His successors, indulging in the wars of succession, became so weak that the ruling elite invited the British to intervene militarily and annex the state as part of British India. The Siege of Chitral in March April 1895, was the last episode of these events. On the one side were those who fought for the freedom of Chitral, led by Ghazi Sher Afzal, Danial Baig, and Muhammad Isa, who were supported by Umara Khan, the ruler of Jandool. On the other side, there were pro-British elements under Shuja-ul-Mulk who wanted to oust Umara Khan and his allies from Chitral. The fighting and siege resulted in the success of the latter group. Consequently, Sher Afzal and his allies were imprisoned for life and Shuja-ul-Mulk was crowned as state ruler with unprecedented powers. Under an agreement, defence and foreign affairs were given to British India. The *mehtar* no longer needed the people's help in these matters. Moreover, a handsome subsidy from the British exchequer gave him financial support to crush his opponents. Thus, the voice of opposition was suppressed in the state.

In the past the *mehtar-e-Chitral* had depended on the public for security and defence of the state. He had needed the people's mandate for his power and had to give some weight to the aspirations of his subjects. Now, as the head of the British protectorate of Chitral, the *mehtar* developed into a monarch having unlimited powers, and his office became the symbol of a despotic ruler. He could seize the properties of his subjects, and even his courtiers could torment the Chitralis by snatching their belongings and encroaching upon their lands.

A number of taxes were levied on the poor masses who no longer had a say in state affairs. Sanctions were imposed on freedom of thought. Nobody was allowed to raise objections to what was going on. Voices raised against these cruelties were suppressed by force. There were courts and legal forums for disposal of cases, but all such forums including the court for Islamic jurisprudence (Mizan-e-Sharia) were just an eyewash. Their decisions were subject to the approval of the *mehtar*, whose person was like a clock tower in a walled city.

It was during this period that Maulana Noor Shahidin returned from Delhi after completing his religious education at the famous Institution of Aminiya founded by Mufti Kifayatullah. He

* Met. officer, Chitral.

belonged to a middle-class family of Chumurkhon, a village 10 kilometres away from the *mehtar's* palace. His father, Sufi Muhammad-ud-Din, was a simple man and had no interest in political affairs. Maulana Noor Shahidin was a man of a different nature. Just after his arrival in Chitral in July 1917, at the age of 30, he delivered his first sermon from the stage of Shahi Masjid, Chitral, controlled by the *mehtar*, in the very presence of the ruler. In his sermon, the young, energetic, and daring *maulana* demanded the enforcement of Islamic laws under an independent judiciary. He also condemned the un-Islamic taxes imposed on the masses and the prevailing system of forced labour in the state. He demanded the abolition of the existing revenue laws and forced labour. This sort of political speech was unexpected and unprecedented, especially under the very nose of the state ruler. It was an open challenge to the authority of the *mehtar*. When the prayers were over, Sir Shuja-ul-Mulk asked the *maulana* what type of *sharia* law he wanted to introduce.

The *mehtar* was of the view that there was a Mizan-e-Sharia in the state, with qualified *qazis*. But the *maulana* was not satisfied with the prevailing system and wanted a totally free Mizan-e-Sharia true to the spirit of the Islamic judicial system. The *mehtar* did not agree with his demand and threatened restrain to him from direct or indirect interference in the affairs of his administration. The *maulana* continued his mission irrespective of the consequences he had to face in his career as a social reformer. He was then put under strict watch. When the Third Afghan War ended, the *mehtar* of Chitral emerged victorious. He summoned the *maulana* to his court and asked for his cooperation, offering certain incentives, but the *maulana* did not bow before the *mehtar*. Although he was warned of dire consequences the *maulana* continued his struggle for ameliorating the lot of the poor masses in the state. He was subjected to corporal punishment and mental torture but these tactics could not force him to abandon his ideals and beliefs.

In 1924, when His Highness Shuja-ul-Mulk returned from his pilgrimage to the Holy Kaaba in Makkah, he was greeted by his subjects with great pomp and show. Political and religious elites and the masses turned out in great numbers to congratulate him. On this occasion, Maulana Noor Shahidin also called on the *mehtar* and advised him to do away with the rule of oppression and introduce Islamic laws in the state. The *mehtar* did not turn down the proposal to his face, but rather thought of a plan to get rid of him. Noor Shahidin was a person neither to be bought nor to be bowed. Accordingly, a member of the clergy, who was trusted by the *mehtar*, was commissioned to make an attempt on the life of *maulana* Noor Shahidin. The plan was carried out, but the *maulana* survived. In retaliation, his supporters managed to baton-charge the offender. As a result, Maulana Noor Shahidin was imprisoned and tortured severely. After his release he emerged as a popular leader of the masses. He organized like-minded people throughout the state and launched an underground campaign for Islamic laws and a democratic setup in the state. On several occasions he fled to Kabul in self-exile, and contacted prominent figures in Afghanistan and India to support his movement for human rights in Chitral.

The *maulana* once again posed a challenge to the state authorities. This time the *mehtar* commissioned a team of his trusted people to assassinate Maulana Noor Shahidin at any cost. The team planned to ambush the *maulana*. Luck favoured him as he passed by the place at the head of a good contingent of his well-wishers. Although an encounter did take place the second attempt on his life also failed. The ambushed party suffered from severe injuries but nobody was killed. When the *mehtar* heard of the incident he wanted to put the *maulana* behind bars, but some of his courtiers, who by now had developed a soft corner for the *maulana*, advised the *mehtar* to forget the matter. The *maulana* was often told by his supporters

to adopt a flexible policy, but he was a hardliner and hard taskmaster. Retreat was written nowhere in his book.

In 1936, His Highness Shuja-ul-Mulk was succeeded by Crown Prince Mohammad Nasir-ul-Mulk. He was an enlightened and broad-minded prince and his views were identical with those of Maulana Noor Shahidin. He established schools and allowed all classes of people to educate their children. He established the Chitral Scouts as a native force and sent the British garrison back to India.

He also embarked upon a plan to introduce development works in the state: generation of electricity by installing mini-hydel power stations was his priority. The enforcement of Islamic laws and introduction of democratic reforms in the state administration were also very much on his agenda. Therefore, Maulana Noor Shahidin did not press his political struggle so hard during his rule.

The rule of His Highness Mohammad Muzaffar-ul-Mulk (1943–49) was quite different from that of his predecessor. Owing to profound illness, the *mehtar* himself could not keep a vigilant eye on the day-to-day affairs of the administration. Those courtiers holding vested interests took the opportunity to oppress the poor masses. Many schemes launched by Nasir-ul-Mulk became redundant. Nobody's life, honour, and property were safe from the subordinate authorities of the state administration. New taxes were introduced. This state of affairs compelled Maulana Noor Shahidin to accelerate the pace of his mass movement once again. His highness employed the tactics of his father and placed a choice before him: either he accept royal offers and incentives or be subjected to severe punishment. The *maulana* opted for the latter, and underwent torture in prison. On his release, a third attempt was made on his life. The would-be killers opened fire on his house. He was unaware of the conspiracy but survived the attack. The snipers' raid was reported in the press and the state administration had to hang its head in shame.

By this time, the Pakistan movement was in progress in the subcontinent and efforts were being made to popularize the slogans of the All-India Muslim League in Chitral State. There was a ban on political activities in the state, but Maulana Noor Shahidin and his colleagues managed to prepare the masses for a grand agitation in 1946. Their struggle resulted in the accession of Chitral to Pakistan in 1947. The Pakistan Muslim League was introduced in Chitral by Maulana Noor Shahidin in 1949. Owing to legal implications it was called the Chitral Muslim League and the Maulana was elected its president. On 17 September 1949, the Chitral Muslim League held a grand public meeting in Chitral in which the *maulana* floated his well-known demand for the enforcement of *sharia*, the abolishment of cruel taxes and forced labour, and the establishment of a responsible Islamic government in Chitral. His Highness Saif-ur-Rahman attended the public meeting and announced a number of concessions in taxes, the abolition of forced labour, and the enforcement of *sharia* within the existing legal system. This was a great success for Maulana Noor Shahidin, yet he did not accept it because he wanted to bring revolutionary changes in the entire setup. He did not give up his struggle and made representations to the provincial and central governments pressing his demands.

In 1953, the *maulana* succeeded in compelling the Pakistan government to make administrative reforms and enforce an interim constitution providing for a democratic setup to replace the age-old administrative hierarchy in Chitral. The *maulana* was elected unopposed to the state advisory council. Until now he was hopeful regarding the enforcement of *Sharia* in the country especially in Chitral. When he was again disappointed he went to Kabul to see for himself if the Afghan government could help him in this regard. On his return he told his colleagues that things were even worse in that country, so he gave up the idea of seeking its help.

After living a long and eventful life, Maulana Noor Shahidin died on 27 September 1967 at the age of 80. He is highly regarded by his supporters as well as opponents for his bold character and fair game. Enforcement of *sharia* was his cherished goal and sole ambition.

Maulana Noor Shahidin was a true reformer and saviour of the oppressed people of Chitral. He was imprisoned eleven times and left his homeland on several occasions. He could have got benefits for himself and his family, but he did not accept such offers. He sacrificed his time, energy, and resources for the better future of his people. He often said, 'One should neither be afraid of any body except Allah nor expect any sort of help from anyone save Allah.' In fact, he was the founder of modern Chitral. In particular, the political horizon, land tenure system, and administrative setup of the district would have been quite different had he not devoted his intellectual as well as physical capabilities for socio-political reforms in Chitral. It is pertinent here to quote Allama Iqbal in order to pay homage to this great hero of the twentieth century:

بگوشم آمد از خاک مزارے که درون زمین ہم متیوان زیست
نفس دارد و لیکن جان ندارد کسے کہ بر مراد دیگران زیست

I heard a voice coming from the soil of a grave, saying, 'There can be life even inside the grave. Those who lived for others' welfare, are, though dead physically living spiritually'

Likewise, Maulana Noor Shahidin is alive in spirit as well as in the hearts and memories of hundreds of thousands of people across the country that he served so devotedly.

References

Books

Israr-ud-Din, Wazir Ali Shah, & Inayatullah Faizi. *Books* 1985. *Chitral Ek Taaruf*. Chitral: Anjuman-e-Taraqqi Khowar.

Khan, Faramoz. 1991. *Chitri Nizhad* Peshawar.

Ghulam Murtaza Mirza. 1963. *Tarikh-e-Chitral*. Peshawar.

Papers/Journals

Alfalah Daily, Peshawar.

Azad Daily, Peshawar, 12 April 1949.

Tarjuman-e-Afghan, Peshawar, 8 February 1950.

Terich Mir Weekly, Peshawar, 4 October 1967.

Terich Mir Annual Journal of Chitral Student Association, Peshawar University, 1989–90.

Shahbaz Daily, Peshawar.

38

SIEGE OF CHITRAL: SOCIO-POLITICAL IMPACTS OF THE BRITISH INFLUENCE (1895–1995)

*Inayatullah Faizi**

The Siege of Chitral was such a remarkable event that it has been remembered as a milestone and significant point in history. Besieging a party of 543 men including civilians and followers in a small fort of about 2400 square feet, with limited supplies and ammunition hardly sufficient for 37 days, was a great success on the part of the freedom fighters, and withstanding the siege for more than 46 days was a display of courage and planning on the part of the defenders.[1] The siege had commenced at a place where communication with the outer world was very difficult even for those who were outside the besieged fort. In early March 1895, all the passes were packed with soft snow and mobilization of the relief force for the besieged party was almost impossible. Another handicap was that the land and people were biased against the besieged for being strangers either from Britain or from Punjab and other parts of southern India. The event did not happen all of a sudden; it was rather a natural course of the events that followed the signing of an agreement between Aman-ul-Mulk, the *mehtar* of Chitral, and the British Government of India through the good offices of the *nawab* of Dir and the *maharaja* of Kashmir in November 1885.[2]

The *mehtar* was compelled to lean towards British India for help in case of any aggression from tsarist Russia, whose forces were being deployed on both banks of the Oxus in Badakhshan and Turkestan, on the vulnerable northern borders of Chitral.[3] The expansionist *amir* of Afghanistan was another threat to the state from the southwest.

The agreement with the British was likely to serve the common interest of both the parties in checking Russian forces on the northern bank of the Oxus and preventing Amir Abdur Rahman Khan from stretching his influence towards the southern valleys of the Hindu Kush. The move also blocked the way of the Jandool chief, Umara Khan, who was constantly seeking British help to materialize his designs against the *mehtar* of Chitral.[4] Even after the agreement, Umara Khan remained in contact with British officers in Peshawar asking for arms and ammunition to invade Chitral. In his letters Umara Khan repeatedly reminds the British government of his past services, loyalty, and friendship. He also assures them of his sincere services in future.[5]

As long as Aman-ul-Mulk and Sardar Nizam-ul-Mulk lived, Umara Khan could not attack Chitral. The assassination of Sardar Nizam-ul-Mulk and subsequent coronation of Amir-ul-Mulk in January 1895 gave him the long-awaited opportunity of attacking Chitral, partly because Amir-ul-Mulk was in the bad books of the British Government and partly because the former was weak and depended on Umara Khan for support.

* Lecturer in Urdu literature, Govt College, Buni (Chitral).

The invasion of Chitral by Umara Khan, the bloodshed, and the twelve eventful weeks of the presence of the Pathan forces in Chitral changed the face of the country from an independent friend to a protectorate of British India. Prior to January 1895, the British agent, with an escort of only 100 men, was stationed in the state. After the invasion of Umara Khan a British garrison of 1000 men had to be raised and kept for the tiny hill state by the British commander-in-chief in India on a permanent basis. The political mission had to be upgraded and an assistant political agent was permanently posted in Chitral. Thus in letter and spirit it ushered in a new era for the land and people of the mountainous tract of the Hindu Kush.

The area remained a British colony for fifty-three years, and it acceded to the sovereign state of Pakistan at the time of partition to become the country's northern borderland. The experience has been interesting in many respects and its impacts and impressions on society have been of great significance. The following is a classified discussion on the bright and dark sides of the most controversial period of the history of Chitral.

1. Strategic Imperatives

Chitral was an area closely connected and deeply linked with Central Asian *amirates* and *khanates* for many centuries. The people of this area looked towards Kashgar, Bukhara, Tashkent, Samarqand, and Kabul at times of peace and crisis. Historic and cultural links between Turkestan, Afghanistan, and Chitral were deep-rooted in the remote past. Any conflict arising with any neighbouring state to the west or north was liable to be short-lived. The British influence closed all doors opening to the west and the north. It linked Chitral with the east and southeast, providing for its new relations with Kashmir and India. It further strengthened the ties of Chitral with Gilgit and Peshawar. Gradually, the Silk Route caravans of China and Russia were replaced by short-distance travellers from Peshawar to Gilgit and back. Destinations of traders and travellers began to change and in a few decades, the names of Chigha Serai, Kabul, Kashgar, Yarkand, Bukhara, and Samarqand were substituted by Srinagar, Amritsar, Delhi, Agra, Bombay, Calcutta, Lahore, and Karachi. The shifting of direction changed Chitral's strategic imperatives and it gained a pivotal place in the geo-political setup of this subsystem. In the past it was considered a periphery in the 'great game' but now it became a core area which played the role of a strong British outpost during the Third Afghan War in 1919.

Exposure to the Outer World

For 3000 years Chitral had been little known in the outside world. Owing to its position and location in the mountainous terrain, on the alternate passage of the famous Silk Route, it was only known in the neighbouring areas as Kashgar-e-Khurd, that is, Little Kashghar or Kashqar. Earlier itineraries of the British explorers had given it some sort of publicity as a peaceful place on the way to the Pamirs and Oxus. Owing to the siege in 1895, Chitral became widely known across the globe. Stories of the siege were carried by Western print media, which gave Chitral the fame of an important borderland of British India. British officers wrote extensively on the terrain, its people, language, and culture. The Royal Asiatic Society and the Royal Geographical Society of London made it a permanent feature of their exploratory and intellectual pursuits. The pioneers in writing on the history, culture, geography, and literature

of Chitral were British officers serving in Gilgit and Chitral or travelling here on special missions.[6]

Cultural Patterns

The interaction of the people of Chitral with British officers created a social, cultural, and political awareness hitherto unknown in the princely state. Urdu and English became popular at first and then replaced Persian as official languages. Chitral's linkage with British India also affected the cultural norms. Indian dresses, costumes, and etiquettes were gradually adopted first by the rulers and courtiers and then by the elite and finally by the people on the street. Mughal architecture was also introduced in the state during this period, when architects and masons from Agra were employed in the construction of mosques, palaces, and other buildings in Chitral. Western games like football, hockey, tennis, and cards became popular among the people. New dishes and beverages (pudding, tea, juices, wines, etc.) were brought to Chitral as a aresult of the British influence.

Statecraft

Before the British hegemony, Chitral was a classic model of an eastern princely state, where the ruler was all in all in internal affairs. The law of the land was nothing but the sweet will of the ruler. Lord Curzon gives a valuable account of the system, as he observed it in 1894, 'The *Mehtar* was supreme. He alone had the power of life and death. Theoretically, the whole property of the country belonged to him, and in more than theory, he actually disposed of the persons and possessions of his subjects.'[7] In his opinion the *mahraka*, in which issues were taken up and decided by the *mehtar* in an open court, was an eyewash like the British House of Commons, where the front two benches participated in the debate and the remainders were spectators to the show. It was instituted to prolong the inevitable while avoiding any adverse reaction.[8]

In the prevailing system of government, there was no constitution and no record of proceedings or events whatsoever. Important fields of statecraft, that is, revenue, defence, and justice, were never organized under a discipline. Public welfare was a strange concept in the state. Social services, schools, and hospitals were not known to the ruler or his subjects. Slave trade was one of the notorious practices of that age. Traders from Kabul, Turkestan, and Badakhshan used to barter their goods for slaves in Chitral, Gilgit, and neighbouring states.[9]

Shuja-ul-Mulk was the first ruler of the state who brought about far-reaching changes in statecraft and set new trends in the civil and military administration, under the surveillance of British agent in Chitral. Prior to 1895, stability of the government had depended on the skill and power to behead those who opposed the ruler. The precedents available provided survival of the fittest person in the true sense of the word. In a short span of twenty-nine months from August 1892 to January 1895, five princes, including two *mehtars*, were assassinated by one another. All the princes were brothers and the cause of dispute was succession by force. The expansion of British colonial rule to Chitral went a long way in giving stability and sense of security to the ruler. Now the state ruler no longer needed murder and plunder for survival. A defence department was set up with the establishment of the Chitral Scouts and State Bodyguard force. Arms and ammunition were provided to enable the defence force to take required action at the hour of need. A law of succession was framed, removing the possibility

of future wars of succession. The revenue department was organized and an annual income/expenditure assessment system was introduced in 1898.[10]

A justice department was set up in 1909, which maintained a record of all civil and criminal cases. Similarly, trade and forest departments were established to streamline the government's control over these vital sources of income. A works department was set up to bring barren lands under cultivation and increase farm production of the state. This department also looked after construction of buildings and roads.[11]

Human rights were given due impotance and the slave trade was abandoned in 1895. All these efforts helped Chitral State to enter into the twentieth century with a forward-looking approach and make progress in many walks of life.

Economic Implications

Financial constraints always play a role in the crucial stages of the history of a nation. The poor economic condition of the state of Chitral was one of the major factors to compel the *mehtar* to allow the subjugation of his country to British India. It is evident from letters written to the British authorities by the *mehtars* from time to time in order to request for enhancement in the annual subsidies received by them. The following is an extract from one of many letters written to the Government of India by Shuja-ul-Mulk and Nasir-ul-Mulk. All letters bear more or less the same wording.

> Therefore being forced by the dint of shear necessity I am compelled to appeal to the Govt. of India for pecuniary help and most ardently pray that they may be pleased to earn the ever lasting gratitude of a loyal and faithful dependency by raising the govt. subsidy to rupees one lakh per annum. (Letter of His Highness Mohammad Nasir-ul-Mulk to the secretary, foreign affairs, Government of India, dated 14 January 1937)[12]

The following table shows the gradual increase in the subsidy received by the *mehtar*:

Table 38.1 Subsidy Received by the *Mehtars* of Chitral (1888–1943)

Year	*Amount (in Rs)*
1888	6000
1895	14,000
1914	24,000
1936	65,000
1938	100,000
1943	180,000

In 1895, economic activity was restricted to a limited trade with Badakhshan and Turkestan. Apart from the government subsidy, income sources of the state were negligible.

With the British influence, new sources of income were generated through supply contracts to the *mehtar* and the state income was gradually raised to Rs 316,000 in 1937. Construction works and transportation of government goods and other activities were casual sources of cash earnings. Such incentives gave some sort of relief to the middle and lower classes in the country. As a result of the state's exposure to the Indian plains, a good number of workers from Chitral migrated to the urban centres of the subcontinent to seek jobs and brought their

incomes to the state. Similarly traders from Bajour, Peshawar, Nowshera, Amritsar, Ambala, Jalandhar, Srinagar, and Delhi set up their business centres in Chitral. This increased Chitral's potential trade with Afghanistan and Turkestan. A special cloth quota was given by the British authorities to Chitral for export to Badakhshan and Turkestan. Before 1919, export of timber via the river course through Afghanistan was a source of state income but after the Third Anglo-Afghan War the Afghan government imposed a ban on the passage of timber and all trade routes were closed. In 1937, a trade delegation led by Shahzada Hussam-ul-Mulk was sent to Kabul to negotiate for the resumption of the trade route and passage of timber through Afghanistan which yielded positive results, and trade routes were reopened.[13]

Imports from India were iron, salt, indigo, raw silk, cloth, groceries, tea, tobacco, cooking pots, books, cowries, sugar, agricultural implements, and pedlars' wares. Imports from Badakhshan and Turkestan consisted of carpets, cotton, cooking vessels, silk, saddle, bridles, *charas* (hashish), opium, *zira*, cloaks, horses, sheep, and leather goods.[14]

Apart from the timber, exports of Chitral were woollen products on a very small scale. After the accession of Chitral to Pakistan, the trade of cottage industry products, especially woollen goods such as Chitrali *chogas*, caps, and woollen cloth increased day by day, and now it has become an important source of income. In 1937, Nasir-ul-Mulk gave incentives to the farmers in the upper one-crop zone of Chitral to grow cash crops like *charas* and opium. In a few years, *charas* became one of the major crops of the area and a good source of income for the growers, traders, and the government. In spite of a ban on its growing and trade, it is still being produced in some areas of Mastuj Tehsil. The post-independence era opened new horizons and venues for business and trade in Chitral. The merger of the state in 1969 went a long way in accelerating the pace of development. Manpower is still a major source of income. Skilled and unskilled labour's migrating to the urban areas of the country and abroad has increased the ratio of per capita income to a considerable extent. Lately the Aga Khan Rural Supsport Programme (AKRSP) has successfully used human resources as a tool for integrated rural development. Apparently the British influence on Chitral helped in opening opportunities for economic development in Chitral at least half a century ahead of its accession to Pakistan.

Physical Infrastructure

The poor economy and internal feuds of the former rulers of Chitral did not allow them to plan rural development of any sort. Even some efficient, capable, and powerful rulers such as Khan Ra'is (1356–1420), Nasir Ra'is (1531–74), Muhtaram Shah Kator II (1788–1838), and Aman-ul-Mulk (1854–92) could not spare time and resources for the development of the infrastructure. The British, no doubt, had little interest in the welfare of their subjects. Yet they needed certain developmental activities for the mobilization and deployment of troops in border areas. Therefore physical infrastructure was developed in the area by the British authorities.

Communications

The mountainous terrain of Chitral had only paths and tracks for movement of people within the state and its link with the neighbouring areas. The maximum width of the best path and trail was about two feet. In 1895, the troops faced a tough time in carrying guns over these paths. In 1902, a plan was chalked out to develop all the paths into 6–8 feet wide tracks, and

build hanging bridges at suitable places. Bengal Sepoys and miners were given the hard task, and they made a 163 mile track on the main route across the country from the Loari Pass in the south to the Shandur Pass in the northeast, during the first three decades of the twentieth century.[15] In 1928, Shuja-ul-Mulk converted 40 miles of tracks into motorable roads.[16]

The Loari-Shandur mule track was widened for vehicular traffic in 1976, about a half a century after it was first built. Of the seven hanging bridges built by the British garrison, one at Kuna, near Mastuj, has been washed away by floods. The rest are still used for motor transport. Facilities of telecommunications were also introduced in Chitral by the British government in 1904 and work on a telegraph line was taken in hand which later connected Chitral with Peshawar and Gilgit. Telephone facilities were provided by the *mehtar* for communication with all six governorships in the state. Wireless stations were set up in Chitral and Mastuj.

Social Services

Society in Chitral represented mountain communities of India where the concept of services like health care, education facilities, and legal procedure were unknown in the nineteenth century, and it was likely that these concepts would have taken another century to reach them. The British occupation was a turning point in the history of Chitral because it extended the facilities available in urban areas to the rural community of Chitral. Hospitals were set up in Drosh and Chitral to provide medical facilities primarily to the garrison and political elite, and of course, to the public as well.

Opportunities of education were opened at first stage for the princes and students close to the ruling elite, in Peshawar, Aligarh, and Dehradun, India. The commoners followed them, and many students from Chitral went to Delhi, Deoband, Bombay, Lahore, and Peshawar for education. Most of them received free education at religious schools, and on their return every one of them played a key role in bringing about a change in their society. Some of them, such as Maulana Noor Shahidin, His Highness Mohammad Nasir-ul-Mulk, and Maulana Hazrat-ud Din, became pioneers of socio-political revolution in Chitral during the first half of the twentieth century. Mehtar Shuja-ul-Mulk had to open some non-formal schools in Chitral in 1904. This move was followed by Mohammad Nasir-ul-Mulk, who established the first Anglo vernacular formal school in Chitral in November 1938.

As far as legal procedure is concerned, the state of Chitral was governed by customary laws and there was no written record of any procedure in the dispensation of justice, because it was a verbal exercise. As a result of the British influence, Shuja-ul-Mulk directed that all complaints, appeals, or requests be submitted in writing and an order to this effect was consequently passed in writing. In 1909 a forum for the institutionalized disposal of cases was constituted as the Judicial Council of Chitral, which is still intact. The agreements signed by Shuja-ul-Mulk with British India in 1914, and by Nasir-ul-Mulk in 1938 and 1941 have a clause to the effect that the *mehtar* will not fail in dispensation of justice with impartiality to his subjects and will in particular respect their rights in the matter of land tenure.[17]

Though justice dispensed under these agreements was not always quite fair, it was quick and it was not so costly.

Demerits of the British Rule

Each system has, of course its merits and demerits, the British era in Chitral being no exception. The colonial nature of statecraft and subjugation of a free nation for the political and territorial benefit of another was no doubt a dark side of the picture. The following aspects of the British influence bear the mark of disrepute and ignominy.

Stability of One Man Rule

Though the British for themselves follow a democratic system at home and also introduced a semi-democratic system in India, they never attempted the same for Chitral. On the contrary, the British gave more strength and stability, as well as the mandate to rule, to the *mehtar* over his subjects by protecting his crown through the use of strong military firepower. Before 1895, the *mehtar* was totally dependent on the people for defeating his opponents. As a consequence of the British influence, the *mehtar* no longer needed his people's help. So he became more despotic and ruthless in his outlook towards his subjects.

Degradation of Public Morale

Another dark aspect of the British influence was the degradation of the people's morale. The masses in Chitral were warlike in nature. They had defended their boundaries from the neighbouring powers and even extended their borders by enchroaching upon others' territories, capturing or seizing them in war. No doubt they were lovers of songs, music, and sports, but they were more than that. The colonial rulers gradually and steadily planned to abase the people's character and began to look down upon them as singers, dancers, and players of sports. By apparently encouraging their cultural pursuits, the British officers in fact degraded their character. Before they were used to carry the flute and polo stick along with their swords and matchlocks but the British officers made them carry only the polo stick and flute. In the past, class division was only nominal and it had no major impact on society but the British gave permanent structure to the division of people into classes, and even carved out a lowest class called *faqir-miskin*. This class, even this name, was not known in Chitral prior to the British influence. The Sunni-Maulai conflict was also whipped up during this period in order to divide the masses in a number of factions under the famous dictum 'divide and rule.'

Breach of Trust

Public service and employment in the court of the ruler was considered a sacred trust by the people of Chitral before the British made their presence felt. After 1876, the British missions and political authorities developed a tendency of bribing certain elements in the state administration for espionage against the *mehtar*. This created a corrupt class in the society and damaged the trust and confidence which the public, the *mehtar*, and the serving class enjoyed. This breach of trust was a major blow to the image of public life and society.

Biased Approach in Scholarship

Generally it is believed that the British officers pioneered in writing on the land and people of Chitral through their itineraries, autobiographies, and reports. The whole truth is that all these efforts gave nothing to the readers but an impression of a demoralized and oppressed nation in the mountainous terrain of the Hindu Kush.

To conclude, the goal that the British government had been pursuing in Chitral was to achieve its own interests. It never meant to serve the interest of the people in the long run. The British managed the affairs of the state smoothly because the prevalent system was not smooth, and the public opinion was ready to accept any sort of change in the inherent way of the rulers. The British period is remembered just because its successors could not give a better administration to the public.

NOTES

1. *Military Report and Gazetteer on Chitral* Government of India Press, (Calcutta: 1929), pp. 1–2.
2. Records: Chitral Agreements, Ch-13 (Peshawar: Tribal Research Cell, Home Department Government of NWFP).
3. Ghufran, Mirza Muhammad *Tarikh-e-Chitral* (Peshawar, 1962), p. 143.
4. Ibid., 135–36: File No 348, (Peshawar: Tribal Research Cell, Home Department), Notes on Chitral by Ataullah Jan, Secretary SAFRAN, 1956.
5. Records: File No 1/69 S. No 850, Bundle No 9 Peshawar: Archives) .
6. Robertson, Younghusband, Biddulph, Thomson, etc., served here. Leitner, O'Brion, Schomberg, Lockhart, Curzon, and others were on visits and special missions.
7. Marquess Lord Curzon, *Leaves from a Viceroy's Notebook* (London: Macmillan, 1926), p. 131.
8. Ibid., p. 133.
9. *Military Report*, p. 30.
10. Ghufran, *Tarikh*, p. 217.
11. Ibid., pp. 218–20.
12. Records: File No Ch-18, Financial Position of H.H. The Mehtar, p. 21 (Printed p. 004).
13. Ghufran, *Tarikh*, p. 225.
14. *Military Report and Gazetteer on Chitral* Calcutta: Government of India Press, 1928), p. 50.
15. Tribal Research Cell Peshawar.
16. Ghufran, *Tarikh*, p. 210.
17. Ch-13, Financial Position of H.H., Chitral Agreements (Peshawar: Tribal Research Cell), p. 5.

39

A MINORITY PERSPECTIVE ON THE HISTORY OF CHITRAL: KATORE RULE IN KALASHA TRADITION

*Peter Parkes**

Introduction

Local historical scholarship in Pakistan, as exemplified in the work of the Anjuman-e-Taraqqi Khowar, has struggled for many years with little recognition or support from national or international foundations. But there are now encouraging signs that local and regional histories are being more seriously treated as crucial archival resources for rethinking the multiple cultural identities that make up contemporary Pakistan.[1] The history of the Katore kingdom of Chitral is an appropriate topic for the constructive dialogue between international and local scholars that the Hindu Kush cultural conference encourages. Apart from well-known British eyewitness accounts surrounding the siege of 1895, there is a vast amount of largely untapped reports and secret correspondence relating to this critical period of Chitrali history in the India Office Library in London, of which we get only tantalizing glimpses in Garry Alder's *British India's Northern Frontier, 1865–95* (1963: 255–57, 287–99). Compared with local compilations of court chroniclers, such as Mirza Mohammad Ghufran and Ghulam Murtaza (1962), and with family histories (Wazir Ali Shah 1983), an unusually nuanced, multi-perspectival compilation of external and internal sources on this regional history becomes possible.[2] These reveal complex international machinations of great-power rivalry and tributary allegiance—involving British India, imperial Russia, Kashmir, and Kabul—mediated through the ever-adaptive dynastic politics of local rulers. But all such histories are also rooted in more intimate social ties of fealty, support, rivalry, and opposition, which are still the stuff of local recollection.

It is on this intimate level of socially transmitted memory that I shall concentrate, outlining oral historical accounts of the Kalasha concerning their relationships with successive Katore *mehtars* over the past two or three centuries. Like all histories, Kalasha oral traditions are shaped by partisan social interests, as well as being subject to fallibilities of unwritten memory and selective transmission. Yet they are also privileged testaments: firstly, because of the close association of many Kalasha ancestors as servants and attendants of Katore rulers, often privy to inside chamber knowledge of the *mahraka* court; secondly, because ancestral traditions continue to have a vital significance in Kalasha culture, being perpetually rehearsed in the form of praise oratory or elegies at festivals and feasts, so that this reiterated historical knowledge may have better conditions of survival here than elsewhere. But apart from its evidentiary value, the thematic configuration of such historical knowledge among minority populations also vitally informs us about their own peculiar past and present experience: as

* Dept of Anthropology, University of Kent.

both subjects and agents of regional history, however powerless or insignificant they may appear from the perspective of international—or even local dynastic—historiography.

Oral Transmission and Kalasha Historical Knowledge

Before attending to details, one needs to comprehend the social and performative conditions that structure and reproduce Kalasha collective memory. Historical knowledge is here primarily embodied in fragmentary evocations of praise songs and oratory rather than in formal narratives (Parkes 1994, 1996b). Yet a few gifted experts on ancestral tradition, such as Quasi Khrosh Nawaz of Ramboor, are capable of reformulating such fragments into more coherent historical 'testaments' (*wasiāt*) that are sometimes used to brief orators and praise singers before important festivals, as well as being relayed to outsiders—with explicatory embellishments—as 'Kalasha history' (Parkes 1975). But even these narrative accounts tend to be organized as genealogical pedigrees of particular clans or patrilines (*kam*), recounting the famous activities of successive generations of male ancestors down to living elders. Like tribal genealogical traditions elsewhere (Davis 1989), knowledge of the past is thus thematically organized according to a generic scheme of moral continuities in lineal succession, linking the achievements or misfortunes of ancestors with their successive patrilineal descendants. Instead of any singular 'corpus' of traditions relating to the Katore *mehtars*, there are therefore almost as many separate narrative fragments and episodic accounts of this era as there are Kalasha patrilines. In sifting through these lineage histories in order to compile a synopsis on this topic, I am therefore aware of tearing apart and patching together odd narrative details of lineal testaments into a coherent 'chronicle' that is alien to the oral medium of Kalasha knowledge. I have also necessarily paraphrased some of these oral testaments as extracts, denying the vibrant performative quality of their normal recitative context as oratorical narrations. Yet I trust there is still much to be learned from the informational and ethical content of these recollections of Chitrali sovereignty from the perspective of a peculiar minority enclave.

Reconstructing Feudal Morality

To appreciate these traditions sympathetically, one should recognize that popular conceptions of personal relations to the *mehtar* or ruler were always ambivalent. The Katore *mehtar* was at once a source of protection and blessing, a dispenser of materially and symbolically valuable favours and grants, as well as a capricious devourer of property, especially when misled by cunning courtiers conspiring with local enemies. He was thus a chimaeric creature: part divinity, and part monster.[3] Ancestral associations with the Katore are still a subject of family pride. Successful petitioning at the ruler's court (*khanē ḍhukāu, arzidōyu*) and the receipt of royal favours and gifts (*khanē baṣeṣ, sariphā, išpēn*) are treasured epithets of distinction in oratorical praise of ancestral achievements, while recognition as a ruler's companion or 'favoured flower' (*khanēas khoš gamb'ri*) was considered a meritable rank worthy of acclamation through public feasting. Yet respect and admiration for royalty has always been tempered by counterpoints of subaltern derision and discomfort, especially so nowadays for a younger generation of educated Kalasha born after feudal enfranchisement in the early 1950s. Local *asakāl* headmen were also sometimes disparaged for their treacherous compliance with Katore rulers in loading additional taxes onto their people, as well as their collaboration in

selling off young women and children into slavery.[4] Many ancestors are furthermore related to have been unfairly dispossessed by fickle *mehtars*, often driven into exile to the neighbouring Bashgal valley of Afghanistan (Kafiristan), sometimes for several generations. Close allegiance to a prince or ruler was also evidently a risky gambit, since family fortunes could be reversed overnight on the succession of a rival pretender, often supported by local opponents eager for revenge. With such uncertainties of welfare stemming from dynastic machinations at court, a large part of Kalasha oracular divination and shamanic revelation was significantly directed at second-guessing the personal fortunes of Katore princes.[5]

Behind such occasional intrigues, however, Kalasha oral histories indicate a more reliable code of consensual moral committments underlying allegiances to their overlords and rulers. In several traditions we find *begār* (Khowar *barbārā*, Kalasha *briṣṭāu*) labour dues and *qalāŋ* or *thaŋgī* tributary taxes comprehended as obligations of an ancient reciprocal 'contract' with the Katore, whereby Kalasha undoubtedly benefited from royal protection against local Islamic proselytization, as well as from molestations of neighbouring aggressors such as the Afghan Kafirs of Bashgal. Part of this 'special relationship' may also have entailed a former superstitious respect for the non-Islamic Kalasha as autochthonous aborigines of Chitral, retaining ritual associations with its localized powers—that is, *sūči* or *pariān* mountain spirits—with whom early Katore rulers were also associated in popular imagination. Kalasha *dehār* shamans thus seem to have been frequently employed as court soothsayers, seemingly in preference to equivalent Kho *biṭān* diviners, before such divinatory practices were suppressed by Sunni *'ulamā*. On the other hand, Kalasha conversely regarded the Katore family as having spiritual or quasi-'divine' attributes, confirmed by traditions of the secret spiritual marriages of Shah Kator and his descendants with 'fairy queens' of the mountains.[6]

Yet the feudal loyalty of Kalasha subjects to Katore rulers was also underpinned by a sense of indigenous justice or 'moral economy' (Scott 1976) concerning reciprocal duties of subaltern tribute and princely protection. Dutiful monarchism might therefore always turn to subversive intrigue or protest against particular rulers if this customary justice was felt to be infringed. Such moral contracts primarily concerned conditions of enforced tax and corvée labour, supposedly instituted by the Ra'is dynasty after the legendary conquest of the Kalasha kingdoms of Rajawai and Bulasing (Wazir Ali Shah 1974b: 70, 78–79). But this ancient contract was seen to be perpetually eroded by greedy and unjust officials at court, sometimes aided by treacherous or self-interested Kalasha *asakāl* officers, thus requiring endless petitions to the *mehtar* to restore reasonable justice.[7] When such justice was not forthcoming, as under Aman-ul-Mulk's tyrannous 'slave rule' in Kalasha memory, then intrigue and subversion was morally in order. This fundamental moral theme of contractual justice is an underlying template or 'transcript' (Scott 1990) of all Kalasha narrative traditions related in the following pages.

Early Rulers: Sirang, Sumalik, and Sangali

A local political context of tributary overlordship is already recognized in Kalasha traditions of their earliest lineal ancestors, twelve or thirteen generations removed from living elders. This is the semi-mythical era of the legendary Kalasha kings Rajawai and Bulasing, of the great shaman-prophet Nanga *dehār*, and of many miraculous clan ancestors supposedly 'mixed' with gods and *sūči* spirits. Notable overlords of this era were Sirang of Wirishikgum or Yasin, a supposedly 'Kalasha' (i.e., Kafir or non-Muslim) ruler, and Sangal or Sangali, identifiable with the Katore forefather Sangin Ali.[8] Another early 'Kalasha' ruler, Sumulk or Sumalik, also based in Wirishikgum, is referred to mainly in fables rather than lineal traditions

as a successor of Sirang.[9] Historically identifiable overlords of Yasin and Mastuj are Shah Khushwaqt and Shah Faramat (Faramurd), for whom Birir ancestors of Gurul village, Dhondi and Babura, worked as officers or sublords.[10] A more localized early ruler, mentioned in several traditions from all three valleys, is Bamburus Khan, *mehtar* of Drosh.[11] There are also occasional references to a monstrous 'Tajik Shah' warlord of Badakhshan, who invaded and devastated both Bumboret and Birir valleys in this era.[12] But all such named early kings (including 'Mir Katur') tend to be quite freely interchanged in different renditions of lineage histories, while the majority simply refer to an anonymous 'king' (*ṣa, bačhā*) or 'ruler' (*khanē*).

The traditions reproduced below relate that Kalasha *asakāl* 'headmen' or local deputies of foreign overlords were already appointed in this early era. Yet the first story of Lataruk of Birir suggests some regional autonomy, also indicating potential resistance or subversive challenges to tyrannous masters. The story of Barik of Ramboor relates common banishment or refuge in Bashgal, as well as the appropriation and restoration of property by capricious *mehtars*; while that of the brothers Dremes and Begal, apical ancestors of two other Ramboor lineages, indicates a common theme of ancestral rivalries associated with tributary dues, which may be perpetuated as corporate grudges wryly invoked in the lineal memories of their descendants.

Lataruk[13]

Shurasi's son was Suashai, and from Suashai was born Dhondi and Babura [in Gurul, Birir]. From Dhondi Lataruk was born. While his mother was still pregnant, the king [Khushwaqt] had Dhondi killed, throwing him into the water at Shasha. Fleeing from Birir, Gaumir, Dula and Bangulai accompanied Lataruk's mother, crossing over Drigawisht Pass to Kushtaydesh [Bashgal] Kam[desh] in the middle of winter. There Lataruk was born. Before he suckled at his mother's breast, the Kam elders threw lots to decide his name and it came out Lathari Lataruk, meaning 'Troublesome Lataruk' in the Kam [Kati] language, for he came with so much trouble. There in Kamdesh he grew into youth; but here [in Birir] the elders could not control the people, for they had no leader [of the Lataruk-dari clan]. The king asked: 'Are there no sons of that *asakāl* Dhondi that I had killed?' The people told him that his son was a youth in Kamdesh. So the king sent messengers thrice to him; but Lataruk would not come, fearing he would be killed. At last the king sent a horse with fine silver and gold trappings for him, and then Lataruk came back by way of Urtsun and Drosh. There the king came to greet Lataruk, but he would not dismount from his horse. Asking him why he would not dismount, Lataruk told the ruler: 'Why should it please me to dismount for you? You killed my father, now what can you give me in compensation?' The king replied: 'I don't want to make you upset; I want to make you a big man!' And so with promises he sat Lataruk down at Gahiret. The king gave Lataruk authority over all Chitral. But at that time there was much selling of people into slavery, and so Lataruk made another test for the king. Whenever they brought a bound orphan woman from Shishi Kuh or Ghos, he would say, 'But she is my mother!' or 'She is my sister!' And so he would free them. When the officers of the king reported this, he said: 'If you are asking for orphans, what better orphan is there than I? Sell me myself!' So the king was perplexed. He stopped selling slaves, and he gave Lataruk Shishi Kuh valley, and Gahiret, and Maskor: that was his realm, and Lataruk took control of this country up to Wirishikgum [Yasin]. This control [of the Lataruk-dari lineage in Birir] has lasted nine generations.

Barik[14]

Barik was the son of Dramui and the grandson of Adabok. Barik's sons were Nhongi and Juar Beg: they were a strong family, living in a tower above Balanguru village. The great ruler in those days was Sirang, living in Wirishikgum [Yasin], who was also Kalasha. Barik was Sirang's *asakāl*, and Juar Beg was appointed to succeed him. His father told him to take *salaam* greetings to Sirang. Crossing Shandur Pass, Juar Beg came down to Wirishikgum, but he did not make a *salaam* to the ruler there. 'My father told me there was a great "*mehtar*" here,' he said to Sirang. 'But you are merely a human, with just two eyes, two feet, and two hands; so why should I *salaam* to you?' Well the *mehtar* kept him one night, awarding him a gown as *sariphā*, before sending him back with a written message for King Bulasing in Chitral. When he returned, there was a dowry-giving assembly (*sariēk*) for the wife of Preshuma in Bumboret. So Juar Beg and Nhongi went there, playing the drums at the *jeSTakhan* temple of Rajawai in Barik. Bulasing had been told in the letter of Sirang to capture Juar Beg's family and send them bound as slaves to him; so an army of soldiers came from Chitral and surrounded the temple. Juar Beg and Nhongi managed to escape through the smoke-hole of the temple by night, fleeing to Ramboor. There they gathered their families, crossing Gangalwat Pass into Bashgal. The soldiers came and seized all their property in Ramboor, also taking their father's sister captive for Sirang. The two brothers returned to free their aunt: ambushing two guards at the bridge at Shasha, they took the old woman with them to Bashgal. They stayed in Bashgal over twenty years, and their sons Chiker and Gabaroti were born there. Later these sons came back to Ramboor, and they built a water channel at Damik, cultivating new land there. Mehtar Sangal [Sangin Ali] pardoned them, awarding them gowns, and they pointed out their fathers' property at Pindawat and Palarok and Puristewa. When this property was restored, Gabaroti brought his father and family back from Bashgal, and they returned to their tower at Balanguru.

Dremes and Begal[15]

Dremes and Begal were brothers, sons of Preshuma, and grandsons of Madri. Begal was the *asakāl* headman of Ramboor under Bamburus Khan, the ruler at Drosh. In those days they paid a yearly tax of a plough-shear and yoke as part of the 'iron tribute' (*čCimbēr thaŋgī*). Bamburus Khan's soldiers came to take this tax, telling Begal to find a man to carry the plough. People said it was the turn of his elder brother, Dremes. But Dremes was ill and lame and could not walk; so they gave the plough to his wife Makhtum. She carried the plough up over Khondawisht Pass. But when Dremes heard of this shameful insult, he came painfully limping up to Khondawisht, telling his wife there to tie the plough with rope to his body. Tied like this, he came down to Drosh with the plough.

Now Begal had three sons and Dremes had four sons, the eldest Mahadin. In springtime, Begal became ill one day, and by night he was dead. Begal's eldest son Tikar went to the house of Dremes, and said to Mahadin: 'Our father has died, and we have no wheat for feasting.' Mahadin replied: 'How can I give you wheat, when my father is also old and ill' [i.e. they needed to save for his own funeral feast]. But when Dremes heard this, he said: 'My brother has died, and we must now take out wheat and give it to his son.' So Dremes brought many *maunds* of wheat and ground it, giving two bulls and twelve he-goats, and making a further feast of mature cheese (*kuhīṇḍa jĭrē*) for the funeral of his brother Begal.

Shah Kator and Khairullah (Ca. 1760–90)

Traditions of a pre-Katore Ra'is dynasty of Chitral are laconic in Kalasha tradition (cf. Holzwarth 1996: 123–25), apart from references to a singular 'Rahis Mir,' who supposedly drove the Kalasha king Bulasing from Chitral to ayun. Early Katore rulers also tend to be conflated as a single 'Shah Katur' or 'Mir Katur' in many traditions, although a few

genealogical experts distinguish a more precise line of succession from 'Great Katur' through 'Shawazal' (Shah Afzal) to 'Little Katur' and 'Sardar Katur.'[16] Several traditions concern the fraternal rivalry of 'Katur and Khairullah', identifiable with the usurpation of the *mehtarship* of Shah Nawaz Khan (Kator) by the Khushwaqte ruler of Mastuj, Khairullah, in the mid-eighteenth century (Ghulam Murtaza 1962: Chap. 5). In a composite narration from Ramboor, reproduced in summary form below, we witness the primordial contract established by Kalasha ancestors assisting Katur against Khairullah in exchange for a promised reduction of taxes and labour dues introduced under earlier Ra'is or Sangalie rulers.[17] Accounts of Khairullah's disastrous winter campaign in lower Bashgal, and his defeat in Urtsun, correspond closely with the account of the *Nai Tarikh-e-Chitral* (Ghulam Murtaza 1962: Chap. 5.4; cf. Holzwarth 1999). But more significant is the claim of Kalasha assistance to the Katore against their Khushwaqte dynastic rivals, establishing a bond of mutal obligation reneged by subsequent tyrants such as Aman-ul-Mulk. A second linking motif with this later era is that of shamanic revelation (*dehār umbulēk*) or dream divination (*isprāp pašēk*) concerning Katore fortunes. The heroic ancestors assisting Katur, Kanek and Karuzhi, belong to a famous patriline (the Karuzhi-dari lineage of Anish village in Bumboret) of spiritually 'mixed' ancestors, stemming from their semi-divine great-grandfather Kurumba, and terminating with the last great *dehār* shamans of Bumboret, Rabadan and Budok *dehār*, seven generations later. It is notably a dream-prediction of Amir or 'Amir Kalash' (Kalashamir, an early ancestor of the *Balōhe-nawau* lineage in Ramboor) that emboldened Katur to ambush and defeat Khairullah, after which Amir was awarded tributary 'governorship' of Bashgal (i.e., the right to collect annual tribute for the *mehtar*; cf. Wazir Ali Shah 1974a: 24).

Katur and Khairullah[18]

After Rajawai and Bulasing, Ra'is took control and put taxes on the people. Then the Katur family came to power, and they demanded the same taxes of *thaŋgī* and *briṣṭāu* labour. Shah Katur and Khairullah were rival brothers of the Katore, always fighting one another. Katur promised he would abolish all taxes imposed on Kalasha if they would help him fight his brother. Kanek and Karuzhi hid Katur in a cave in Acholgah valley and helped him escape to Bashgal. When Khairullah heard about this, he had Kanek and Karuzhi killed, while their younger brother Gabor was taken captive. Khairullah further increased taxes: in the time of Ra'is, only five Kalasha were sent to work in Chitral; but Khairullah now ordered thirty men to be sent from Bumboret, and twenty-five from Birir, and five men from Ramboor for labouring. It was a time of great oppression. But when Gabor was freed, he helped to bring Katur back from Bashgal. Helped by a Kalasha servant of Khairullah, they entered his fort at night, killing his daughter's husband there. After Khairullah regained the fort, driving Katur to Dir, he became even angrier with Kalasha, demanding now sixty men for labour. But at this time the Chatruma [Kati] people of Bashgal revolted against Khairullah, and so he went to fight them at Kamdesh. There the army of Khairullah was trapped in a snowstorm, and forty soldiers died before he retreated to Urtsun. Two Ramboor Kalasha soldiers in Khairullah's army, Amir and Adraman, secretly favoured Katur: they sent a Sheikh [Kati Kafir convert] Ishtaluk to Katur to prepare an ambush, asking Katur to send a piece of his clothing. Placing Katur's cloth under his pillow, Amir had a propitious dream: two eagles, old [Khairullah] and young [Katur], were fighting in the air, and the elder bird fell dead to the ground. So Amir sent Ishtaluk to set the ambush at Urtsun, where Khairullah was killed. Katur became *mehtar*, and he made Amir Kalash his governor in Bashgal, collecting *thaŋgī* of 180 calves from the Chatruma and 180 blankets from the people of Wetdesh [Prasun].

'Great Mehtar' Aman-ul-Mulk (1857–92)

The previous Ramboor tradition, conflating Mehtar Shah Nawaz Khan with his younger brother Muhtaram Shah Kator (1788–1838), was followed by a slight leap in narration to the reign of 'Great Mehtar' Aman-ul-Mulk in the second half of the nineteenth century. Thematic linkage is also made with the same Karuzhi-dari lineage of Bumboret, whose members appear to have conspired with Sher Afzal Khan against Aman-ul-Mulk. As is evident here, Kalasha traditions of the Great Mehtar are not favourable. He is remembered as an oppressor, reinstituting the enslavement of unprotected widows and orphaned children, and appropriating the estates of the heirless *(hiṇḍāl-ḅas)*, which justified his cursed death in Kalasha tradition. This is furthermore linked to the mistreatment of the pregnant daughter of Amir Kalash, the loyal ally of Shah Katur, instigating Aman-ul-Mulk's downfall through the invoked curse of her husband. Similar mistreatment of a Birir concubine, another descendant of Shah Katur's erstwhile allies, added to Kalasha resentments and righteous curses. But Aman-ul-Mulk's death is actually accredited to his legendary poisoning with British connivance, a contemporary rumour already noted by Robertson (1899: 23). At the time of the Great Mehtar's funeral, despite a curfew of mourning imposed by Aqsaqal Fateh Ali Shah, Kalasha are said to have gleefully rejoiced at the return of so many enslaved brothers and sisters, celebrating his demise with jubilant festival drumming and dancing.

Amani Mulk[19]

When Amani Mulk [Aman-ul-Mulk] came to power, he was warned that Amir Kalash favoured his younger brother Sher Afzal Khan as *mehtar*. He was also told about the earlier work of Kanek and Karuzhi in helping Katur against Khairullah. So he called their descendants Sherdil and Purdil, and he divided the governorship of Bashgal into three parts, awarding two parts to them and one to his *asakāl* Mahamurat [of the Dremese-nawau lineage, Ramboor]. Then he recalled Amir Kalash from Bashgal and sold him into slavery in Kabul together with his son Janjamir [see note 4 above] and many of his lineage brothers [of the Sumbara-nawau clan in Ramboor], including their elder Sharuta. Now the elders of Rumbur gathered together and came to the officers of Amani Mulk, offering tins of honey: 'Take the sister of Sharuta as a slave instead of our elder!' they insisted. So his sister Zazima was taken off weeping to be sold, and since then there have been few women born to the Balōhe-nawau lineage, only male children. Then the elders of Ramboor made a plan to get other slaves redeemed: they brought five tins of honey and sixty goats with kids to Aqsaqal Fatali [Fateh Ali] Shah as *bunyāt*, and so they repurchased Derum and Gulading [ancestors of the Mutimire-nawau lineage of the Sumbara-nawau clan]. But when Amani Mulk heard rumours that the Kalasha of Ramboor were so rich that they were buying people, he called his *asakāl* Mahamurat, telling him to sell all Kalasha widows with their orphaned children. Mahamurat was cunning: whenever there was a widow in Ramboor, he would say, 'She is my wife!' In this way he had more than seven wives.

Amani Mulk also took all the most beautiful women as his concubines, whether they were married or not. From Ramboor he took the daughter of Amir Kalash, Niad Bigim, who was eight months' pregnant. Her husband Matoni pursued the soldiers taking his wife, passing over Khondawisht Pass to Urghuch. There he screamed loudly at the grave of his father Adraman [the former companion of Amir Kalash and assistant of Katur, a Muslim convert of the Begalye-nawau lineage], demanding a curse on Amani Mulk. Another beautiful woman from Birir was taken from her infant son, her breasts so heavy with milk that she had to milk herself in the garden of the *mehtar's* fort. Seeing this cruelty, Prince Afzal became incensed with his inhuman father. He obtained poison from Gaden Mulki [Capt. B.E.M. Gurdon, later political agent] and had this mixed in the *mehtar's* rice. Just before taking supper, Amani Mulk saw a corner of his fort on fire: 'Maybe this is the curse of that

Kalasha husband!' he said, ordering all Kalasha women to be freed. But then he took two mouthfuls of rice, and he fell down screaming. Prince Afzal then became *mehtar*.

Aman-ul-Mulk's *asakāl* Mahamurat is mentioned in many other Ramboor traditions, and he was no doubt the most prominent Kalasha communal leader of the nineteenth century. A great-grandson of Dremes, Mahamurat had also inherited the supernatural powers of his grandfather Mahadin (supposedly born from a *bhut* demon who had violated the wife of Dremes), giving rise to exceptional wealth and ability. Mahamurat was therefore honoured in old age with an exceptional double sharuga feast, sponsored by his sons Surchai and Mahatomar, entitling his commemoration with a magnificent ancestor effigy astride a double-headed horse (Plate 39.4).[20] The *asakāl* office was subsequently retained by many of Mahamurat's descendants in the Dremese-nawau lineage, devolving through his son Mahatomar to such contemporary Kalasha leaders as Abdul Salam (*asakāl* of Ramboor in the early 1950s) and Sherjuan (great-grandson of Surchai and Basic Democracy member for Kalasha under Ayub Khan; see plates 39.639.7).

The Events of 1892–95

After the death of Aman-ul-Mulk, Kalasha traditions allude to the internecine succession struggles of Afzal-ul-Mulk, Sher Afzal Khan, and Sardar Nizam-ul-Mulk in autumn 1892.[21] On the accession of Nizam-ul-Mulk, many Kalasha women and children were again seized and sold as slaves, with additional burdens of tax and corvée labour imposed. Retribution for this injustice is now directly attributed to Kalasha agency, through the brave action of Sherjang of Lawi in Shishi Kuh, who alone of Amir-ul-Mulk's servants proved fearless enough to assassinate Nizam. The *Nai Tarikh-e-Chitral* (Ghulam Murtaza 1962: Chap. 10.3) confirms that the assassin was 'a Kalash servant of Prince Amir-ul-Mulk named Ahmad Jan of Lawi.' This is again foreshadowed by Kalasha prophecy, albeit a deceptively ambivalent prediction (of Shuja-ul-Mulk's ultimate success) attributed here to the famous Birir shaman, Wirishik *dehār*.[22]

Assassination of Nizam-ul-Mulk[23]

After Amani Mulk, the Katore were again fighting with one another. Amiri Mulk [Amir-ul-Mulk] had a trusted Kalasha servant, Sherjang of Lawi, and he asked him to find a *biṭān* [*dehār*] soothsayer to predict which side of the Katore family would be successful. Sherjang brought Wirishik *dehār* from Birir, and the shaman prophesied in a trance: 'I see drums beaten in the sky for the son of the queen of Asmar.' Then Amiri Mulk was content, for his own mother was the queen of Asmar [although the prophecy evidently referred to his younger full-brother Shuja-ul-Mulk]. He then called his servants to choose an assassin, placing his hand on their chests: the hearts of all six Kho servants beat rapidly with trepidation; only the heart of his Kalasha servant was still. So the next day, Sardar Amiri Mulk took Sherjang with him when he joined Mehtar Nizam hawking at Broze. He had another Kho servant with him, but this man fainted with fear. Sherjang boldly aimed his gun and fired at the *mehtar*, killing him. Amiri Mulk then fired his own gun in the air, shouting: 'It was I who shot my brother, not this poor Kalasha!' And so he became *mehtar* for three months, with Sherjang his trusted companion. But when the British came and caught Amiri Mulk, Mir Hamza came with a sword to torture Sherjang. As he was cut down, he cried out fearlessly: 'Do what you will, I am content that my wish was granted to see my master rule!'

Mehtar Shuja-ul-Mulk (1895–1936)

We thus arrive at the fateful spring of 1895, entailing the siege, the relief, and the British installation of Shuja-ul-Mulk. Kalasha traditions about these tumultous events are meagre: no doubt the rapidly shifting opportunities and reversals of alliance, as detailed by Robertson (1899) and Ghulam Murtaza (1962: Chap. 10), were too fluid to be easily registered in Kalasha historical consciousness. But again, one encounters traditions encompassing Katore fortunes within an indigenous narrative scheme of moral theodicy as well as shamanic prophecy. I reproduce below an apocalyptic prophecy about this so-called 'black-toothed king' *(ṣāḍoni sa)*, ascribed to a prescient shaman of Birir seven or eight generations earlier, as well as part of a lineal-praise song commemorating the greeting of Shuja-ul-Mulk by the *asakāl* Fauch of Ramboor (see Plate 39.3).

Sujao Mulk[24]

When Sujao Mulk [Shuja-ul-Mulk] came to power, he was very young and so the British government looked after him. At this time Kalasha were doing the same *briṣṭāu* labouring work as imposed under Khairullah, sending thirty men from each community. The elders of Birir then made a petition to the ruler: 'In the time of Ra'is only six men were sent from Birir and Bumboret, and just two men from Ramboor; but now you ask for thirty men to work for you. Yet our grandfathers helped your own grandfather Katur against Khairullah.' Hearing this, the ruler became ashamed and ordered that only six men be sent from Birir. Then the elders of Ramboor—Mahatomar with Sherbek, Fauch, and Lamtson [elders of the Dremese-, Mutimire- and Balōhe-nawau lineages]—petitioned the ruler: 'We also favoured Katur! So why should you make this hardship for us?' But the ruler replied: 'You Kalasha have also been a dangerous people for the Katore family!' Then he ordered that the same number of workers should be sent as under Ra'is: just fourteen people from all three Kalasha valleys.

Sindi *Dehār's* Prophecy[25]

Sindi *dehār* was the father of Rashmuk [the apical ancestor of the Rashmuk-dari lineage of Gasguru/Grom, Birir]. In trance the shaman gave this revelation: 'When this [king's] tooth becomes black, the "black-toothed king" will emerge! The Kafir king will also emerge from the east, coloured red. And Dajal [the Islamic Antichrist] will appear: from mountain peak to mountain peak he will build houses, and he will walk from forest to forest, putting iron beams over the rivers. The kingdom will be finished. Then will come the time of free anarchy *(mahmur dāur)*, and the world will become soft. Water mills will be many, but nothing will be ready at home. Mosques will be many, but nobody will come to them.' He gave this talk. The 'blacktoothed king' was Alahazrat [H Shuja-ul-Mulk] and the king from the east was *you*, the English *sarkār*, coming over Loari Pass and putting down iron bridges. After Alahazrat this kingdom was truly finished.

Praise Song for Fauch[26]

Oh father Fauch Khan, you alone petitioned the ruler!
Crossing Loari Pass, Alahazrat announced to the great valley of Kohistan:
'I have become king of Chitral! So give me two words of advice, my Kalash servant and *wazirs*!'

'From Shandur to Loari my master's [kingdom] is one livestock pen...'
Thus he honoured [the king]: '...Do not separate my life and service!'
A waterfall of tears he pressed from the ruler, your grandfather Fauch Khan
That became a record indeed, when tears came to the ruler!
Even Gaden Mulki [Capt. B.E.M. Gurdon] became surprised, saying 'What has happened to our *raja* of Chitral?'
It was your great fortune, grandson of Mutimir, to have done such a deed...

Recollections of Feudal Service

The reign of Shuja-ul-Mulk marks the intersection of lineal traditions with living memories, still in process of narrative crystallization through oratory and praise songs. Many of the elders of Ramboor mentioned as delegates to the court of Shuja-ul-Mulk at his accession were still alive in mid-century, and thus encountered and photographed by such colonial travellers as Reginald Schomberg (1938; see plates 39.–39.3). In this period there appear to have been further impositions of tax and labour on Kalasha, just when slavery had been abolished, and when *qalāŋ* or *thaŋgī* taxes were elsewhere reduced or replaced by conventional Islamic tithes of ushur and *zakāt* (Ghulam Murtaza 1962: Chap. 13). Autobiographical memories of this period give vivid details of such 'uncustomary demands' (*bedasturī*), when 'the rulers were eating the very skin off our backs,' particularly in Ramboor under their tributary overlord 'Komander' (Asfandiar Khan of Denin, son of Aman-ul-Mulk and commander of the *mehtar's* bodyguard).

Komander[27]

> As a boy I used to do *briṣṭāu* labour service at Komander's land in Denin. Climbing a tree, I would shake down walnuts. Becoming thirsty, I would call down: 'I need to get down to drink!' But Komander would never allow that: 'Stay working in that tree!' he would shout, 'We'll pass up water to you there!' He would have us beaten for complaining, shooting rocks at us with a stonebow. Or he would take goats as a fine if we were sick and unable to work properly. Komander put great oppression on us. Only for eating bread were we allowed to sit down; and even when stars appeared in the sky, he would continue to make us work, ploughing and clearing his land.

Such corvée labour on a lord's estate required five Ramboor males working continuously throughout the year, typically organized in shifts of eight or nine days per month.[28] Other tributary dues and services were recalled by one of the last *asakāl* officers of Ramboor:

asakāli[29]

> For organizing labour the *asakāl* didn't have much to do; everyone understood this work. Five people had to be working for the lord all the time, and this work was simply divided by lineage (*kam*) and household (*kušūn*) by turn. But the *asakāl* had to organize load-carrying: each family had to carry 15 *maunds* of loads each year, including ushur tithe from the Bashgalis. Then there was poll tax (*iṣmarōnu*): whenever a prince came to the valley, he had to be provided with cheese and meat and fresh bedding, and these duties were appointed to families in turn. As for tribute tax (*thaŋgī*): the *ṣarwēlu* officer came and told the *asakāl*, who knew how much property the people had. The profit of the *asakāl* was his own release from labour and tribute tax; so when his turn came round, only four out of five people went off to labour. The *asakāl* had to agree with his community, so he would

inform the *mehtar* and make a petition if anything was being imposed against custom. Tribute tax used to be 20 *batī* of honey each year, and thirty female goats with kids, and 16 *maunds* of walnuts. All this was weighed, and if it came out less, then extra was taken from the *asakāl* himself. Tax was divided by lineage from old times, and a man had to pay whatever was demanded, even if he had to sell his land to do so.

Other elder Kalasha recalled annual taxes in Ramboor of forty kid goats, 40 *batī* of honey, and 40 *maunds* of walnuts, collected 20 days before the Chaomos festival in December. But there was a further miscellany of odd customary payments due to the Katore *mehtars* or to their appointed overlords (cf. Biddulph 1880: 66; Baig 1994: 113):

Taxes

'provisioning' (Khowar *utaghī*): a goat slaughtered daily for visiting court officials, regularized as a livestock tax on all Kalasha households, collected annually by the lord's *ṭarwēlu* bailiff.

'salutation' (Khowar *salamī*): a contribution, collected from herd owning households, for a formal presentation by the *asakāl* to the *mehtar's* court of four goat-hair rugs, four goats, 8 batī honey, 1 *maund* cheese.

'skin-puttees' (Khowar *tačiŋgār*): a houshold tax to provision royal hunting expeditions, consisting of a skin bag, a pair of goatskin puttees, and a rope.

'spring-blossom cheeses' (Khowar *ispruwo pīnak*, Kalasha *puṣ ṭāṣa*): 3 *batī* cheeses from each goat stable at the blossoming of fruit trees in early May.

'load-carrying' (Khowar *kušūn boī*, Kalasha *phar drāžik*): each house to provide one male porter to convey grain tithes from Bashgali refugees, and to return from Chitral portering state-owned rock salt for compulsory purchase in exchange for grain.

Customary fines *(J̌irmanā)* included the seizure of a goat from every household if local gunfire was heard during a royal hunt, and the payment of a bull if any firearm was discovered in a goat stable during the closed season on hunting in winter. At compensation payments for elopement marriages, a 'commissionary bull' (*bunyāt don*) was due to the overlord, together with a goat or cauldron for his *ṭarwēlu* bailiff, and an iron tripod for the Kalasha *asakāl*. At all marriages a 'goat of salutation on behalf of the lineage woman' (*jamīli salamī*) had to be given as a marital prestation *(pandār)* by the bride's father and lineage elders to the overlord (cf. Saifullah Jan 1996: 239).

Although these seemingly oppressive taxes and fines are often recalled with bitter resentment nowadays, Kalasha oral traditions indicate that they were perforce accepted as part of the natural order of Chitrali sovereignty, with which lineage elders and *asakāl* officers were sometimes tempted to collaborate for their own family interests. Thus even Mahamurat, proudly remembered for defending Kalasha against slavery through cunning petitions to Aman-ul-Mulk, is related to have somewhat unjustly favoured his own Dremese-nawau lineage brothers, off-loading part of their labour services to minor descent groups in Ramboor, who were less able to protect themselves. After the death of Mahamurat, around the turn of the century, the succession of the *asakāl* office appears to have been contested between his son Mahatomar and a rival elder, Fauch, of the small but wealthy and prestigious Mutimire-

nawau lineage of Ramboor (see note 26). This inaugurated interlineage and factional competition for paramount leadership in this community continues among their descendants to this day. In competing for the official favours of successive *mehtars*, these rival elders even reportedly counterbid each other's bribes and promises of increased taxes for their overlords. Mahatomar thus supposedly innovated the customary payment of honey in Ramboor tribute (hitherto an ad hoc gift to rulers), while Fauch inaugurated additional labour services, including the deeply resented porterage of tithe grain from Bashgali refugee settlements in upper Ramboor and Bumboret. Only at the end of the feudal era, on the eve of enfranchisement in the early 1950s, do we witness concerted struggles against such impositions.

From Fealty to Protest

I conclude with a brief epilogue, concerning the troubled years of social agitation against Katore rule in mid-century, instigated by Muslim League activists (and Katore dynastic rivals) under the *mehtarships* of Muzaffar-ul-Mulk (1943–49) and Saif-ur-Rahman (1949–54).[30] The ancient moral contract of Kalasha and Katore had tenuously survived earlier oppressions, usually blamed on the tyranny of feudatory overlords such as Komander, while the Mehtar's Council was still regarded as a potentially accessible court of redress for such inequities. Under Mehtar Nasir-ul-Mulk, the Ramboor leader Mashar (son and successor of the *asakāl* Fauch) thus famously outwitted Komander at a council tribunal with a cryptic allegorical speech (*nākul*): 'Given two watermelons to hold in one hand, the lord beats me if one falls down,' alluding to additional levies of walnuts imposed by Komander on Ramboor. Pleased with such wittily indirect requests for justice, Nasir-ul-Mulk repealed these uncustomary demands by royal favour. But such benign intervention, traditionally legitimating the royal court as a popular tribunal of prompt justice, was otherwise all too rare, as Kalasha encountered increasing inaccessibility to a tiresomely bureaucratized state administration under late colonial and early Pakistani stewardship.

Fauch's son Mashar was himself briefly an *asakāl* headman. But he was also one of the first Kalasha leaders to actively embrace the Muslim League as a local party organizer in Ramboor. Inspired by its progressive social rhetoric, he is even renowned for a daringly suicidal gesture of protest. Unable to get justice from the British political agent advising Nasir-ul-Mulk, Mashar boldly threw himself off the Chiv Bridge above Chitral in protest against Komander's tyranny, narrowly escaping with his life, but again successfully publicizing his indignant petition to the *mehtar*. This heroic act of self-sacrificial leadership is now integrated as a famous episode within the lineage traditions of the Mutimire-nawau in Ramboor, recalled in oratory and praise songs as a just fulfilment of the earlier intercessionary efforts of his father Fauch.

In the early 1970s, when Mashar's autobiographical memories were still acute, I was able to record his extensive reminiscences of this period, including mass protests to Chitral, and even threatened Kalasha emigration to Bashgal if additional load-carrying dues were not repealed.[31] This was also a time of bitter polarization between loyal supporters of the Katore rulers and the populist Muslim League party, established in Chitral in 1949. For Kalasha, especially vexed factional disputes concerned the divisive issue of whether to continue to pay feudal tribute and labour or to render regular government tithes and taxes like other peoples in Chitral. As Mashar himself recalled: 'It was a time of great party politics (*patī-bazī*), of Muslim League and Pakhti League (Ittehadi Muslim League). Those in the Muslim League refused to give *begār* labour or to carry loads, offering only ushur and *zakāt* tithes. It was a

time of great disagreement among us.' Another contemporary elder, also an active Muslim Leaguer in his youth, explained:

Muslim League and Pakhti League[32]

When Pakistan started, they replaced *thaŋgī* tax with ushur and *zakāt*. Then Sarfaraz Shah atalique [Muslim League president] came and announced: 'Either you can continue labouring, or else you can take up rifles and join the bodyguard [militia].' Well, there were ten of us then, all from Bakar-nawau lineages [of Balanguru and Malidesh villages], and we said: 'We are not going to labour for Komander any more! We will take up the rifle!' So we became the Muslim League here. But others said: 'We will carry loads and do labour, for we are in the *mehtar's* Pakhti League!' Those were all Sumbara-nawau lineages, apart from Mahmat Isa.[33] So we went to Chitral and they dressed us in uniforms, with guns and bandoliers. Our wages then were just 7 rupees a month. They sent us to guard the pastures against thieves, six months on and six months off. But there remained a great division between those two parties. They even divided the daily grinding of grain at water mills according to party allegiance, and they separated the jeSTakhan temple [of the Sumbara-nawau clan of Grom] into two parts, dividing it down the middle. When Surchai [a son of the *asakāl* Mahamurat] died, the Sumbara-nawau [clan] would not even come to our funeral feast, since we were Muslim League. Later they brought a bull as peace offering; but they still would not allow our sisters and daughters [as their wives] to attend the funeral feast. They even had a separate Chaomos festival, sacrificing goats on separate days, celebrating it apart.

This dispute raged for two or three years, splitting each valley into violently opposed parties, whose political fallout is still evident in factional divisions to this day. But these internal disruptions signify the end of our chronicle, marking an irrevocable rupture in Kalasha relations with their Katore rulers, whose political authority was now in eclipse. Without princely protection, Kalasha arguably suffered more devastating setbacks in the 1950s and 1960s than under the cruel oppressions of local lords like Komander. For these were decades of forcible mass conversions to Islam in lower Bumboret and Birir, rallied by local *pirs* like the infamous 'Owirai Maulai' of Uyun. These were also decades of massive appropriations of Kalasha property by Uyuni settlers and traders, hitherto prohibited by royal decree (Saifullah Jan 1996: 240–41). Such contemporary—and continuing—oppressions conceivably vindicated the ancestral faith of earlier generations of Kalasha elders in their ancient moral contract with the Katore, for all its gross inequities.[34]

Conclusion

In this brief essay, I have only begun to explore Kalasha historical consciousness of feudal subordination within the Katore kingdom of Chitral. In common with other studies of subaltern morality under similarly abject conditions (Genovese 1974; Scott 1985, 1990; Haynes & Prakash 1992), Kalasha traditions reveal complex accommodations of obligatory assent, covert resistance, and occasional protest against perceived injustices, which were sometimes committed by their own elders and leaders in connivance with overlords and outside authorities. In selecting and detailing narrative traditions that help to elucidate Kalasha moral evaluations of this ancestral history, I am aware that contemporary Kalash leaders of a post-feudal generation may consider these as distasteful and unwanted reminders of an era of

dishonourable servitude that is better forgotten. Such determined amnesia of ancestral history is nowadays characteristic of other formerly subordinate and marginalized enclaves of the Hindu Kush and Karakoram (Schmid 1997; Flowerday 1998: 61). Yet I have suggested that a sympathetic comprehension of the experienced social conditions of indigenous ancestors, as evinced in these traditions, might encourage a more appreciative moral understanding of their many tortuous struggles for negotiated survival under exceptionally adverse circumstances, which were also experienced in different respects by their Katore rulers (Staley 1982: Chap. 12). Recollection of such traditions may therefore offer an informed historical consciousness of intergenerational continuities with contemporary struggles for regional and local self-determination in modern Pakistan, deriving from a common historical legacy, properly cherished by the Anjuman-e-Taraqqi Khowar, to which ancestors from all fractions of Chitrali citizenry have contributed.

Photographic Plates: Ancestors and Elders of Ramboor Valley Kalasha

Four photographic plates accompanying this article serve as an additional visual archive complementing Kalasha narrative traditions, selected for their historically illustrative rather than aesthetic value. Taken by Colonel R.C.F. Schomberg in spring 1935, they were not included in his *Kafirs and Glaciers* (1938) and are therefore printed here for the first time from his photographic negative collection in the Pitt Rivers Museum, University of Oxford (see Jones 1996), by kind permission of its director and trustees, and photographic curator, Dr Elizabeth Edwards. I also include three of my own photographs: showing the equestrian ancestor effigy of Aman-ul-Mulk's famous *asakāl* Mahamurat, still standing in Ramboor graveyard in summer 1972; a portrait of his great-great-great-grandson Sherjuan, former Basic Democracy member for Kalasha; and a portrait of Abdul Salam, also of the Dremese-nawau lineage, the last major *asakāl* headman of Ramboor before Kalasha enfranchisement from feudal service in 1954.

Plate 39.1 Kalasha *begār*. A group of Kalasha labourers assembled for portering duties in Uyun. Individuals remain to be identified. The accompaniment of a drum (Kalasha *dahū*, Khowar *damāma*) was mentioned in recollections of *briṣṭāu* labouring duties. The tall youth standing on the left may be a Kho supervisor *(sarkār)* of this group, perhaps assembled as coolies for Colonel Schomberg's visit (1938: 36–37). Two seated figures are dressed in homespun goa-hair herding jackets (*saŋgāči*) and puttees (*kuṭawāti*), while others are dressed in Chitrali woollen gowns (*šuqa*), used as blankets for sleeping when labouring. Photograph Copyright: Pitt Rivers Museum, University of Oxford, Neg. SH.1.19.

Plate 39.2 Joshi Spring Festival at Grom, 19/20 May 1935. A view of line-dancing *(dražaīlak naṭ)* taken several minutes before that depicted in *Kafirs and Glaciers* (Schomberg 1938: opp. p. 64), which more photogenically captured the rear view of female dancers (left) as these circulated counterclockwise. This plate is of alternative value in illustrating now obsolete features of male dress, such as the fringed and embroidered homespun trousers *(dāšak bhut)*, which all but one young boy is wearing here. Such trousers are now only rarely woven for boys undertaking their 'trouser-dressing' *(bhut sambiēk)* rite of adult initiation at 7 or 8 years. At least three males here also have necklaces with small bells around their necks, connoting *biramūr* feasts of merit, while several wear red festal dancing-moccasins *(kalūn)* obtained from neighbouring Kati *bāri* artisans. The Joshi festival is a time for conspicuous

displays of both new and traditional clothing: including here several freshly tailored white cotton shirts, and at least one metal-braided ceremonial gown (*čapān*, left) of gaudy *'kinkab'* (*khimkhāp*) brocade, typically awarded as inferior *khelāt* (*sariphā*) gifts by Katore rulers. Within the inner circle of elders clustered for song recitation, the praise singer seems to be Lamtson (cf. Schomberg 1938: 55, plate opp. p. 80) holding a stick or dancing-axe for classic 'name-naming' recitation (Parkes 1996b: 326). This photograph may show a majority of the adult Kalasha population of Ramboor in the mid-1930s, then amounting to barely forty households. A similar view of Joshi dancing at Grom in May 1929 was photographed by Georg Morgenstierne (1973: plate 5; also cine film at the Indo-Iranian Institute, Oslo; cf. Morgenstierne 1947). Photograph Copyright: Pitt Rivers Museum, University of Oxford, Neg. SH.1.96.

Plate 38.3 Senior Elders of Ramboor. Sakdar, Kan, and Fauch (left to right): three brothers and senior elders (*gāḍa baṣāra*) of the Mutimire-nawau lineage in Ramboor, 1935. Some fifteen years earlier, these three brothers had sponsored a prestigious double Sharuga feast at the funeral of their father Achayak, who had given in his lifetime a 'great he-goat sacrifice after showing a "thousand" (twenty-score) goats' (*gona biramūr, hazār pai pašāi biramāūr*), commemorated with a fine double-horse-headed equestrian ancestor effigy, now in the Peshawar Museum. Achayak's *biramūr* feast was to be repeated by Sakdar's currently distinguished grandson, Katarsing, in November 1977 (Darling 1979: Chap. 5). The old *asakāl* Fauch, wearing an officer's greatcoat here, was also photographed by Georg Morgenstierne in 1929 (1973: final plate). His son Mashar, briefly *asakāl* headman and original Muslim League leader (before floor-crossing to 'Pakhti League' party leadership in 1950), recently died in equally active and distinguished old age. The three brothers stand proudly by ancestral 'wealth stones' *(mal bat)*, placed to commemorate the homicidal feasts *(šūra uphōr)* of their grandfather Brumburak, and other early ancestors of the Mutimire-nawau lineage, at the community assembly place (*phařāřî*, now police station) below Batthet village. The growth of beards by Kalasha elders was common before this became an emblem of Muslim conversions from the 1950s. Photograph Copyright: Pitt Rivers Museum, University of Oxford, Neg. SH.1.31.

Plate 39.4 Ancestor Effigy of Mahamurat. The double-headed equestrian effigy (*dū-ṣīṣ īstōri gaṇḍāo*) of Aman-ul-Mulk's renowned *asakāl* Mahamurat, commemorating his double *Sharuga* mortuary feast, sponsored by his son Mahatomar and grandson Kanek (son of Surchai), whose pedestrian effigies (*pōi gaṇḍāo*) stand dutifully behind (Schomberg 1938: 50, plate opp.). By 1972 these effigies were badly mutilated, reputedly defaced by Kati *sheikhs*. In spring 1973, Mahamurat's effigy was awarded by his lineal descendant Sherjuan (Plate 39.6) to President Z.A. Bhutto for official presentation to the Italian embassy in Islamabad. The subsequent commercial history of antiquarian dealing for this statue in Europe and America, prior to its purchase for several hundred thousand dollars by the State Museum for Ethnography in Munich, is related by Jürgen Frembgen (1998: 336–38). Mahamurat's miniature enthroned effigy (*guṇḍurīk*), standing in fields between the hamlets of Malidesh and Batthet (Schomberg 1938: 50; photograph in Haserodt 1989: 92, plate 28), was earlier removed with Sherjuan's approval for conservation in the Pitt Rivers Museum, Oxford. While these effigies are preserved, the destiny of many other Ramboor ancestor statues—mainly acquired by a Zurich antiquity dealer in the 1970s—is largely unknown. Their sale and occasional theft then caused bitter factional accusations among lineal descendants, for whom these monuments were vital

mnemonic markers—albeit rarely visited—of collectively inherited ancestral renown. Photograph: P. Parkes, August 1972.

Plate 39.5 Ancestor Effigy of Safar in 1935. Equestrian statue (*istorī gaṇḍāo*) of Safar, also of the Dremese-nawau lineage, commemorating the *Sharuga* feast sponsored by his elder brother Durum Shah, father of Abdul Salam (see Plate 39.7). Like the double-horse headed effigy of Achayak, this statue was said to have been removed for conservation in the Peshawar Museum by a British officer around 1935 (together with other ancestor statues of the converted Kati *sheikhs* of upper Ramboor; see Schomberg 1938: plate opp. p. 182), who might well have been Colonel Schomberg himself. Safar's miniature equestrian *guṇḍurīk* effigy in Balanguru village (still fragmentarily extant) was also depicted by Schomberg (1938: photo opp. p. 58). Another plate in his *Kafirs and Glaciers* (1938: opp. p. 52) shows a similar equestrian effigy of Kalashamir (Balōhe-nawau lineage), the famous 'Amir Kalash' appointed governor of Bashgal under Shah Kator, together with a smaller equestrian effigy of his 'son' (actually FFFBSSS) 'Khush Beg' or Khoshalbeg (Schomberg 1938: 49–50). Both statues (also in the Peshawar Museum) were sponsored through *Sharuga* funerary feasts given by Kalashamir's son Sherbek around 1900 (Parkes 1983: 495), carved by Kati *bāri* artisans from Bumboret. Photograph Copyright: Pitt Rivers Museum, University of Oxford, Neg. SH.1.29, detail.

Plate 39.6 Sherjuan. Sherjuan or Shah Juwan, lineal successor of Mahamurat (see Plate 39.3) after four generations, was an able and renowned Kalasha leader overseeing the transitional period in the 1960s following Kalasha enfranchisement from Katore feudal service in 1954. As a young man in his twenties, he was appointed Basic Democracy member for all three valleys under President Ayub Khan (on 30.11.1964 according to his notebook), when he pioneered government development initiatives for Kalasha with the generous support of Wazir Ali Shah. Sherjuan is the narrator of several traditions cited in this essay (see note 18), related in his home village of Malidesh (since destroyed by floods) in the summer of 1972. Photograph: P. Parkes, August 1989.

Plate 39.7 Abdul Salam. Abdul Salam ('Jangalwal') was the last major *asakāl* headman of Ramboor valley in the late 1940s. The son of Durum Shah, his family had also given the *ghōna biramūr* feast in his childhood, and further sponsored a *Sharuga* mortuary feast for his father's brother Safar (see Plate 39.5). Abdul Salam himself sponsored a great *han-sarīk* feast for rebuilding the jeSTakhan temple of the Bakar-nawau clan in Balanguru in 1968. Despite early conversion to Islam, Abdul Salam has continued to play an active and vital role as a progressive community leader and respected senior elder of Ramboor valley for over half a century. Photograph: P. Parkes, August 1989, when Abdul Salam was 80 years old.

A commemorative song Abdul Salam composed in the early 1970s may serve as an epitaph to three centuries of Katore rule, also conveying Kalasha aspirations of a more just moral order within modern Chitral, which his political successors—like his grandson Saifullah Jan (this volume)—continue to pursue:

wēnao dai sīra dyāi-o, ṣoṣkī hāirao katūra bačaī	From above the winds blew, sweeping away the kingdom of the Katore
mīmi-o nekām āle, mai satīr bhutō že rāǰā wazīr	Your own success came about, my president Bhutto and Raja [Tridiv Roy] your *wazir*

išlamabād žōši dahū banǰāle, mai ne asālak hīu	They played the Joshi drums at Islamabad, where I felt homesick
šasē khabār bilān-ǰāo, brešāis se ghōra paṭhōřik bau	When this news was spread around, it confounded the white-butterfly army [of Kho]
lot mōndr-o kia dēme? ǰarāluri, mai šāma pakistān	What great speech shall I give? It should be digested: my [vision of] this Pakistan.

PLATE 39.1

Kalash begār

PLATE 39.2

Joshi Spring Festival at Grom, 19/20 May 1935

PLATE 39.3



Senior elders of Ramboor

PLATE 39.4



Ancestor effigy of Mahamurat

PLATE 39.5

Ancestor Efiggy of Safar 1935

PLATE 39.6



Sherjuan

PLATE 39.7



Abdul Salam

NOTES

1. In the NWFP these include a pathbreaking historical ethnography (Bannerjee 1994) and a meticulous archival history (Wiqar Ali Shah 1997) of the Khudai Khidmatgar movement. Ethnographically informed histories of the Northern Areas include Müller-Stellrecht 1978; Tahir Ali 1983; Jettmar 1983 1989; Söhnen 1983; Frembgen 1985, 1986, 1999; Dani 1989; Kreutzmann 1996: Chap. 4; Schmid 1997: Chap. 2; Sökefeld 1997; Flowerday 1998; and contributions in Stellrecht 1997, 1999. Indigenous histories include Zarin 1984; Mankiralay 1987; Shah Rais Khan 1987; and translations undertaken by Adam Nayyar at the Lok Virsa Institute (e.g., Hashmatullah Khan 1987); while local histories in Urdu are noted by Frembgen (1996).
2. For example, Eggert 1990; Holzwarth 1996; Cacòpardo & Cacòpardo 1995, 1996; Baig 1997; Stellrecht 1998; Hussam-ul-Mulk & Jettmar no date; and Parkes 1996a, no date.
3. Cf. Tahir Ali 1983: 90–108 on such ambivalence regarding the *tham* or *mir* of Hunza, who 'evoked simultaneously obeisance mixed with fear, respect with anxiety, and loyalty with resentment' (p. 94).
4. On Katore slave trading, see Müller-Stellrecht 1981: 415–17 (also Raverty 1864: 127, 133; Biddulph 1880: 67–68; Durand 1899: 51f.). The sale of 'Kalásh slaves' is mentioned in an early trade report (Davies 1862: 362; cf. Leitner 1880: 7). The destiny of such slaves is, of course, rarely narrated. But in 1974, I witnessed the remarkable reappearance of the son of a slave, Janjamir (of the Balôhe-nawau lineage, Ramboor), specifically remembered as having being cruelly seized and sold to Kabul by Aman-ul-Mulk. His son, Abdul Gani, from Ramgal valley in western Nuristan, was visiting Chitral in the hope of curing a footache at the hot springs of Garam Chashma; but he was also curious to meet his 'Kafir cousins' in Ramboor, and to regale them with his family history. His enslaved father (youngest son of Amir Kalash or Kalashamir) had been successful as an 'officer' or spy in the army of Amanullah of Afghanistan, and he had been richly rewarded with servants of his own, as well as a small estate in Ramgal, where he had married a local woman and lived with her maternal uncle, establishing a prosperous family there.
5. Kalasha scapulamancy, scrutinizing the shoulder-blade of a sacrificed animal (*as jiēk*), includes a prominent area at the base of the bone-ridge dedicated to omens concerning the Katore royal family, where white spots indicate an impending death. A star of Katore (*katurēan tāri*, the planet Mars) was also periodically observed to predict royal fortunes.
6. See Nizam-ul-Mulk & Leitner 1891: 153; Schomberg 1938: 235–36; Lorimer 1980: 192; and Hussam-ul-Mulk 1974: 98. Such traditions conceivably derived from former Katore ritual pretensions to 'divine kingship' or control of local spiritual powers comparable to those of the *tham* or *mir* of Hunza (Müller-Stellrecht 1973: 161–71).
7. Compare Guha 1991: 65–67 on the similar 'motif of the wicked official' in the Garwhal Himalaya: The state, or the monarch, appears as an abstract entity far removed from the scene of exploitation...surrogate officials are perceived as the true exploiters. The notion of a 'just' government...is another factor which influences popular perceptions; thus tyrannical officials are seen as breaching the ethical code of justice governing relations between ruler and ruled. (p. 65–66).
8. On Sangin Ali or Sangali, see Biddulph 1880: 151 and Ghulam Murtaza 1962: 37. Kalasha traditions of Mir Sangali probably refer to Sangali II, reportedly ruling in the late 17th century (Ghulam Murtaza 1962: Chap. 4.5). Ghulam Murtaza (1962: 28, 30, 37, 40) refers to the defeat of the Kalasha king of Chitral 'Bula Singh' by 'Shah Nadir Rais' in the 14th century, while 'Raja Wai' was supposedly defeated by 'Shah Tahir Rais' some two centuries later. But these accounts do not conform with Bumboret oral traditions, where Rajawai (son of Raja Krishnuk) and Bulasing—eponymous clan ancestors of lineages in Batrik and Brun—are treated as contemporary and rival local chiefs, associated with the era of Mir Sangal or Sangali's overlordship in Wirishikgum. The Bulasinge *qaum* of Uyun claim that Bulasing was a 'Kho Kafir' formerly ruling from Chitral, whose pagan followers became Kalasha when driven to Bumboret. Traditions of the Bulasing-nawau lineage of Brun relate that their ancestor retreated there after being mistakenly attacked by his brother Kavijok in Uyun. Cf. Wazir Ali Shah 1974b: 79.
9. On Sumalik, son of Trakhan and successor of Shiri Badat in Gilgit tradition, see Biddulph 1880: 135–36 and Lorimer 1980: 119–22; also Dani 1989: 166–67, citing Hashmatullah Khan 1938 and Shah Rais Khan 1987. Early Ra'is wars against Sumalik of Gilgit, and his capture by Taj Mughal (see note 12 below), are mentioned by Ghulam Murtaza (1962: 37; cf. Ghulam Muhammad 1907: 126–27; Shah Rais Khan 1987: 56–66). The lineal pedigree of the Sherä-nawau ('Zondre') lineage in Darasguru claims royal descent from Sumalik through his son Siahgush, the father of their apical ancestor Pahlawan (the wrestler), who is supposed to have been a brother of Zandro or Zon, founder of the noble Kho Zondre *qaum* in Uyun and elsewhere. Sumalik is here related to be the son of Sirang, with a younger brother Bukara or Bokhara. Kalasha legends of Sirang, Sumalik, and Siahgush—born 'black eared' (*siāhguš*) perhaps by Persian folk etymology for Siyavosh—

correspond with Zondre traditions elsewhere in Chitral (Schomberg 1938: 160–61; Jettmar 1975: 448–49; cf. Eggert 1990: 39, passim, indicating 'Sirenge', 'Siah Gushe' and 'Shere' descent sections of the Zondre *qaum*). A whimsical tale tells of a Kalasha woman's rude concealment of meat in her skirts on attending a premortuary feast of Sumalik, justifying the ritual prohibition of sacrificial male goat's meat for Kalasha women.

10. Dhondi was famous for his manly beauty and shining golden teeth, which gained the infatuation of Khushwaqt's queen. The king therefore had him thrown from Shasha Bridge, where his head was cut off and thrown into the Chitral River. Floating down towards Nagar, to the whirlpool near Kalkatak named Dhondigal (Kalasha *bṝuarsār*), his revolving head and golden teeth famously lit up the valley like the sun. His brother Babura was equally famous for building the great *rikhīni-han* clan-house at Gurul, using Birir bond-labourers loaned by Khushwaqt, who supplied treasure and gowns for its celebratory feasting. Shah Khushwaqt of Yasin and Mastuj (grandson of Sangin Ali I and brother of Muhtaram Shah Kator I) is indeed related to have owned extensive *jagīr* estates around Uyun, conceivably including the Kalasha valleys, whose tribute and labour services would thus have been inherited by his son and successor in Yasin, Shah Faramurd, who supposedly ruled Chitral briefly in the early 18th century (Ghulam Muhammad 1962: Chaps. 4.4, 4.9). Ancient funeral praise songs of Dhondi and Babura's services to these rulers in 'Balōs Wirishikgum' mention their forts in Mastuj, Shoghor, and Sonoghor, also referring to an unidentifiable rival 'Shah Madrush' of Nari in Kunar.
11. Mehtar Bamburus or Bambaras Khan of Drosh recurs in Birir as well as Ramboor traditions. He is said to have made war against Kasata, a lineal descendant of Dhondi and Babura, of the Lataruk-dari lineage. He is sometimes confused with a later ruler of Drosh, Sherbalang Khan, associated with 'Shah Katur,' who received as *nazrana* (Khowar *ūsel*) magical treasure brought from the 'temple of Mahandeu' in Wetdesh (Prasun) by ancestors of the Rashmuk-dari and Mārā-dari lineages of Gasguru (Parkes 1991: 84). Sherbalang Khan is evidently Sar Buland Khan, the Reza-khel prince appointed governor of Drosh by his elder brother Mehtar Shah Nawaz Khan at the end of the 18th century (Ghulam Murtaza 1962: Chap. 5.5), and subsequently under his younger brother Muhtaram Shah (Little Kator). He is also the 'Mir Shah Rizá, Badshah or Chief of Drúsh' who provided extensive information on late 18th century Chitral to the anonymous surveyor cited in Raverty's notes on 'Káshkár and its Daráhs' (Raverty 1888; cf. Holzwarth 1996: 129-30, note 7h).
12. This early conquering warlord is perhaps comparable with the 'Taj Mughal' of Badakhshan or Yarkand mentioned in other regional histories (Hashmatullah Khan 1939: 672; Ghulam Murtaza 1962: 28–29, 34, 36; cf. Holzwarth 1994: 19, 1996: 120; Jettmar 1996: 90). But he appears to be a composite figure, also plausibly identifiable with the Badakhshani invader, Mir Sultan Shah Azdaha (the Dragon), supporting Shah Abdul Qadir Ra'is and besieging Khushamad II at Mastuj in the mid-18th century (Ghulam Murtaza 1962: Chaps. 4.8, 5.1). In Birir, Ghor Dimiu, a forefather of the Rashmuk-dari lineage and grandfather of the prophetic shaman Sindi *dehār* (see below), also 'mixed with the gods' *(dēwa mišāri)*, single-handedly made war against such a 'Tajik Shah' before he was treacherously tricked by a Kalasha slave woman revealing the markhor-horn pipeline bringing water to his fortified castle above Gasguru in Birir (as with Bulasing at Chitral); but he later outwitted and killed the king with a series of similar folkloric counter-tricks, including a rolling log of mill stones. Another 'Tajik Shah' is said to have been killed by Juruwek, a forefather of the Bazike-nawau lineage in Brun (Bumboret), resulting in another Tajik invasion from Badakhshan before a large blood-price was settled in compensation, notably after Juruwek's daughter had offered herself as a slave to raise proceeds.
13. Ancestral tradition of the Lataruk-dari of Gurul, Birir valley. Narrator: Shar Khan (Gilasur-dari), aged ca 70 years in 1976. Lataruk is placed ca eight to nine generations prior to living elders of this descent line. Literal translation from Kalasha verbal transcription.
14. Ancestral tradition of the Barik-dari or Dramui-nawau lineage of Balanguru village, Ramboor. Narrator: Khrosh Nawaz (Balōhe-nawau lineage), aged ca 43 years in 1974. Barik is placed eight generations back from a single living elder of this descent line.
15. Ancestral tradition of the Dremese-nawau and Begalye-nawau lineages of Balanguru village, Ramboor. Narrator: Khrosh Nawaz in 1974 (as above). The eponymous ancestors Dremes and Begal are placed five to six generations from living elders.
16. Cf. Schomberg 1938: 264–68; Ghulam Murtaza 1962: Chap. 4; and Lorimer 1980: 213. Conversion to Islam of former Kalasha communities in Broze and Urghuch are related in some detail to have occurred under 'Great Kator' (Muhtaram Shah I), i.e., within the 17th century. The last Kalasha pagan of Urghuch, Suki, was memorably feasted and entombed at Nosbiu in Birir.
17. Khairullah also features as a rapacious king in Ramboor traditions about the early lineage ancestor 'Little Sumbara' (son of Balōh, apical ancestor of the Balōhe-nawau lineage, six to seven generations removed from its living elders). After sponsoring the first great Sharuga feast (see note 20 below) at the funeral of his

father's brother Chakhun, Khairullah is said to have sent soldiers from Wirishikgum to seize Sumbara's renowned herds of goats. But the shaman Nanga *dehār* had earlier ordered his making of a shrine to the fertility goddess Jach, and with her divine protection Sumbara managed to escape with sixty milking goats to Bashgal, together with his infant son Kasum, whom he suckled with goat's milk. The goddess further protected his herds in Ramboor by causing hallucinatory mists, confusing the soldiers of Khairullah, who found only rocks in the mountains, returning empty-handed to Wirishikgum (Parkes 1975: 25–26; cf. Loude 1980: 55–56). A similar motif of family loyalty and martyrdom for Shah Kator (here Muhtaram Shah II) against Khairullah, during related civil and sectarian interdynastic strife in Upper Chitral at the end of the 18th century, occurs in the legendary history of the Roshte *qaum* related by Wazir Ali Shah (1983: 640).

18. Composite Ramboor tradition, mainly derived from ancestral traditions of the Karuzhi-dari lineage of Anish, Bumboret. Narrator: Sherjuan (Dremese-nawau lineage), aged ca. 35 years in 1972. Kanek and Karuzhi, sons of Mahadust and grandsons of Kurumba (a foundling discovered by Dangariks), were placed six to seven generations back from living elders of the Aspāhi-nawau and Karuzhi-dari lineages of Anish. The Ramboor ancestors Amir (or Kalashamir) and Adraman are placed three to four generations back from living elders (of the Balōhe-nawau and Begalye-nawau lineages), suggesting an anachronistic conflation of separate lineage traditions. This text, continuing below, is summarized from a unique communal 'epic history' of Kalasha (the topic of Parkes 1975) related by Sherjuan (see Plate 39.6) in August 1972, assisted by the Ramboor elder Baraman (Balōhe-nawau lineage). As in the case of traditions related by Quasi Khrosh Nawaz (note 14), these narratives appear to be influenced by indirect (oral) knowledge of the *Nai Tarikhi-e-Chitral* (Ghulam Murtaza 1962). Fuller translations (through Khowar renditions) are reproduced in Parkes (1975: 164-75).
19. Narrative continuation of the Ramboor 'epic history'. See note 18 above.
20. Schomberg (1938: 50) describes the 'extra large' equestrian effigy of 'Mahomuret...on his two-headed steed' *(istōri gaṇḍāo)* as well as a miniature enthroned effigy (*guṇḍurīk*), commemorating 'the distribution of two hundred cattle on his death' (i.e., the Sharuga feast series, which Mahamurat performed twice; see Darling 1979 105–15 Parkes 1983: 490-95). Schomberg's photograph of Mahamurat's effigy (1938: opp. p. 50) is miscaptioned 'Achayak', actually the father of Fauch (see note 26 below) of the Mutimire-nawau lineage, one of just five Ramboor families around the turn of the century who had sponsored the *Sharuga* feast series (see Klimburg this volume), commemorated with the only other known two-headed Kalasha equestrian effigy, now in the Peshawar Museum. The subsequent odyssey of Mahamurat's effigy, from its removal from Ramboor graveyard in 1973 to its acquistion by the State Museum for Ethnography in Munich, is recounted by Frembgen (1998).
21. See Ghulam Murtaza 1962: Chap. 10. Primary eyewitness accounts of these events are Robertson (1899), Thomson (1895), and Gurdon (1933, 1934). Cf. Alder 1963: 287–99.
22. This shamanic prophecy was also ascribed to the Bumboret shaman Rabadan, father of Budok *dehār* (cf. Siiger 1963). As related by Budok to Adolf Friedrich in 1956, Rabadan *dehār* had a similar revelation of 'fairies in heaven playing drums' in honour of Shuja-ul-Mulk, whose mother (Asmari Khonza) is said to have delightedly awarded the *dehār* robes as well as securing his village's release from tributary taxes (Friedl 1965: 16). Rabadan was indeed appointed *asakāl* headman of Bumboret under Shuja-ul-Mulk.
23. Narrative continuation of the Ramboor 'epic history'. See note 18.
24. Narrative conclusion of the Ramboor 'epic history'. See note 18.
25. Narrator: Shar Khan (Gilasur-dari, Gurul), aged ca 70 years in 1976.
26. Extract of praise song for the Mutimire-nawau of Ramboor recorded in 1974 and fully reproduced in Parkes 1975: 63–64. The greeting here possibly refers to Shuja-ul-Mulk's return to Chitral from touring India in 1910. A photograph of the *asakāl* Fauch as a senior elder in 1929 is shown in the final plate of Morgenstierne's *The Kalasha Language* (1973): the bearded 'headman' on the left, accompanied by the 'soothsayer' Dangarik *dehār* (Wakoke-nawau lineage) and by Mahmat Isa (Balōhe-nawau; see note 33 below) on the far right. Schomberg's 1935 photograph of Fauch and his brothers, previously unpublished, is printed as Plate 39.3 here.
27. Bakhdur, elder of the Dremese-nawau lineage, aged ca 60 years in 1989.
28. Labour sevices and taxes demanded of Kalasha communities were traditionally divided up among *kam* lineages, whose elders would further subdivide specific tasks and payments by rota among their constituent households. This resulted in sometimes disproportionately greater dues demanded of small lineages. Many potentially wealthy households with inadequate labour were thus obliged to sell or mortgage their inherited property to lineage members who could provide the required services and taxes. Equivalently remembered overlords (*mulāwa*) to Asfandiar or 'Komander' in Ramboor were: Lalzaman Khan of Mastuj (son of Bakhdur Khan, a brother of Aman-ul-Mulk), commanding labour in Bomboret; and 'Chir-Brar' (a royal foster-brother) of Muldeh, commanding labour in Birir. The corvée labour and taxes of the Kalasha valleys were thus

frequently granted as *jagir* estates to Katore nobility in return for administrative services. Cf. Butz (this volume) and Macdonald 1998 on similar corvées in Hunza and Baltistan.

29. Recollection of Abdul Salam (Dremese-nawau lineage), aged ca 80 years in 1989. See Plate 39.7.
30. See Ghulam Murtaza 1962: Chap. 15; also Hussam-ul-Mulk 1947 (cf. Eggert 1990: 6).
31. This would have been around the time of Halfdan Siiger's visit to Ramboor (summer 1948). He was perhaps shielded by Wazir Ali Shah from awareness of impending Kalasha insurrections (cf. Siiger 1956: 15), yet his transcribed autobiography of Kwad Shah (Dremese-nawau *asakāl* preceding Abdul Salam) alludes to earlier public protests:

> When prince Ghulam [Dastgir] imposed uncustomary taxes on us, then all of us, women and men together, emigrated en masse to Chitral. We made a petition to the king and Gaden Mulki [Capt. B.E.M. Gurdon, political agent]. Then the king severed us from Ghulam and gave us two month's labour-release, before he gave [us] to Asfandiar [i.e. Komander]. From then until now this [community] has been with Asfandiar. (Morgenstierne 1973: 45 lines 33–38 retranslated);

32. Recollection of Bakhdur in 1989 (see note 27 above), a long serving *hawaldar* of the Border Police in Ramboor. He ended this account with the wry comment: 'In those days they beseeched us to join the bodyguard; but nowadays it takes a bribe of over a thousand rupees to sign up in the Border Police!' The 'Pakhti League' (properly the Ittehadi or 'Unionist' Muslim League of local royalists contesting national Muslim League agitation in Chitral from 1950) was colloquially named after the lavish cooked rice (Khowar *paxtī*) feasts offered to supporters at their rallies. Their paternalist promise of reduced *thaŋgī* tribute and labour was an arguably better option than regular *ushur* and *zakāt* harvest taxes for most poor Kalasha households, who paid these government tithes until 1973.
33. Mahmat Isa (Balōhe-nawau lineage) was in several respects the most pioneering Kalasha of this century, serving as a *shikari* (hunting) guide and interpreter to British officers throughout northwest India, fluent in Persian, Urdu, and Pashto. He was the guide and informant to Reginald Schomberg in Ramboor, whose travel book *Kafirs and Glaciers* displays a portrait, taken at the Joshi festival in May 1935, showing Mahmat Isa in the background, with his brother Saidaman and young son Zulum Khan in the foreground (1938: plate opp. p. 170; cf. p. 60). Mahmat Isa also served as an interpreter for the Norwegian linguist Georg Morgenstierne in 1929 (see Morgenstierne 1973: 184–85). He was murdered after a land dispute with Bashgali *Sheikhs* in Ramboor ca 1956. I intend to describe his narrative history in a companion piece to this article, concerning traditions of Kalasha relations with British colonial officers and Pakistani presidents ('Kafir Kings: Colonial and Postcolonial Rule in Kalasha Tradition' ms.).
34. On current predicaments of Kalasha development, see Saifullah Jan this volume; Babar Jamal (this volume); and Parkes (1999).

References

Alder, G.J. 1963. *British India's Northern Frontier 1865–95. A Study in Imperial Policy*. London: Longmans for the Royal Commonwealth Society.

Ali, T. 1983. The Burusho of Hunza: Social Structure and Household Viability in a Mountain Desert Kingdom. University of Rochester. Ann Arbor: Microfilms International.

Baig, Rahmat Karim. 1994. *Hindu Kush Studies, Volume One*. Peshawar: Rahmat Karim Baig (Rehmat Printing Press).

———, 1997. An Abridged History of Chitral. In *Hindu Kush Studies, Volume Two*: pp. 1–58. Peshawar: Rahmat Karim Baig (Rehmat Printing Press).

Bannerjee, M. 1994. A Study of the *Khudai Khidmatgar* Movement 1930-47, NWFP, British India. Ph.D. thesis, University of Oxford.

Biddulph, John. 1880. *Tribes of the Hindoo Koosh*. Calcutta: Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing. Reprint edited by K. Gratzl, Graz: Akademische Druck-u. Verlagsanstalt, 1971.

Cacopardo, Alberto, & Cacopardo Augusto 1995. Unknown Peoples of Southern Chitral. Part I: The Dameli. *East and West* 45: pp. 233–82.

———, 1996. The Kalasha in Southern Chitral, Parts I–III. In *Proceedings of the Second International Hindu Kush Cultural Conference*, ed. Elena bashir and Israr-ud-Din, pp. 247. Karachi: Oxford University Press. [Also 1991–92: The Other Kalasha. A Survey of the Kalashamun-speaking People in Southern Chitral, parts I–III. *East and West* 41: 273–350, 42: 333–75]

Dani, Ahmad Hasan. 1989. *History of Northern Areas of Pakistan.* Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research.

Darling, Elizabeth G. 1979. Merit Feasting among the Kalash Kafirs of Northwest Pakistan. MA thesis, University of British Columbia.

Davies, R.H. 1862. *Report on the Trade and Resources of the Countries of the North-western Boundary of British India.* Lahore.

Davis, J. 1989. The Social Relations of the Production of History. In *History and Ethnicity*, ed. E. Tonkin, M. McDonald, and M. Chapman. London: Routledge.

Durand, A. 1899. *The Making of a Frontier: Five Year's Experiences and Adventures in Gilgit, Hunza, Nagar, Chitral and the Eastern Hindu Kush.* London. New edition 1974, with foreword by G.J. Alder. Graz: Akademische-u. Verlagsanstalt.

Eggert, P. 1990. *Die frühere Sozialordnung Moolkhos und Turkhos (Chitral).* Beiträge zur Südasienforschung 134. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.

Flowerday, Julie. M. 1998. A Construction of Cultural History from Visual Records for the Burusho of Hunza, Pakistan. Ph.D. thesis, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International.

Frembgen, J. 1985. *Zentrale Gewalt in Nager (Karakorum): politische Organisationsformen, ideologische Begründungen des Königtums und Veränderungen in der Moderne.* Beiträge zur Südasienforschung, 103. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.

_____, 1996. Local Dignitaries as Historians: Guardians of Traditional Culture from Gilgit, Hunza and Nager (Northern Pakistan). In Bashir, E., and Israr-ud-Din (eds), *Proceedings*, pp. 97–104.

_____,1998. Zur Biographie einer Reiterstatue der Kalasha (Hindukusch). *Baessler-Archiv* (NS) 46: pp. 329–42.

_____, 1999. Indus Kohistan: An Historical and Ethnographic Outline. *Central Asiatic Journal* 43, 1: pp. 70–98.

Friedl, E. 1966. *Träger medialer Begabung im Hindukusch und Karakorum.* Acta Ethnologica et Linguistica, 8. Vienna: Verlag Österreichische Ethnologische Gesellschaft.

Genovese, E.D. 1974. *Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made.* New York: Pantheon.

Ghulam Muhammad. 1907. Festivals and Folklore of Gilgit. *Memoirs of the Asiatic Society of Bengal* 1, 7: pp. 93–127.

Guha, R. 1991. *The Unquiet Woods: Ecological Change and Peasant Resistance in the Himalaya.* Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Ghulam Murtaza, Mirza. 1962. *Nai Tarikh-e-Chitral* [New History of Chitral, in Urdu, translated and compiled from the Persian *Tarikh-e-Chitral* of Mirza Muhammad Ghufran]. Peshawar: Ghulam Murtaza (Public Art Press).

Gurdon, B.E.M. 1933. Chitral Memories: Events Leading up to the Siege. *Himalayan Journal* 5: pp. 1–27.

_____, 1934. Chitral Memories: The Siege of Chitral. *Himalayan Journal* 6: pp. 1–30.

Haserodt, K. 1989. Chitral (Pakistanischer Hindukusch): Strukturen, Wandel und Probleme eines Lebensraumes im Hochgebirge zwischen Gletschern und Wüste. In *Hochgebirgsräume Nordpakistans im Hindukusch, Karakorum und Westhimalaya*, ed. K. Haserodt, pp. 44–180. Beiträge und Materialen zur Regionalen Geographie, 2. TU Berlin.

Hashmatullah Khan, Al-Haj Maulvi. 1939. *Mukhtasar-i Tarikh-i Jammun wa riyasatha-yi maftuha-yi Maharaja Gulab Singh Bahadur, wali-yi Jammun wa Kashmir* [A Short History of Jammu and Kashmir, in Urdu]. Lucknow. Reprint, Mirpur: Verinag Publishers, 1991.

_____, 1987. *History of Baltistan.* Translated from Urdu by A. Nayyar. Islamabad: Lok Virsa National Institute for Folk and Traditional Heritage.

Haynes, D., Prakash. 1992. *Contesting Power: Resistance and Everyday Social Relations in South Asia.* Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Holzwarth, Wolfagang. 1986. *Die Ismailiten in Nordpakistan: zur Entwicklung einer religiösen Minderheit im Kontext neuer Aussenbeziehungen.* Berlin: Ethnizität und Gesellschaft, Occasional Papers 21.

_____, 1996. Chitral History, 1540–1660: Comments on Sources and Historiography. In Bashir, E., and Israr-ud-Din (eds), *Proceedings*, pp. 117–34.

_____, 1999. Ein Kriegszug in das Bashgal-Tal (um 1790) und sein regionalpolitischer Kontext. In *Hindu Kush. In Memory of A.L. Grünberg*, ed. V. Kushev, N. Luzhetskaya, and L. Rzehak. St Petersburg: Petersburgskoe Vostokovendenie.

[Hussam-ul-Mulk, Shahzada: anonymous authorship] 1947. *Oppression in Chitral.* Compiled by the Organization of Chitrali Students and published by the Office of the Chitrali Students in Delhi.

Hussam-ul-Mulk, Shahzada. 1974. Chitral Folklore. In *Cultures of the Hindu Kush: Selected Papers from the Hindu-Kush Cultural Conference Held at Moesgård 1970*, ed. Karl Jettmar and L. Edelberg, pp. 95–115. Beiträge zur Südasienforschung, Heidelberg, 1. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner.

Hussam-ul-Mulk, Shahzada, & K. Jettmar. No date. The Traditional Culture of Chitral. Edited with analytical commentary by K. Jettmar. Typescript, 115 pp.

Jettmar, K. 1975. *Die Religionen des Hindukusch.* Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer.

_____, 1983. Indus-Kohistan: entwurf einer historischen Ethnographie. *Anthropos* 78, 3-4: pp. 501–18.

_____, 1989. Northern Areas of Pakistan: An Ethnographic Sketch. In Dani, A.H., *History of Northern Areas*, pp. 431–51.

Jones, Schuyler. 1996. The Research Value of Old Photographs. In Bashir, E. and Israr-ud-Din (eds), *Proceedings*, pp. 105–108.

Kreutzmann, Hermann. 1996. *Ethnizität im Entwicklungsprozess: Die Wakhi in Hochasien.* Berlin: Dietrich Reimer Verlag.

Leitner, G.W. 1880. *Kafiristan: Section I, The Bashgeli Kafirs and their Language.* Lahore: Dilbagroy at the Albert Press (reprinted from the *Journal of the United Service Institution of India*, 43: 147–93).

Lorimer, David Lockhart Robinson. 1980. Texts on Gilgit, Yasin, and Chitral (1923–24). Library of the School of Oriental and African Studies, London (MS 181247). Edited with German language commentary by I. Müller-Stellrecht as *Materialen zur Ethnographie von Dardistan (Pakistan). Aus den nachgelassenem Aufzeichnungen von D.L.R. Lorimer: Teil II-III, Gilgit, Chitral and Yasin.* Graz: Akademische Druck-u. Verlagsanstalt.

Loude, Jean-Yves. 1980. *Kalash: les derniers 'infidèles' de l'Hindu-Kush.* Paris: Berger-Levrault.

Macdonald, Kenneth Iain. 1998. Push and Shove: Spatial History and the Construction of a Portering Economy in Northern Pakistan. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 40, 2: pp. 287–317.

Mankiralay, Abd Al-Haq 1987. A Political History of Kalam, Part I. Translated from Pashto by A. Raziq Palwal. *Zentralasiatische Studien* 20: pp. 282–357.

Morgenstierne, G. 1947. The Spring Festival of the Kalash Kafirs. In *India Antiqua: A Volume of Oriental Studies Presented to Jean Phillippe Vogel, C.I.E.*, Leyden. pp. 240–48.

_____, 1973. *The Kalasha Language.* Oslo: Institutet for Sammenlignende Kulturforskning, Universitetsforlaget.

Müller-Stellrecht, I. 1973. *Feste in Dardistan. Darstellung und Kulturgeschichtliche Analyse.* Arbeiten aus dem Seminar für Völkerkunde der Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität, Frankfurt-am-Main, 5. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner.

_____, 1978. *Hunza und China (1761–1891).* Beiträge zur Südasienforschung, Heidelberg, 44. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner.

_____, 1981. Menschenhandel und Machtpolitik im westlichen Himalaja: ein Kapitel aus der Geschichte Dardistans (Nordpakistan). *Zentralasiatische Studien* 15: pp. 392–472.

Nizam-ul-Mulk, Sardar, & G.W. Leitner. 1891. Fables, Legends, and Songs of Chitral. *Imperial Asiatic Quarterly Review* 1, 1: pp. 145–58.

Parkes, P. 1975. The Social Role of Historical Tradition among the Kalash Kafirs of Chitral. M.Litt. thesis, University of Oxford.

_____, 1983. Alliance and Elopement: Economy, Social Order, and Sexual Antagonism among the Kalasha (Kalash Kafirs) of Chitral. D.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford.

_____, 1991. Temple of Imra, Temple of Mahandeu: A Kafir Sanctuary in Kalasha Cosmology. *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 54, 1: pp. 75–103. University of London.

_____, 1994. Personal and Collective Identity in Kalasha Song Performance: The Significance of Music-making in a Minority Enclave. In *Ethnicity, Identity and Music*, ed. M. Stokes, pp. 157–85.Oxford: Berg.

_____, 1996a. Indigenous Polo and the Politics of Regional Identity in Northern Pakistan. In *Sport, Identity and Ethnicity*, ed. J. MacClancy, pp. 43–67. Oxford: Berg.

_____, 1996b. Kalasha Oral Literature and Praise Songs. In Bashir, E., and Israr-ud-Din (eds), *Proceedings*, pp. 315–28.

_____, 1999. Enclaved Knowledge: Indigent and Indignant Representations of Environmental Management and Development among the Kalasha of Northern Pakistan. In *Indigenous Environmental Knowledge and its Transformations: Critical Anthropological Perspectives*, Ed. R. Ellen, P. Parkes, and A. Bicker. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers.

_____, No date. Alternative Social Structures and Foster Relations in the Hindu Kush: Milk Kinship and Tributary Allegiance in Former Mountain Kingdoms of Northern Pakistan. Ms. submitted to *Comparative Studies in Society and History.*

Raverty, H.G. 1864. An Account of Upper Kásh-kár, and Chitral, or Lower Kásh-kár, together with the Independent Afghán Statelet of Panj-korah, including Tál-ásh. *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal* 2: pp. 125–35.

_____, 1888. Kásh-kár and its Daráhs. In *Notes on Afghanistan and Part of Baluchistan*, ed. H.G. Raverty. pp. 152–74. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode.

Robertson, George Scott 1899. *Chitrál: The Story of a Minor Siege.* London: Methuen.

Saifullah Jan [Kalash] 1996. History and Development of the Kalasha. In Bashir, E., and Israr-ud-Din (eds), *Proceedings*, pp. 239–46.

Schmid, A. 1997. *Die Dom zwischen sozialer Ohnmacht und kultureller Macht. Ein Minderheit im Spannungsfeld eines interethnischen Relationengeflechts.* Beiträge zur Südasienforschung, Heidelberg, 179. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.

Schomberg, R.C.F. 1938. *Kafirs and Glaciers: Travels in Chitral.* London: Hopkinson.

Scott, J.C. 1976. *The Moral Economy of the Peasant.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

_____, 1986. *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

_____, 1990. *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Shah Rais Khan. 1987. *Tarikh-e-Gilgit.* Edited by A.H. Dani. Islamabad: Quaid-i-Azam University.

Siiger, H. 1956. Ethnological Field-research in Chitral, Sikkim and Assam: A Preliminary Report. *Historisk-filologiske Meddelelser udgivet af Det Kongelige Danske Videnskabernes Selskab* 36, 2: pp. 12–35.

_____, 1963. Shamanism among the Kalash Kafirs of Chitral. *Folk* 5: pp. 205–303.

Söhnen, R. 1983. On Reflections of Historical Events in Balti Folksongs. In *Ethnologie und Geschichte: Festschrift für Karl Jettmar*, ed. P. Snoy, pp. 582–601. Beiträge zur Südasienforschung, Heidelberg, 86. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner.

Sökefeld, M. 1997. *Ein Labyrinth von Identitäten in Nordpakistan. Zwischen Landbesitz, Religion, und Kaschmir-Konflikt.* Culture Area Karakorum Scientific Studies, 8. Cologne: Rüdiger Köppe Verlag.

Staley, J. 1982. *Words for my Brother: Travels Between the Hindu Kush and the Himalayas.* Karachi: Oxford University Press.

Stellrecht, I., ed. 1997. *The Past in the Present: Horizons of Remembering in the Pakistan Himalaya.* Culture Area Karakorum Scientific Studies, 2. Cologne: Rüdiger Köppe Verlag.

_____, 1998. Trade and Politics: The High-Mountain Region of Pakistan in the 19th and 20th century. In *Transformations in Exchange Relations and New Patterns of Ethnic and Religious Groups in Northern Pakistan*, ed. I. Stellrecht and hans-georg Bohle, pp. 7–92. Culture Area Karakorum Scientific Studies, 5. Cologne: Rüdiger Köppe Verlag.

_____, ed. 1999. *Karakorum-Hindukusch-Himalaya: Dynamics of Change.* Culture Area Karakorum Scientific Studies, 4. Cologne: Rüdiger Köppe Verlag.

Thomson, H.C. 1895. *The Chitral Campaign: a Narrative of Events in Chitral, Swat and Bajour.* London: W. Heinemann.

Wazir Ali Shah. 1974a. Invasions Preceding the Conquest of Nuristan. In Jettmar, K., and Edelberg L. (eds), *Cultures of the Hindu Kush*, pp. 24–25.

_____, 1974b. Notes on Kalash Folklore. In Jettmar, K., and L. Edelberg (eds) *Cultures of the Hindu Kush*, pp. 69–80.

_____, 1983. The Roshte, a Tribe of Chitral. In Snoy, P. (ed.), *Ethnologie und Geschichte*, pp. 639–48.

Wiqar Ali Shah, Sayed. 1997. Muslim Politics in the North-West Frontier Province, 1937–47. D.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford.

Zarin, M.M., & Ruth Laila Schmidt 1984. *Discussions with Hariq: Land Tenure and Transhumance in Indus Kohistan.* Berkeley: University of California, Center for South Asian Studies.

40

EVALUATION OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN CHITRAL

*Muhammad Shahab-ud-Din**

Till the beginning of the present century the ex-state of Chitral followed unwritten traditional customary law prevalent in the region since ancient times. As a princely state ruled by different dynasties of rulers for more than a thousand years, the rulers enjoyed the supreme authority to enforce any law according to their sweet will. With the coming of Islam into the region in medieval times, certain disputes concerning marriages, divorces, murders, and so forth were referred to *qazis*, who proceeded judgement according to the *Islamic sharia*. Disputes, especially marital ones, were also sometimes referred by the ruling prince to the *qazi* and were settled according to *sharia*.

It was in 1909, when the then ruler, His Highness Shuja-ul-Mulk, for the first time passed a legal document called *Dasturulajmal* to deal with murder cases on adultery. This written enactment was enforced in consultation with the British authorities and remained in effect till the merger of the state with other districts of Pakistan in 1969.

During the state regime, till 1953, the following procedure was followed regarding the settlement of different disputes, as mentioned in *Military Report and Gazetteer on Chitral* (1928).

In every big village his highness appointed a committee consisting four to ten leading members. This committee met once a week under the chairmanship of the *çarwēlu* or *hakim*, to dispose of petty cases, civil and criminal. These were only reported to the (Judicial) Council if a fine was levied.

> In important cases, land, thefts, or murder, the complainant first reports to the local official, and then proceeds to Chitral and petitions His Highness. The petition is forwarded to the (Judicial) Council for investigation and report. The council, on receipt of the plaint, may hear the parties and if no immediate settlement is possible the petition is forwarded to the head of the District. From here after investigation, the petition with both parties and the recommendations of the head of the District, comes back to the Council who again hears the parties and submits recommendations to His Highness, His Highness then passes orders.

The penalties were:

a. death by shooting,
b. imprisonment in the jail in Chitral Fort,
c. fines, and
d. confiscation of property.

Till 1953, some unconstitutional, non-humanitarian and ultra-Islamic provisions were also embodied in customary laws such as Hindal BaSu, that is, escheating of the property of a man

* Advocate, Buni, Chitral District.

having no male issue to the state and on the discretion of the ruler to dipose it off to the non-concerned, depriving other classes of heirs altogether. Moreover, some classes of Islamic provisions were enforced besides the customary laws, such as the Shariat Application (Amendment Act) 1952, Interim Constitution Act 1953, and the Inheritance Act 1953, passed by the Advisory Council (a sort of legislature), finally concurred with by his highness the *mehtar* of Chitral on 19 April 1954, and termed as Personal Law (Shariat Application Act) 1954. This Personal Law of 1954 gave the region a multiple legal system with a tiny institutional setup, renovated under the Interim Constitution Act 1953.

The Setup under the Personal Law of Chitral of 1954

The law provides as under:

Union Councils

The whole region was divided into six union councils. The union council had to decide petty cases on reference from *tehsildars*, on conciliatory basis. In case reconciliation failed, the council had to submit its recommendation to the *tehsildar* for decision.

Village *Qazi*

The village *qazis* were included in the judicial staff of the state, drawing their pay from the state treasury. Their function was to decide the cases according to the norms of the *sharia*, on reference from the *tehsildar*, deputy commissioner, or Judicial Council. There were *muftis* as a part of the judicial staff of the state to give opinion according to the *sharia* on matters when required.

Decisions of *qazis* could only be based on the Sunni school of thought, the majority sect. Therefore, the Ismailis, despite being Shias and comprising at least 40 per cent of the population, had to follow, in legal practices, the majority school of thought.

Tehsildar's Court

The *tehsildars* were vested with the judicial powers besides other powers on administrative and criminal side. *Tehsildars* could decide all cases except murder, dacoity, adultery, abduction, and could impose a fine to the tune of Rs 100 while on the civil side they could hear all civil cases to the value of Rs 2000. Appeals against their decision lay with the deputy commissioner.

DC's Court

The deputy commissioner (DC) was competent to hear all criminal cases except those reserved for the Judicial Council to dispose of. On the civil side the DC was empowered to decide a case up to the value of Rs 5000. Appeals against the order of the DC had to be lodged with the Judicial Council.

Judicial Council

It was the highest court of the state as far as judicial decisions were concerned. The members of the Judicial Council were appointed by the chief advisor/the *wazir-e-azam* for one year. All heinious criminal cases and all civil cases beyond the value of Rs 5000 were heard in the Judicial Council, the superior court, in its original criminal/civil jurisdiction. Though the Judicial Council of the state is deemed to be the Supreme Court of the time, it is important to note that, in the annals of the legal system, except in contempt cases, none of its decisions were final and executable unless approved by the chief advisor. The chief advisor, on the recommendation of the Judicial Council, could either approve the same or reject it, or give his own decision by setting aside the recommendation of the Judicial Council or refer it back to the Judicial Council for fresh trial. The Jirga Regulation Criminal/Civil Act 1975 was a bit of a prototype of the Judicial Council because, like those of the Judicial Council of that time, its recommendations had no value without the final verdict, which was to be given by the assistant commissioner with the powers of the DC.

Mizan-e-Sharia

This court of *sharia* consisted of three religious scholars appointed by the chief advisor for a tenure of six months. They drew their allowances from the state treasury. Important cases of *sharia* matters were referred to them by the chief advisor, with the consent of the parties. The verdict of the Mizan-e-Sharia was to be submitted before the chief advisor for approval, who could accept it or reject it or return it for retrial.

Chief Advisor's Court

Under this setup the powers of the ruler of the state as the final authority in judicial cases were vested in the chief advisor, whose order was appealable before the regent.

Regent's Court

The political agent of Malakand was vested with the power as the regent for Chitral. The political agent of Malakand had appellate jurisdiction in matters of the judiciary as regards Chitral, and could hear appeals against the decisions of the chief advisor, Chitral.

Shariat Order 1959

This order was promulgated by the chief advisor, Chitral. It provided that when a party to a case wanted the case to be decided in the light of *sharia* while the other party wanted it to be adjudicated under '*rewaj*,' the case was to be decided under *sharia*, on the condition that the party asking for *sharia* adjudication proves that it has been observing *sharia* in all its cases before *sharia* courts. The process of written enactments gave birth to the Procedural Rules, 1962. These rules were enforced by the chief advisor of Chitral on 25 August 1962. It was the first procedural codification. Till the promulgation of Regulation 1 of 1969, these Procedural Rules of 1962 were in practice.

Post-merger Legal Practices of Chitral (1969)

Legal practices in Chitral took a new turn in 1969. By Regulation 1 of 1969, the administration of Chitral State along with other ceded states, was taken away from the respective rulers and assumed by the Government of West Pakistan. In consequence of the dissolution of the province of West Pakistan, by President's Order No 1 of 1970, the territories of the ceded states including Chitral were annexed to the territorial/administrative jurisdiction of the province of the NWFP. By promulgation of Regulation 1 of 1971, by the governor of NWFP, a number of statutes were extended to Chitral District, including the Evidence Act, Civil Procedure Code (CPC), Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.), Pakistan Penal Code (PPC), and all other enactments of regular law. In 1973 a new constitution came into force in Pakistan. By Article 246 of the constitution of Pakistan 1973, the territories of the ceded states, including Chitral, were declared as Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA).

Under Article 247 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 the administration of the PATA, including Chitral, became the exclusive concern of the governor of NWFP and the president, unlike other territories of the NWFP, an evidently discriminatory provision of law created to deal with a people of a particular area differently from those of other areas of the same province governed by the same constitution.

Promulgation of PATA Regulation Criminal-Cum-Civil 1975

On 26 July 1975 with the approval of the president of Pakistan, the governor of NWFP under Article 247 of the constitution of Pakistan 1973 promulgated Regulation No 1 of 1975 termed as PATA Criminal Law 'Special Provision' Regulation of 1975, in respect of criminal justice in the PATA area and Chitral. The offences provided/embodied in the PPC were divided into two parts. The offences falling in Part One of the Schedule of Regulation 1 of 1975 became triable by the tribunal constituted by the DC while Part Two of the schedule could also be tried by the tribunal but with the consent of the parties.

The tribunal consisted of five persons, one of whom was to be a government official not below the rank of a *tehsildar*. The tribunal was just a recommending authority and could never award punishment. On the other hand, the DC was not bound to accept the verdict of the tribunal except where it unanimously or on a majority of four found an accused not guilty. But in this case too the DC was not bound to accept the recommendation if material irregularity and miscarriage of justice were apparent. The order of the DC or the assistant commissioner or extra assistant commissioner exercising the power of the DC was appealable before the commissioner and that of the commissioner could be revised by the provincial government/ home secretary as a revisional forum. As far the PATA Civil Procedure (Special Provision) Regulation No 2 of 1975 is concerned, the civil disputes were again divided into two categories. Part One of the said regulation related to the disputes, the value thereof not exceeding Rs 5000 were to be tried by a tribunal consisting of three members, one of them being a government official not below the rank of a *tehsildar,* while the two other members were to be chosen among the notables of the locality, keeping in view their social status. Cases under Part Two of Regulation 2 of 1975 were also referable to the tribunal by the DC with the consent of the parties to the case. The tribunal was just a recommending body. The DC was required to pass a decree in case of his agreement with a verdict of that tribunal and the reverse in the case of material irregularity or an occasion of miscarriage of justice. Appeals against the decree/order of the DC lay with the commissioner, and orders of the

commissioner could be revised by the provincial government/home secretary or revisional jurisdiction.

On 29 December 1976 the governor of NWFP with the approval of the president of Pakistan, promulgated Regulation 4 of 1976. This regulation further amended the provisions of regulation no 1 & 2 of 1975 by enlarging the jurisdiction of the tribunals, now called the *jirga*. The *jirga* was given exclusive jurisdiction in respect of all offences under the PPC except offenses against the state, armed forces, elections, coins, and stamps. Likewise the *jirga* could try all the cases of civil nature except those exempted under Part Two of the proceeding Regulation No 2 of 1975. Now even a *naib tehsildar* could preside over the *jirga*. Regulation No 1 of 1975 was further amended on 11 January 1978 to curtail the jurisdiction/ competency of the *jirga* in respect of offences of public tranquillity relating to contempt of lawful authority of public servants, false evidence, and public justice. The PATA regulations of 1975 criminal/civil with all amendments thereto, remained alive with their inherent ambiguities and unjustness till 13 February 1993. It is strange to note that for Chitral, the period from 1969 to 13 February 1993 has been an era of a multitude of laws, as there were customary laws, regular laws, *sharia* laws, and *jirga* laws, coupled with the functions of the Judicial Council established under the Interim Constitution Act of Chitral 1953. During such a short span of time no other land perhaps has seen such multifarious and numerous laws.

According to the legal history of Chitral from 1969 to 26 July 1975, the Malakand Division including Chitral District like all other areas under the same constitution enjoyed only one simple regular law for civil and criminal matters. But the Government of NWFP, under Article 247 of the constitution 1973, for reasons unknown, decided to amend this unified system of law and promulgated PATA regulation nos 1 and 2 of 1975, locally known as 'Black Law,' for the people of Malakand Division. The law remained in practice till 24 February 1990, when on a few constitutional petitions, the Peshawar High Court declared the PATA regulation nos 1 and 2 of 1975, with all the amended regulations embodied thereto, as unconstitutional and discriminatory in nature. On appeal against the judgement of the Peshawar High Court and the Human Rights Case No 50 of 1992, the Supreme Court of Pakistan, upholding the judgement of the lower court, declared the PATA regulations as invalid and discriminatory and hence against the constitution of Pakistan 1973. Thus dawned a new era of social justice in the region. The Pakistan Supreme Court judgement dated 13 February 1993 opened a new chapter in the annals of the legal history of Chitral (Malakand Division), resulting in the promulgation of the PATA (Nifaz-e-Nizam-e-Sharia) regulation 1994. The Nifaz-e-Nizam-e-Sharia Regulation No 2 of 1994 aims to provide an administration of justice in the division. This regulation is again a product of Article 247 of the constitution of 1973, because no law of the land is enforceable in the categorized region unless it is extended through a special notification by the governor of the province through the force of Article 247 of the constitution. By Regulation 2 of 1994, those laws which are in consonance with the injunctions of Islam or which are necessary for the proper enforcement of Nizam-e-Sharia but which have not so far been applied, are declared to be applicable to Malakand Division including Chitral. Besides, all other laws provided in the said regulation vide Schedule No 1 annexed thereto, in force in other areas of the province immediately before the promulgation of the said regulation are declared applicable to PATA. These enactments are twenty-three in number, with the CPC, Cr.P.C., and PPC coupled with the Qisas and Diat Ordinance inclusive with other Islamic provisions. Schedule No 2 of Regulation 2 of 1994 provides the designations of the judicial officers as *zilla qazis*, *a'la ilaqa qazis*, and *ilaqa qazis* for district and session judges, senior civil judges, civil judges/magistrates, respectively. Regulation No 2 of 1994 has declared void customs, usages and instruments corresponding to any law in force in this

area. For specified classes of cases the services of '*muavin qazi*' to assist the court of the *qazi* have been introduced. But the real function of the *muavin qazi* and sanction behind it under the regular law is shrouded in mystery.

Initially every case under this regulation is supposed to be referred to mediators for settlement. If the case is reconciled, the *qazi* is to approve of the agreement, or otherwise to proceed with the case. Another salient feature of Regulation 2 of 1994 is that all the proceedings are to be conducted in the national language, that is, Urdu.

Although all the provisions of the law consistent with Islamic injunctions and already in force in other parts of the province have been made applicable to the PATA, they are much more ambiguous in their present shape, having no procedural law of their own. The legislative assembly has nothing to do directly with the people of Malakand Division, as far as legislation is concerned, unless Article 247 of the constitution of 1973 is invoked. This is a big question mark and a discrimination against a certain class of citizens. Here equality in the eyes of law is denied and this contradicts Article 25 of the constitution of Pakistan 1973, which reads, 'All citizens are equal before law and are entitled to equal protection of Law.'

Yet Nifaz-e-Nizam-e-Sharia Regulation No 2 of 1994 seems subservient to procedural law laid down for the regular legal practice in effect since the colonial era, instead of having its own procedural law. Hence it does not meet all the requirements of a full-fledged law.

Now the question arises whether Regulation 2 of 1994 will suffice for all the times to come. Will it meet the ends of justice in the present multifarious society, which will in five years embrace the twenty-first century? The answer—naturally—is no.

Suggestions and Proposals

The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 should be implemented for all purposes and for all the citizens alike. This proposal requires an amendment in the constitution of 1973 to bring the citizens residing in Malakand Division at par with those living in other parts of the province. An independent judiciary is the need of the time. Oppression by the bureaucracy cannot be effaced or pacified unless the services of an independent judiciary is availed for the citizens and the functionaries. It would be only then be possible for all the people of Chitral to enjoy the benefits of a real judiciary. Unified laws for all the citizens of Pakistan under one and the same constitution should be introduced in the letter and spirit of the constitution, so as to provide justice, easy and accessible, quick in nature and procedure, because justice delayed is justice denied. During the whole span of time of the PATA regulation 1975 and subsequent amended regulations thereof, justice was and has been always denied due to the Machiavellian framework of the regulation of 1975. According to natural Justice, it is not sufficient to hold that justice is being done—it should be seen being done.

It is only unified laws for all, whether Islamic laws or regular laws, which can guarantee that justice is neither denied nor delayed, and, moreover, not simply being done but actually seen being done.

It is hoped that the above-mentioned proposals will be helpful for all citizens of Pakistan in general and for the citizens of Malakand Division (under Article 247 of the constitution of 1973) in particular to enjoy the blessings of a just and efficient judiciary in the years to come.

References

Dasturual γmal Chitral, 1909.
General Staff India. 1928. *Military Report and Gazeteer on Chitral.* Calcutta.
Interim Constitution Act Chitral 1953.
Mahmood, Shaukat. *Constitution of Pakistan 1973.*
PATA/*jirga* regulations 1 and 2 of 1975.
Personal Law (Shariat Application Act) Chitral 1954.
Peshawar High Court judgement dated 24 February 1990.
Procedural Rules Chitral 1962.
Pakistan Legal Decisions (Central Statutes) 1969.
Pakistan Legal Decisions (Central Statutes) 1970.
Pakistan Legal Decisions (NWFP Statute) 1971.
Pakistan Legal Decisions 1995 Supreme Court 281.
Shariat Application (Amendment) Act Chitral 1952.
Shariat Order (Chitral) 1959.

41

ADMINISTRATIVE EVOLUTION OF CHITRAL DISTRICT

*By Mohammad Yousaf**

General

Chitral, also known as Chetrar and KASHQAR, is the northernmost district of the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan. It enjoys a unique position in the region because of its location and potentials. The district is located in such a way that it either adjoins or is proximate to Afghanistan, the Central Asian Muslim states, the Northern Areas of Gilgit/ Baltistan, and China. No links can be established with these important neighbours without developing Chitral or without giving is dominated by due importance. Even though Chitral the Kho people, it also has a number of other linguistic groups including the Kalash and Pathans in different valleys of the district. These people have, generally, maintained the special characteristics of their culture and traditions.

Location

Chitral District is situated between 71 degrees, 22 minutes, and 74 degrees, 60 minutes, east longitudes, and between 35 degrees, 15 minutes, and 36 degrees, 50 minutes, north latitudes.

Boundaries

The boundaries of the district are as follows:

North: Afghanistan
West : Badakhshan and Nuristan provinces of Afghanistan
South: Dir District of Pakistan and Kunar province of Afghanistan
East : Ghizer District of the Northern Areas and Swat District of Pakistan

Physical Features

The approximate area of the district is 14,850 square kilometres with population of around 300,000.[1] Chitral District is a mountainous tract. The mountains are bare except for the lower part of the district and it is only in small patches at the bottom of the deep and narrow valleys that any cultivation is to be found. Altitude of the area ranges from 3500 feet in the extreme

* Deputy Commissioner, Chitral.

south in Arandu to 25,526 feet at Tirich Mir, the highest peak of the Hindu Kush Range. There are about 100 other peaks above 20,000 feet. The district is made up of several valleys, the most important and the largest of which is the main Chitral-Mastuj valley. It is 200 miles long stretching from Boroghil in the Pamirs to Arandu on the southern tip on Afghan border. The width is between one and ten miles. Other valleys of the same size are the Laspur, Mulikhow, Torkhow, Tirich, Owir, Golen, Lotkuh, Shishi, Urtsun, Ashret, and Damel valleys.

History

No authentic account of the history of Chitral State prior to the second century AD is available. From a Sanskrit rock inscription near Baranis it is believed that about the year 900 AD the inhabitants of the country were probably Buddhists. It is said that the area changed hands several times between the Kushan of Peshawar, Chinese, and the Iranians. It was initially inhabited by the Kalash, who were Buddhist or followed a religion similar to Buddhism. Alexander also passed through its southern tip while crossing into Northern India via east Afghanistan. Known as Little Kashgar, Chitral in the old days was on the trade route between China and western Asia. In the fourteenth century it was conquered by a Turkoman prince called Ra'is, who established the Ra'ise dynasty, which flourished for about 275 years. The Ra'isae subdued the remaining Kalash Kafir strongholds in southern Chitral and conquered the whole country stretching from Gilgit to Asmar. Then the Taimuris, descendants of Mirza Hussain of Hirat, overthrew the Ra'is ruler and established their rule. A branch called Khushwaqte ruled Gilgit while another called Katora ruled Chitral. From 1590 to 1969 Chitral was ruled by the Katore dynasty. Baba Ayub, a saint and Taimuri prince, came from Hirat during the reign of Shah Akbar Ra'is (1491–1520). It is said that Baba Ayub accompanied his *pir*, Shah Shams-ud-Din Tabreezi, a reputed Muslim scholar and saint, and settled in Upper Chitral as directed by his *murshid*. He eventually married the daughter of Shah Akbar Ra'is, got '*jagirs*' and landed properties at Kosht, Gohkir and Lone and died there. The great-grandson of Baba Ayub, namely Muhtaram Shah, called as Shah Kator, was the first Katore ruler who became a *mehtar* by defeating the last Ra'is ruler, Shah Mahmood. The state was annexed to Pakistan in 1947 and merged with the NWFP in 1969 and became a district.

State Administration

The state had a ruler called a *mehtar*, who was the final authority in all maters. Before 1953 the state was divided into six *ilaqas* (areas) under governors appointed by ruler. These were Drosh, Shoghor, Lotkuh, Mulikhow, Torkhow, and Mastuj. The other state officials were the *dewan begi*, *hakim*, *ṭarwēlu*, *atalique*, *chharbu*, *baramush*, and *asakāl*. There were also ministers, who tended to revenue matters.

Dewan begi: The official in charge of treasury and trade.

'*Hakim*,' '*ṭarwēlu*,' and *atalique* were equivalent titles. With the exception of three or four, the holders used to be from the Adamzada class. These officials held offices under the governors of the *ilaqas*. The *hakim* was the assistant of the governor and the *ṭarwēlu* performed the functions of the *hakim* in the villages, while the *atalique* was a high official with vast

powers. The *Chharbu* (the livestock-tax collector) and *baramush* were the subordinates of the *çarwēlu*.

The *asakāl* were the men in charge of the *mehtari* (royal) estates.

The offices were mostly hereditary. Some *dewan begi*, *çarwēlu*, *ataliques*, and *asakāl* were given lands, in addition to the grains which all received for their services. The office of the *wazir-e-azam* was introduced in 1936.

Reorganization

In the year 1953, His Highness Saif-ur-Rahman, in consultation with the central government of Pakistan, abolished the old system and introduced new setup of administration. The state became federated part of Pakistan and was included in Peshawar Division. Under the new system, the state was divided into two districts, that is, Chitral District and Mastuj District. Chitral District was subdivided into three *tehsils*, namely, Drosh, Chitral, and Lotkuh. Mastuj District was subdivided into Mastuj Tehsil, Torkhow Tehsil, and Mulikhow Tehsil. Deputy commissioners (DCs) were appointed for the districts and *tehsildars* for the *tehsils*.

In the centre there were eight secretaries of equal status in charge of different departments directly under the political agent in his capacity as *wazir-e-azam* (or chief advisor) of the state. The different secretaries were chief secretary or secretary to *wazir-e-azam* (incharge establishment), secretary education, planning, and development and forests, secretary *tamirat*, secretary trade, and secretary Judicial Council. There was one Assistant Secretary in the office of the chief secretary.

The political agent as *wazir-e-azam* of the state was chief executive authority.

There was a state police force, under a superintendent of police to assist the administration in the execution of its functions. There was a police station in each of the six *tehsils*.

Civil and Criminal Justice

For procedural purposes there were five sets of courts in the state invested with judicial powers:

a. The lowest court was that of the *naib tehsildar*. It could hear and decide a civil suit up to the value of Rs 100 and impose a fine up to Rs 20 in criminal cases. Appeals against any order lay with the *tehsildar*.
b. The second court in the state was that of the *tehsildar*. *Tehsildars* were invested with judicial powers in addition to their other duties. According to the Dasturul Amal, *tehsildars* could hear all criminal cases except those of murder, dacoity, and so on, which were reserved for the Judicial Council. In criminal cases, they could impose a fine up to the limit of Rs 100. They could hear and decide all civil suits up to the value of Rs 2000.
c. The third court in the state was the DC's court. DCs could hear original civil suits up to the value of Rs 5000. In criminal cases except those which were reserved for the Judicial Council they could impose a fine up to Rs 200 and could imprison offenders up to one month. In other cases which were reserved for the Judicial Council they could make a

preliminary inquiry and submit it to the Judicial Council for further disposal. All appeals against the decisions of *tehsildars* were heard and disposed of by the DCs.

d. The highest court in the state was the Judicial Council with the *wazir-e-azam* at its head. The order of the Judicial Council was not final and could not be implemented until it was submitted to and approved by the *wazir-e-azam. Wazir-e-azams* could approve or reject the verdict and give their own decision or send it back to the council for a fresh trial, if it seemed to them that there had been some lacking in the proceedings or in the verdict. The Judicial Council decided criminal cases of important nature, that is, murder, dacoity, adultery, abduction, and so forth in its original jurisdiction and recommended punishment. The council could hear civil suits above the value of Rs 5000. It heard appeals against the decisions and orders of the DC. The members of the Judicial Council were nominated by the wazir-e-azam on the approval of the regent, for a period of one year, from among the elders of different tribes, one each from each *tehsil.*

   Besides these courts, there was one Mizan-e-Sharia in Chitral and *qazis'* courts in the villages. These courts only heard and determined cases and issues which were referred to them by the above-mentioned courts. Their decisions were subject to the approval of the referring authority. The union councils also assisted the *tehsildar* in the preliminary inquiries and investigation.

e. The highest court of appeal in the case of Chitral State was the Court of the Commissioner, who was also the regent of Chitral State. This court only heard appeals against the decisions of the political agent and *wazir-e-azam*, Chitral.

Cases in the state were decided according to the unwritten customs of the state and according to the general principles of justice. However, there were some standing orders, procedural rules, and precedents which were followed by the courts. There was no court-fee system in the state.

Land Revenue

There were no records of ownership rights, and no settlement has been done. The land revenue was recovered in kind and was one-tenth of the produce called '*ushur.*' The *ushur* was charged from all the lands without exception. It was collected through contractors.

Present Administrative Setup

Chitral State was merged as district in 1969 and since then the administrative setup in force in other parts of the country has been introduced in the area. Presently Chitral District is part of Malakand Division of the NWFP of Pakistan. It consists of two subdivisions, viz., Chitral and Mastuj. The DC is assisted by an assistant commissioner in each subdivision. Two extra assistant commissioners have been authorized in each subdivision. Each subdivision is further divided into *tehsils*, and each *tehsil* is headed by a *naib tehsildar.* Chitral subdivision has Arandu, Drosh, Chitral, and Lotkuh *tehsils*, whereas Mastuj contains Torkhow, Mulikhow, and Mastuj *tehsils.* The *tehsildars* and *naib tehsildars* look after revenue matters and perform other miscellaneous administrative functions.

In order to maintain law and order in the district, a police force headed by the superintendent of police is maintained in various police stations.

The Border Police under the DC is basically meant for guarding important passes leading to Afghanistan and imposing anti-smuggling duties. It is a unique feature of this district. Besides this, the Chitral Scouts are also stationed at important places. Whereas they guard the international borders, they can also be called to the aid of civil power by the administration.

PATA Regulation

The Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) regulation 1975 vested all powers, both criminal and civil in the DC, who could delegate these powers to assistant commissioners and extra assistant commissioners. *Tehsildars* and *naib tehsildars* were appointed as *jirga* presidents with two members nominated by the parties subject to approval of referring authority. This regulation was declared null and void in February 1994 under an order of the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

Judiciary

A Sharia Ordinance has recently been promulgated in Malakand Division including Chitral. In pursuance of this ordinance, district *qazis* and *ilaqa Qazis* have been appointed, who adjudicate upon both civil and criminal matters. The prominent *'ulamā* and scholars assist *qazi* courts in the capacity of *'muavineen'*.

A Look into the Future

Chitral is a developing district and development efforts are underway by various departments of the government and non-government agencies. The important projects include an all-weather passage across Loari, supply of electricity to Chitral from the National Grid System, widening and black topping of the Chitral-Buni Road under the Chitral Area Development Project (CADP), Kalash Valley Development Project, construction of bridges at Ashret Nallah and over Yarkhun River near Mastuj, and construction of the Chitral Town Bypass and Reshun Hydel Power Station. The Aga Khan Rural Development Network is also undertaking development activities through community participation. The government is making all-out efforts to bring this district at par with the developed areas of the NWFP.

Appendix I

Chitral through History at a Glance

i.	First Phase	:	The cave age
ii.	Second Phase	:	Persian rule, 5th century BC (Dara Khushtana of Iran)
iii.	Third Phase	:	Chinese period Ist century BC
iv.	Fourth Phase	:	The Buddhist era, 2nd century AD (Kanishka)
v.	Fifth Phase	:	Chinese period, 7th century.
vi.	Sixth Phase	:	Bahman-e-Kohistani, Chinese ruler, 7th century
vii.	Seventh Phase	:	Under Islamic influence (185 Hijra)
viii.	Eighth Phase	:	The rule of Sumalik (Kalash era).
ix.	Ra'ise Rule		
	Shah Nadir Ra'is:		1320–41, Founder of the Ra'is dynasty
	Jan Ra'is,	:	1341 to 1356
	Khan Rs'is	:	1356 to 1420
	Shah Karam Rs'is	:	1420 to 1458
	Shah Nizam Rs'is	:	1458 to 1491
	Shah Akbar Rs'is	:	1491 to 1520
	Shah Tahir Rs'is	:	1520 to 1531
	Shah Nasir Rs'is	:	1531 to 1574
	Shah Mahmood Rs'is	:	1574 to 1595

x. The Rule of the Taimuris in Chitral

Muhtaram Shah I (Kator)	:	1590 to 1630
Sangin Ali II, son of Muhtaram Shah I		
Muhammad Ghulam, son of Muhtaram Shah I		
Shah Mohammad Shafi, son of Sangin Ali II	:	1660 to 1717
Shah Faramurd son of Shah Khushwaqt	:	1717 to 1724
Shah Afzal I	:	1724 to 1754
Shah Fazil, Son of Muhtaram Shah I	:	1754 to 1760
Shah Nawaz Khan	:	1760 to 1761
Shah Khairullah, son of Asmatullah son of Khushwaqt	:	1761 to 1782
Shah Nawaz Khan	:	1782 to 1788
Shah Muhtaram Shah II (The Junior Kator)	:	1788 to 1838
Shah Afzal II	:	1838 to 1854
Muhtaram Shah III	:	1854 to 1856
Aman-ul-Mulk, son of Shah Fazal II	:	1856 to 1892
Sher Afzal Khan, son of Shah Afzal II	:	8 Nov. to 2 Dec. 1892
Sardar Nizam-ul-Mulk, son of Shah Aman-ul-Mulk	:	2 Jun 1895 to 23 Dec. 1895
Sir Mohammad Shuja-ul-Mulk	:	2 Sep. 1895 to 14 Aug. 1936
Sir Mohammad Nasir-ul-Mulk	:	14 Aug. 1936 to 29 July 1943
Mohammad Muzaffar-ul-Mulk	:	29 Jul. 1943 to Jan. 1949
Saifa-ur-Rehman	:	7 Jan. 1949 to 12 Oct. 1954
Saif-ul-Mulk Nasir	:	14 Oct. 1954 to 28 Aug. 1969. State was merged as district on 29 Aug. 1969

Appendix II

Genealogy of the Katore of Chitral



Appendix III

Government Functionaries Assistant Political Agents Chitral Sub-agency

S No	Name	From	To
1.	Lt B.E.M. Gurdon (DSO), IA	1895	1902
2.	Capt. R.L. Kennion, IA	1902	1904
3.	Capt. E. Knollys, IA	1904	1906
4.	Capt. Smith, IA	1907	1909
5.	Capt. R.L. Lyall, IA	1909	1911
6.	Capt. M.E. Rae, IA	1912	1913
7.	Capt. D.G. Wilson, PA	1913	1914
8.	Maj. D.L.R. Lorimer, IA	1914	1916
9.	Capt. N.E. Reilly, IA	1916	1980
10.	Capt. A.E.B. Persons (OBE)	1980	1921
11.	Capt. W.R. May, IA	1921	1922
12.	Capt. I.T. Bowers, IA	1922	1924
13.	Capt. C.E.U. Bremner (MC), IA	1924	1925
14.	A.J. Mopkinson, ICS	1925	1926
15.	Capt. J.R.L. Bransman, IA	1926	1927
16.	Capt. E.M. Cobb, IA	1927	1929
17.	Capt. B. Wods Ballard, IA	1929	1930
18.	Capt W.V. Grapp, IA	1930	1931
19.	Capt. M.D. Rusmton, IA	1931	1932
20.	Lt J.O.S. Donald, IA	1932	1933
21.	Capt. A. Napier, IA	1933	1936
22.	I.D. Scott	1936	1937
23.	R.S.T. John	1937	1938
24.	Capt. A.C.K. Mannsell, IA	1938	1939
25.	Capt. J.M.R. Edleman, IA	19/4/1939	27/5/1939
26.	Lt Allamdad Khan,	27/5/1939	19/12/1939
27.	R.A.D. Lowis (MBE). IA	19/12/1939	4/10/1941
28.	Capt. D.G. Thornburgm, IA	4/10/1941	3/101944
29.	Maj. M.W.H. White (MBE)	4/101944	18/9/1946
30.	F.J.M. Dent, ICE	19/9/1946	3/7/1947
31.	K.S. Arbab Mohammad Abbas	4/7/1947	15/9/1947
32.	Maj. R.R. Bambur, IA	16/9/1947	8/11/1947
33.	A.L. Ebanronif	9/11/1947	23/11/1947
34.	K.B. Faqir Faizullah	24/11/1947	4/11/1948
35.	Maj. Fosket, IA	5/11/1948	16/1/1949
36.	Maj. Oldrini, IA	17/1/1949	16/5/1949
37.	Pir Ahsanuddin	17/5/1949	19/10/1949
38.	Rahimdad Khan	20/10/1949	15/5/1950
Additional Political Agents Chitral Sub-agency			
39.	Mir Ajam Khan, PCS	16/5/1950	4/11/1952
40.	Izzat Bakhsh Awan, PCS	5/11/1952	6/12/1953
41.	Rana Farzand Ali, PCS	7/12/1953	10/10/1954
42.	Sardar Behram Khan, PCS	11/10/1954	12/1/1957
43.	Nawabzada Ayub Khan, PCS	23/1/1957	28/12/1958
44.	Syed Imran Shah, CSP	29/12/1958	12/5/1960
45.	Nasru Minallah, CSP	13/5/1960	28/3/1961
46.	Capt. Ashraf Hussain, PCS	29/3/1961	31/8/1962
47.	Kanwar Idris, CSP	1/9/1962	31/8/1963
48.	Sardar Hizbullah Khan, PCS	18/8/1963	17/8//1965
49.	Mohammad Tariq Khan, CSP	14/2/1965	3/9/1965
50.	Saadat Hussain, CSP	5/9/1965	20/3/1966

Political Agents Chitral Agency			
51.	Saadat Hussain, CSP	21/3/1966	16/8/1966
52.	Capt. Arshad Farid, CSP	20/8/1966	5/2/1967
53.	Capt. Abdul Qayum, CSP	6/2/1967	11/9/1968
54.	Capt. Sibgahtullah, PCS	16/9/1968	19/3/1969
55.	Jahanzeb Khan, PCS	20/3/1969	2/6/1969
56.	Iftikharuddin, CSP	3/6/1969	28/8/1969
Deputy Commissioner's District Chitral			
57.	Iftikharuddin, CSP	29/8/1969	4/10/1969
58.	Capt. A.R. Siddiqi, CSP	5/10/1969	8/7/1970
59.	Mohammad Gul Khan, PCS	15/7/1970	21/10/1971
60.	Hamid Ahmad Qureshi, CSP	25/10/1971	18/1/1973
61.	Gul Khan	2/1/1973	31/2/1974
62.	Rustan Shah Mohmand	1/2/1974	2/10/1975
63.	Qadar Bakhsh Javed	3/10/1975	18/8/1977
64.	Mohammad Nawab Khan Orakzai	19/8/1977	20/11/1980
65.	M. Shakil Durrani	21/11/1980	3/8/1982
66.	Taj Mohammad Khan	4/8/1982	7/7/1983
67.	Ghulam Nabi Khan	8/7/1983	24/3/1984
68.	Mohammad Ihtesham Khan	25/3/1984	25/8/1985
69.	Sharif Ahmad	26/8/1985	13/2/1988
70.	Qazi Mohammad Yousuf	14/2/1988	8/7/1988
71.	Javed Majid	9/7/1988	19/9/1989
72.	Ishtiak Ahmad Khan	20/9/1989	31/1/1992
73.	Mohammad Shehzad Arbab	1/2/1992	27/2/1993
74.	Sahibzada Mohammad Anis (dual charge)	28/2/1993	14/6/1993
75.	Teepu Muhabat Khan	15/6/1993	12/8/1993
76.	Mohammad Yousaf	13/8/1993	

NOTE

1. According to the population census of Pakistan, the population of Chitral District is 319,000 (ed.).